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The thesis examines the transition from post-revolutionary Soviet culture (1917-1928) to the 
culture of the Stalinsist period, arguing for a crucial transformation in the status of agency, 
subjecthood, and authorship between these two historical and cultural frames.  I contend that 
Soviet culture has much to tell us about that momentous event of the twentieth century, the 
“death of author” or, more broadly, the “death of the subject”—an event that Western thought 
has illuminated from various perspectives (philosophy, psychoanalysis, linguistics, structural 
anthropology, political economy, etc.). The analysis proceeds from a consideration of prominent 
literary and aesthetic theories of the 1910s and 1920s—Formalism, the sociological criticism of 
the “Pereverzev school,” the artistic platforms of left avant-garde, the ideological positions of 
RAPP, etc.—in an attempt to present these often divergent currents of thought and praxis as 
homologous, as participating in the same “act”: the cultural act of modernism. Characteristic of 
this act, I argue, is the attempt to transcend the dimension of the individual subjective and, in this 
very transcendence, institute an impersonal, suprahuman objectivity.  The symbolic price for 
reaching this state of superhuman truth is the “instrumentalization” of human agency.  The 
concrete result of the modernist act is Stalinism: a world in which the very production of truth 
and reality is coterminous with the ritualistic surrender of agency and autonomy.  In the thesis’ 
second part, I discuss socialist realism as a concrete instance of this surrender, seeking to 
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demonstrate to what extent the position of the so-called “representing subject” in socialist 
realism is antinomic with the notion of authorship. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE DEATHS OF THE AUTHOR 
 
 
 
Farmhand 
Who are you? 
Whose are you? 
Things 
What do you mean, “whose”? 
Farmhand 
I mean, what is your master’s name? 
Things 
We have no master. 
We belong to no one. 
 
(Mayakovsky, Mystery-Bouffe) 
 
Something happened to the author in the century just past, something bad.  It was even 
announced that the author is no more—a startling announcement.  But what does it mean?   What 
exactly happened?  
Any investigation into this alleged fatality must begin, I believe, with two “happenings” 
of the early twentieth century, happenings that took place in two patently incongruous 
dimensions.  The first of them is the dislocation between sign and referent that has severed, for 
an indefinite time, the reality of the text from any reality “out there.”  The other is the 
emergence, in a Europe still committed to the values of the Enlightenment, of oppressive 
political regimes that conscripted artistic creativity for the production of prescribed realities.  The 
first of these happenings precipitated what might be called the “theoretical death of the author”—
the moment in European thought when the author, as the last and most tenacious of the text’s 
referents, was demoted to the level of the signified, alongside the text’s other fictions.  The 
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second happening amounted to a second death, this one palpably more real, if less universal, than 
the first: a death in history, which occurs when a political power wrestles authorship away from 
the individual, thus making him/her into a mere craftsman of the mandated text.   
These two deaths appear, at first, to be ontologically disparate.  One is a concrete demise, 
occurring in very specific historical circumstances, in which historically concrete human beings 
submit to very real pressures, surrender precious “artistic freedoms,” renounce, recant, resign, 
rewrite.  The other is an abstract death occurring “only in theory,” as if only in effigy, for it 
concerns not the actual person of the author, but only his immaterial ghost within the text.  In the 
most famous obituary to the author, Roland Barthes’s article of 1968, the exorcism of this ghost 
is accompanied by a distinct feeling of relief: rescued from what has never been more than a 
cultural construct, a historically contingent apparition, the text is finally left to itself and to the 
internal freedom it has always potentially possessed.  There is certainly a sense in which this 
second death is also a historically specific event.  How can it not be, if the birth and precarious 
existence of the author belong to a moment in history?1  Yet that which is set free—the true life 
of the text in the revel of the “writerly” and the true calling of the reader in the infinite 
disentangling of textual traces—all this is trans-historical (“No doubt it has always been that 
way” [Barthes 119]).    
How can this theoretical “destruction of the Author” (Barthes 120), which sees itself as a 
revolutionary act, an act of liberation,2 be analogous to that other destruction, which authorship 
                                                 
1 “The author is a modern figure, a product of our society insofar as, emerging from the Middle Ages and English 
empiricism, French rationalism and the personal faith of the reformation, it discovered the prestige of the individual, 
of, as it is more nobly put, the ‘human person’” (Barthes 119). 
 
2 “In […] this way literature (it would be better from now on to say writing), by refusing to assign a ‘secret,’ an 
ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity, an 
activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases—
reason, science, law” (Barthes 122; emphasis added). 
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suffers at the hands of totalitarian power?  One is a cause for celebration; the other elicits morose 
historical and ethical reflections.  In one instance, someone jubilates at the removal of an 
obstacle that bars supra-individual forces and energies—the forces and energies of discourse—
from taking legitimate possession of the text.  In the other, someone bewails the removal of a 
piece of human interiority that bars the supra-individual “truths” of totalitarian discourse from 
writing themselves directly into the artistic text.   
Despite this difference in mood and the apparent heterogeneity of what is being buried—
in one case, a cultural apparition, in the other, artistic individuality and freedom—how can we 
not suspect that these two funerals take place on the same ground, that they are made possible by 
the same positivity?   This common ground opens with the realization that some significant part 
the individual, or, “as it is more nobly put, the ‘human person’” (Barthes 119), perhaps precisely 
the part that defines him as a human person and individual, constitutes an obstacle.  Then, the 
demand is not long in coming for the author to disappear into “a prerequisite impersonality, to 
reach that point where only language acts, ‘performs,’ and not ‘me’” (Barthes 119).  If, in this 
dictum of Barthes’s, we decide to replace “language” with, say, “the truth of socialist 
construction,” we will find ourselves squarely within the critical discourse of socialist realism 
and the imperative of impersonality peculiar to it.  There, too, some supra-individual reality 
seeks realization in the artistic text, eliding the human subject on its way. 
The fate of the author is, unquestionably, related to the broader question of the subject 
and his/her fate in the twentieth century.  The same ambiguity between thought and history 
obtains for the latter as it does for the former.  It is none other than twentieth-century thought 
that has shown most decisively the “decentered,” insubstantial nature of the human subject.  But 
it is also the history of the twentieth century that has derided most violently that same subject’s 
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assumed mastery of experience.  It is between these two facts that the ambiguity opens: does the 
“subversion of the subject” (Jacques Lacan) have the status of truth, or does it have the character 
of an event?   The intellectual critique of the subject—in areas as diverse as psychology, literary 
and political theory, economics, linguistics, and anthropology—has unfolded together with, and 
yet somehow outside, the traumatic histories that have actively erased the subject’s inherited 
dignity.  From the point of view of philosophical/theoretical thought, it has seemed that history 
can do no more than furnish a violent proof of what knowledge has already discovered to be the 
primordial insubstantiality of the individual self.  Yet, by simply turning around and taking the 
viewpoint of history, we would be justified in asking why the radical critique of the subject took 
place at the time that it did, what made it possible in that particular moment?   
Do we have to side with either the historicizing of thought or the hermeneutics of history?  
Do we have to decide whether history has the power of relativizing the achievements of 
knowledge, or whether knowledge has the right to treat history as a testing ground for its truths?  
Is it a matter of choosing allegiances?  I think not.   
The subversion of the subject and the death of the author are not merely the conquests of 
some happy cognitive awakening, after centuries of pre-critical slumber, which have allowed the 
subject to enjoy undeserved cynosure.  But neither are they merely symptoms of concrete 
historical traumas, after which and because of which whatever in the human subject had referred 
to autonomy and exclusivity can no longer be sustained in critical thought.  It is much more 
likely that this history and this knowledge are engendered in some third place that subtends them 
both.  Between the accident of history and the generality of theoretical thought there is perhaps a 
deeper reality, in relation to which history would stand as less “accidental” and knowledge—as 
less universal.   
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We should inquire about this common ground, equally beyond the actuality of history and 
the ideality of thought, beyond history which carries thought as one happening among others and 
thought which “collects” history within the timeless stretch of its cognitions.  We must learn to 
inhabit that space where knowledge, while abiding in its historicity, does not relinquish its claim 
to truth, and where history, while coextensive with knowledge, does not, for that, acquire 
necessity and universality.   
Early Soviet culture (1910s-1930s) allows us to follow the destinies of authorship in both 
these dimensions.  The post-revolutionary decade (1918-1928) abounded in artistic doctrines and 
theories of creativity that challenged from a variety of perspectives the authority and autonomy 
of the author.  The next decade saw the institution of socialist realism and the thoroughgoing 
regimentation of cultural production in all spheres within the newly-created artistic unions, 
directly sponsored and controlled by the state.  Within these institutional confines, there were 
people who casually called themselves “authors” (it is well-known that socialist realism proudly 
proclaimed the unprecedented freedom of individual creativity in the land of the Soviets), but 
their authorship was only nominal.3  The connection between the two cultural frames is not 
simply causal.  It is difficult to hold that socialist realism “implemented” the theoretical ideas of 
the 1920s.  Speaking against such an assertion is the violence with which Stalinist culture 
rejected all the theoretical heritage of the previous period.   
And yet, a connection exists.  The two deaths of the author are continuous.  They are 
really not two happenings, but one.  The goal of the present study is to both follow and grasp 
                                                 
3 In a recent monograph, Aesthetics of Alienation, Evgenii Dobrenko has connected these two orders of events by a 
straightforward line of socio-cultural genesis.  According to him, the impersonal and collectivist visions of artistic 
creation expressed, ideationally, the advent of a new class of cultural producers onto the post-revolutionary scene: 
the lumpen-proletarians.  In the struggle for hegemony, their inability to measure up to the established standards of 
artistic quality leads them to revolt against the haloed institution of individual authorship.  As the lumpen-
proletarians emerge victorious from the cultural struggles of the 1920s, socialist realism becomes the institutional 
and ideological framework within which the willful surrender of personal initiative, originality, and identity are 
normativized. 
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conceptually this continuity.  In its general movement, the exposition will follow what might be 
called the “road to socialist realism.”  The starting point will be the late 1910s-early1920s, a time 
when socialist realism did not yet exist as a formulated doctrine, institutional framework, or as a 
conscious praxis.  What existed was the young Soviet state and, within it—a virulent cultural 
debate on the nature of art, its role in history and society, and, most importantly, its character and 
role in the history that had just begun and the society that was already in the making.  This step 
back in time from the formal birth of socialist realism (1934)—a rather standard procedure in 
Sovietology—does not seek to define some ideal genesis.  Something that is not ideal in nature 
cannot have an ideal genesis.  Socialist realism is not to be grasped at the convergence of ideas 
on the nature and function of artistic representation, ideas of more or less distant historical 
provenance, which somehow congealed into a unified doctrine in the first half of the 1930s.  As 
soon as such an ideal origin is posited, we are forced to remember that, in its nativity, Stalinist 
socialist realism is as much an aesthetic program as it is a political act that sought to regulate the 
cultural sphere of its time; it is as much an arrangement of representations in accordance with 
ideal aesthetic prescripts, as it is an arrangement of people and their activities.  Some critics have 
gone as far as to claim that socialist realism is much less effective in the stipulation of concrete 
poetics, than it is in the ordering of psychologies as anterior to the artistic text,4 that its true field 
of action and authority is less the surface of representation, than it is the reality of human 
attitudes, wills, and behaviors.5   
                                                 
4 Taking a clue from Stalin’s famous description of writers as “engineers of human souls,” Evgenii Dobrenko has 
argued repeatedly (Formovka; Metafora) that the first object of this engineering is the Soviet writer him-/herself. 
 
5  In the insightful essay, “Censorhsip as the Triumph of Life,” Mikhail Iampol'skii addresses the “prophylactic” 
function of Stalinist criticism.  He observes that censoring interventions in Stalinist culture are often directed beyond 
the text, seeking to “remedy” the very life of the artist.   The censored text is taken as a symptom of a vital 
malfunction in the organism of the author-patient, for which criticism must supply appropriate treatment.  
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Whether we accept such a position or not, we find ourselves once again in that—by now 
familiar—space between two orders of “happening”: one apparently “ideal”—the movement 
interior to representation—the other apparently “real,” inasmuch as it concerns real people, 
institutions, dependencies, pressures, etc.  To confine the culture of socialist realism to only one 
of these movements, or even to give one of them priority, seems inappropriate.  As impossible as 
it is to explain the genesis of socialist realism with reference to antecedent thought (that of Marx 
and Engels, Lenin and Stalin, Chernishevskii and Dobroliubov, Pisarev and Plekhanov, or 
Gor'kii and Voronskii), it is equally impossible to situate this genesis squarely within the 
political, to find it solely in what Foucault would call the “technologies of power,” and consider 
the artistic texts of Stalinist culture as mere byproducts of these technologies. 
Socialist realism was founded in 1934.  This is perhaps the best way to put it, inasmuch 
as “founded” suggests the prior existence of a ground on which socialist realism—in its double 
nature as an artistic method and political institution—could rest.  In 1934 this ground was 
already there, it was configured.  If I return to an earlier point in time, it is in order both to 
demonstrate precisely this fact—that the ground was there, that it preexisted the formal birth of 
socialist realism—as well as to map out its landscape.    
Part I offers an analytical survey of some of the most prominent artistic and theoretical 
platforms of the post-revolutionary decade.  These include (in the order of presentation): the 
theories of the Formalists, the sociological method of Valerian Pereverzev and his followers, the 
“science of organization” (“tektology”) expounded by Aleksandr Bogdanov, the constructivist 
movement, and the ideology of the “Onguardists.”  The analysis of these discourses does not aim 
at capturing some agreement, or even vague similarity, on the level of stated positions.  In those 
years the allegiances were few and far between, the antagonisms and collisions—almost a matter 
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of good tone.6  Yet beneath the sometimes violent discords between various artistic 
organizations, academic groupings, and ideological parties, there persisted one secret and 
stubborn life common to them all.  It animated the thought of the Formalists as well as that of 
their Marxist critics, the aspirations of the neo-Futurists, as well as the political maneuverings of 
their sworn enemies from RAPP.  This was not the life of thought, not the stirring of some 
essential idea, which the opponents, in the heat of their dispute, did not recognize as common.  It 
was the life of the object in general, the existence of “this,” before “this” became concretized as 
this or that, before it was apprehended as “form,” “content,” “product,” “word,” “consciousness,” 
“history,” etc.  In 1927 Vladimir Mayakovsky wrote: 
The person who produced “this” was called an “author”; authors were divided 
into poets and prosaists, the remaining people were readers, and an author was 
linked to a reader by means of a book. Readers paid money for books.  
In addition, there were those who revolved around books, juggled them, or 
didn't let them go, or drove up the price of a book—this was criticism. 
The Revolution upset this quite simple literary system. 
Prose was destroyed because of the absence of time for writing and reading, 
because of a skepticism toward fictional events, and because of the pallor of these 
fictions as compared to life.  There appeared poems which no one printed because 
there was no paper, no one had money for books, but books were sometimes 
printed on money which had gone out of use.  The glory of writing authors was 
replaced by the glory of nameless letters and documents […]. (“Broadening” 260) 
                                                 
6 The following humorous observation made by Maksim Gor'kii captures the atmosphere of that period: “If A 
belongs to a group B, then all other letters of the alphabet are for him either inimical or nonexistent.” (qtd. 
Dobrenko, Formovka 430).   
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It is difficult to agree with Mayakovsky that the profound transformation of which he speaks 
should be traced to the socio-economic effects of the October Revolution as to its primary 
determinant.  But I am ready to take a clue from his words that in the 1920s something had 
already changed in the being of “this,” where “this” is not just “literature” or “text,” but is any 
“this” over which the human subject had stood, previously, in the role of a sovereign originator.   
I would like to show how this role is being contested, as the various cultural discourses 
register, each in its own way and from its own particular position, the insufficiency of the 
individual subjective.  I will not be writing the history of organizations and movements, but an 
abbreviated biography of the otherness—“this”—which both knowledge and praxis take as their 
field.  In this field, which is, most broadly, the arena of the cultural act, I hope to delineate 
something like a common “plot,” a shared order of “happening,” in which most heterogeneous 
objects participate.  I will claim that it is precisely in this general order of happening—distinct 
both from purely cognitive achievements or the factuality of historical occurrence—that the 
(single) death of the author should be located.  
The insubstantiality or insufficiency of the subjective—this essentially negative fact—has 
a positive, enabling aspect.  The displacing of the subject from the center-stage of creation 
instantiates a new kind of truth.  This happens in a single motion, single act: as individual 
consciousness and will are found incapable of accounting for the essential characteristics of 
“this,” there opens, beyond their limits, the territory of the “objective.”  Its shapes are different: 
for the Formalists, objective are the workings of the “constructive principle” (against the 
traditional emphasis on intended meaning and expression); for the Pereverzevians, objective are 
the workings of the “socio-psychological complex” (once again, versus the author’s intent and 
explicit semantics of the text); for the constructivists, objective are the dynamics of social 
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movement in its various instances (in opposition to the movement of individual invention); for 
the Onguardists, objective is the “knowing”  of class ideology (rather than the unmediated 
knowing by which the individual proletarian consciousness apprehends the world).   
And yet, there is something common about these various objectivities.  They share the 
character of systematic totality that works autonomously, which here means: irrespective of 
whether it is apprehended in individual consciousness or not.  They are figurations of an auto-
matic agency to which the agency of the individual must submit willfully, since it is always-
already effectively determined/eclipsed by it.  On the broadest plane of happening—the stage of 
historical events—the very emergence and constitution of the Soviet state were seen as the 
manifestation of a super-personal truth about history and society—a truth that was working its 
way from out of latency with the implacable reliability of a pre-programmed device.  The 
revolutionary act, then, even when it is most violent, can be seen as being, in fact, rather 
obedient.  It is an act in which the individual adjoins his agency to the agency by which history is 
performing its own analysis.  (Oximoronically, in “losing himself,” “forgetting himself,” the 
subject “realizes himself,” for his newly-discovered reality is precisely this: that he be 
instrumental to that imperious agency.) 
A variation of it, the creative act is similarly disciplined.  In it and through it, the latent 
essential nature of the object is demonstrated.  In the practice of productionism, as one instance, 
the essential nature of the thing is determined by the range of its potential social appropriations.  
Hence, the creation of the thing is nothing other than the practical bringing-out of what it 
actually (if covertly) is.  In this sense, to produce means to “lay bare,” to analyze through 
making.  The statement can be applied with equal validity to the Futurist making of poetic texts, 
the remaking of the visual world in much of the experimental cinema of the period, the anti-
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literary practice of “reportage,” the anti-illusionist theatrical productions of Vsevolod 
Meyerhold, etc.  All these modernist projects seek to effect the disappearance of the (artistic) 
subject not only theoretically, but also “practically” (here and later, I will leave without 
consideration the question of whether their actual productions live up to the blueprint of the 
project).  This is the real object of their making, the actuality of what they “produce.” 
With the doctrines of the Onguardists (Chapter Five) we find ourselves on the very 
territory where socialist realism will be first institutionalized: the making of the Soviet writer.  In 
their cultural project, implemented within the institutional framework of RAPP, the writer serves 
as the object or “material” that must be methodically analyzed back to an essential nature.  This 
essential nature is “true class consciousness,” or “class ideology,” as distinct from spontaneous 
class being and its immediate reflection into consciousness.  From the latter, the subject must be 
“conveyed” to the former.  The ideological work of the Onguardists was, in this sense, the mere 
implementation of an objective “principle” or “tendency.”  Like the different constructivist 
“makings,” the making of the writer is the facilitation, letting-be, in the present, of a hitherto 
concealed objectivity: the objectivity (or, simply, truth) of class subjecthood.   
Summarily, two things take place in the plot we follow: 1) something true is brought out 
of concealment and instantiated (as a now-manifest “construction,” “organization,” “operative 
principle,” “tectonic,” “texture,” etc.); 2) in the same motion, the individual expressive “self” 
fades away, dissolved into the impersonal mechanism of a cognitive or practical “operation” 
(“method”), accessory and transparent to the essential operations of history, society, language, 
consciousness, etc.  It is important to understand that these two things are interrelated, that they 
indeed belong to a single order of happening.  In other words, the constitution of otherness 
(“this”), its production in the dimension of the “objective,” is constitutively predicated on the 
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self-induced fading of the “I,” its relegation to the impersonal.  This is one event.  And yet, as 
Hegel would say, this realization is “for us” (the observers of the cultural scene); it is only 
implicit in the otherness we are observing.  When it becomes explicit, or “for itself,” we find 
ourselves crossing over from the 1920s into the 1930s, from post-revolutionary into Stalinist 
culture, from the first to the second part of this study. 
Chapter One of Part II elaborates the theoretical consequences of the (extended) 
happening observed previously.  The argument aims at a working notion of the cultural act, 
which would encompass two correlative aspects: the motion by which something comes to count 
as true or real, and the motion by which someone “finds one’s place” and, thereby, also “counts.”  
The curious possibility mentioned, parenthetically, a couple of pages back—that the individual 
could “realize” himself precisely as he abstains from individual expression—forces us, I believe, 
to reexamine the models through which we think about culture and creation.7  If the “subject”—
by which, here, I mean individuated human existence as capable of autonomous agency—and, by 
the same token, the “author,” are just cultural products, the contingent representations under 
which people, for a certain stretch of history, represented to themselves their cultural being, 
should we not rethink the very question of cultural production?  What produces in the plane 
where we find the figure of the subject itself as a product?   Should we not postulate a prior and 
invariable dimension of the cultural act, where the relationship of man and otherness would not 
have yet received a determinate form and the vector of agency—its determinate direction?    
This is, indeed, the dimension I would like to open in Chapter One with the correlated 
concepts of “mattering” and “manning.”  Most generally, they designate the incipience (but also 
                                                 
7 And if the artistic doctrines of Soviet modernism are not enough to urge upon us such a reconsideration, we could 
think back to the icon painter of Medieval Rus.  As Boris Uspenskii has argued brilliantly, for the icon to be true, the 
painter must “remove” himself from the picture, thus letting the divine image come through and imprint itself onto 
the board.  But this individual self-effacement is still a form of fulfillment.  Through it, the painter finds himself “in 
God” and, hence, in ontological plentitude.  He truly belongs, “counts,” is. 
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non-substantiality) of the true/real vis-à-vis the incipience (but also insufficiency) of human 
being.  The “vis-à-vis” here means that these two aspects should be distinguished and yet thought 
as a unity: as the indivisible constitutive aspects of the cultural act understood as an event 
(happening).  With the notions of “draw” and “figuring-out,” this unity is thought in dynamic, 
more specifically, genitive terms: as a unity that unfolds outwardly (“figures out”) into 
determinate realities: determinate shapes of truth and determinate shapes of identity.  In more 
familiar terms, this subsequent level is the one where value is articulated, where something like a 
“currency” emerges between man and otherness.  It is in this currency that things count as 
true/real and men come to “count for something.”   
These theoretical reflections pave the way for discussing Stalinist culture in a 
comprehensive overview that has not been attempted yet in Soviet studies.  Where virtually 
every discussion of socialist realism treat its establishment as derivative from the prior and 
paramount existence of the Stalinist state (which regulates the “cultural sphere” by means of 
policies), I treat these two institutions as coeval.  I do not mean temporal coincidence, of course.  
My point is that the very notion of “cultural sphere” (and, thus, also the notion of the cultural act) 
must be expanded, so as to encompass the institution of the state, rather than being relegated to a 
niche within it.  Within this comprehensive frame, then, it becomes possible to formulate the 
problem of cultural creation in a truly radical fashion: how the making of the socialist-realist 
author is the making of the Stalinist state; or, in a more precise and developed form: how the un-
making of the author as such is the making of the Stalinist state, by being, at the same time, the 
institution of socialist realism. 
Chapter Two seeks to define in a preliminary way the relationship found to exist between 
the representing and represented in the world of “advanced socialist construction” (ushered by 
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the successful, ahead-of-schedule completion of the First Five-Year Plan).  These two instances, 
I argue, do not relate as “subject” to “object.”  In order to procure a true image of reality, an 
entirely different relationship must be instantiated.  The world of advanced socialism is a 
peculiar kind of representational object.  Comparing it to the objects considered in Part I, we find 
that this one is not about to perform its own analysis; it has already done so.  While the culture 
of the 1920s is essentially futural, Stalinist culture is essentially perfective.   
Because it has understood itself, in the present the world shows.  It is exhibitionistic.  In 
this its quality (which, translating an expression from Sergei Eisenstein [uvidennost'], I call 
“seen-ness”), it proves to really not be an object in any accepted sense of the word.  Nor is, for 
that matter, the position of the representing “someone” the position of a subject.  In the place 
where we expect to find the subject, we find an empty spot.  This empty spot is reserved for any 
“one” in whom the self-knowing of the world, its being-foreseen, will be confirmed.    
Chapter Four will develop this dialectic further, in order to show how the empty spot is 
filled concretely, how the Soviet writer is recruited into it.  Before this next step, however, 
Chapter Three attempts to both clear and map the territory on which the question of recruitment, 
or subjection, will be asked.  I argue that this territory lies beyond ideology.  It is patently 
inadequate, I believe, to view the making of the Soviet subject in terms of some top-down 
process of “indoctrination.”  For “ideology” is not some substance poured from the outside into 
people’s heads, nor is it the substance that, once so poured, is the thing that first constitutes them 
as what they are.  Louis Althusser’s enduring achievement is to have shown us precisely that.   
In a detailed reading of his by-now classic “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” 
I discuss the shift that has taken place within the understanding of ideology.  As a result of this 
shift, the notion has transcended its proper object: “ideology” has ceased being about ideas.  
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Rather than to notions and beliefs, that is, to inwardness, Althusser points us, in a gesture 
intended not so much to provide a good illustration as to surprise our usual mode of thinking, to 
the ritualistic externality of seemingly insignificant motions like kneeling and praying, telling us 
that this is what ideology is really and primarily about.  In this scheme of things, actions come 
before beliefs, motions—before notions.  The reversal of the traditional order of determination—
in which inner representations constellate into “motives” en route to producing “acts”—should 
not be taken as some sort of “discovery” credited to a French professor of philosophy, a purely 
intellectual illumination of a general theoretical “problem.”  It is equally an event, an 
illumination produced by an “effective history” (Gadamer) to which we may still belong.  
Stalinism belongs to it certainly and cardinally.  For more than any other event in modern 
history, more than German Fascism, to be sure, Stalinism has showed how little it matters what 
people think or believe in the privacy of their consciousness, conscience, or kitchen versus the 
consequences of their “ritualistic” public doings.8  To the extent to which we choose to locate 
ourselves on the historical trail left by Stalinism, we must be able to discern that this trail leads to 
a conceptual place beyond the traditional notion of ideology.  
Chapter Four is situated precisely in this conceptual space, and from there it asks the 
question: how did the socialist-realist writer happen?  By what has been said so far, it should be 
clear that this is a variation on the general question about the Soviet subject.  In Chapter Two it 
has been suggested already that the writer comes to be in an empty spot circumscribed by the 
power of the Stalinist world to make things apparent, to lay bare.  Now I illustrate and develop 
this argument by following the founding event of socialist-realist culture: the First All-Union 
Congress of Soviet Writers (August-September, 1934).  I treat it—in accordance with the 
                                                 
8 The Soviet equivalent of the innocuous rituals Althusser discusses are the equally innocuous motions of attending 
meetings, getting up, applauding, voting, carrying a sign or a flag during (mandatory) public manifestations, etc. 
  
 16
previously elaborated concept of the cultural act—as a complex happening in which a truth 
receives “erection” in the same movement in which someone comes to “count for something.”  
Specifically: the individual comes to count as a Soviet writer when he shows himself as being 
“acted” by the self-revelatory movement of “our (Soviet) life.”  The possibility of depicting the 
world in its essential reality is thus predicated on belonging, on being-Soviet, which, for its part, 
is made synonymous with being-acted.  Following the logic of these conditions, I arrive at the 
character of representation in Stalinist culture: representation (in the sense of “depicting,” 
showing, reflecting upon) is an agency that has become detached from the person; he is more its 
object than its master; a function of his belonging to “our world,” this agency happens to him in 
the manner of grace. 
Chapter Six expands the scope of these conclusions from the sphere of artistic praxis to 
agency in general.  In my view, the eclipse of authorship in the institution of socialist realism is 
only an instance in the larger predicament of subjecthood within Stalinist culture.  To 
substantiate the connection, I discuss Mikhail Chiaureli’s film The Vow of 1946, in which what I 
just labeled as a predicament is treated in terms of miracle, elevation, and bliss.   The film 
presents us with a group of characters, builders of socialism, whose life we follow from the mid-
1920s to the end of World War II.  The story of each and all of them tells us that their 
achievements are not their own.  With their effort socialism is built and the victory in the war 
won, but the agency that drives them in this effort, guaranteeing in advance that it will be 
successful, comes to them from somewhere else.  It springs into their lives from that same empty 
spot that I have discussed previously as an abstract space, but which The Vow depicts with vivid 
literality.  What in regard to the art of representation has manifested itself as the power of 
exhibition, of making-see, now manifests itself as the general power of fulfillment, of making-
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happen as such.  In the film, among other things, this power is responsible for making human 
lives happen.  It is given a name and a human face: Stalin. 
But this is none other than the power whose instantiations we have been following all 
along.  We encountered it first as a characteristic of the text (in the purview of literary theory): 
its systematic nature.  We then found it as the latent matrix that specifies in advance the making 
of utilitarian things, the showing of the visible world, the movements of the human body, and the 
cognition of class consciousness.  And it is the same power, having gathered momentum and 
entered into a qualitatively new relationship with the individual, that is responsible for opening 
his eyes and, thus, producing truthful representations of reality.  Finally, in an anagogic 
manifestation, we find it in as the agency that constitutes Stalinist society and all its subjects.  It 
does this by recruiting and then “acting” these subjects in the quotidian enactment of a world 
whose ways have been objectively pre-charted, and which, for this very reason, has as its only 
destiny fulfillment as such. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE OBJECTHOOD OF FORM 
 
 
In the writings of those who came to be known as the Russian Formalists, “form” is the 
conceptual space in which the death of the author occurs, even if it is not announced in quite so 
dramatic a fashion.  It is traditionally argued that, in their pursuit of “scientific” objectivity, the 
Formalists sought to eliminate the subjective factor both from the history of aesthetic phenomena 
and from the analysis of specific texts; the German tradition of Kunstwissenschaft (Hildebrand, 
Worringer, Wöfflin) and the work of Aleksandr Veselovskii (1838-1906) in Russia are, then, 
cited as significant precursors in this endeavor.  But should we not be wary of positing the thirst 
for science as a prima causa?  May be it was just the other way around.  It may be that Wöfflin’s 
“history of art without names,” Veselovskii’s “inductive poetics,” and the Formalist “science of 
literature” became practicable because some change had already occurred in the life of the 
object—a change that made it possible for Kunst, folklore, or belles letters to be conceived as 
fields of verifiably objective cognition.   
In art, the Formalists descried a movement that occurred fully outside the subjective 
sphere and carried art through time, while also carrying the promise of a scientific study of 
things aesthetic.  This movement certainly traversed singularities—of this person, of this 
“school” or “movement”—yet the force that propelled it was one that belonged to the object 
itself.  Something in the very nature of art supplied the impulse toward new harmonies and 
cadences, new perspectives and compositions.  This impulse reverberated in the soul of every 
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true artist, but no soul, no matter how great, was to be for it either an absolute beginning or even 
a privileged abode.  Osip Brik expressed this fact most emphatically, when he vouched that, even 
if Pushkin had never been born, his immortal Evgenii Onegin would have been written all the 
same (“Formal'nyi metod” 213).9  It is as if this work, whose author was, ultimately, Pushkin, 
had been programmed, “scheduled,” in some arcane computing of form.  
Even if we disregard Brik’s aphoristic foray, we should take note of the new meaning it 
gives to the old phrase “work of art.”  The genitive attribution becomes more intimate, more 
engaged: “work of art” means not just a thing that belongs to the category “art”; it means, almost 
literally, actual work, activity, performed by the impersonal agency of art itself.  What Brik 
really says is: Evgenii Onegin is work that needed to be done, that would have been done even 
without Pushkin.  For art is no longer merely the collection of things with ascertained aesthetic 
properties; nor is it the generic activity performed on an object that turns it into something 
beautiful; outside of these definitions, art is primarily something that works autonomously, a 
device that performs tasks pre-programmed into it.  As such, it is susceptible to an objective 
description in terms of elements and functions. 
It is highly significant that the manifesto statement of Russian Formalism was an article 
by Viktor Shklovskii entitled “Art as Device,” even if priem of the Russian title (“Iskusstvo kak 
priem”) does not quite support the point I am trying to make.  Priem is “device” only in the more 
archaic meaning of the latter, which allows us to “leave someone to their own devices.”  Priem 
has a more instrumental inflection, it presupposes human agency.  It keeps us in the still human 
sphere of strategy, dexterity, and ploy, of possible unpredictability and cunning winks.  
Machines do not operate through priemy (pl.); the provenance of priem is decidedly not the 
                                                 
9 For all quotations from Russian publications throughout this study, the translation is mine (PP).  Where I quote an 
existing English translation, the citation in parentheses refers to it, rather than to a Russian publication.  In these 
cases, the entry in Works Cited features the English translation first, followed by a source in Russian. 
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mechanistic and the technological, unless it is that original techne with which Aristotle 
designated the skill of the artisan/artist.  Still, the English “device,” precisely in its most 
mechanistic sense, conveys an essential aspect of what Shklovskii and the other Formalists 
understood to be the true nature of art.     
Artistic form is an autonomous mechanism, whose functioning can be described 
synchronically, as well as diachronically.  In “Art as Device” Shklovskii emphasized the latter 
aspect, as he spoke of art’s ability to renew the perception of things.  He made very few 
references to “form,” while using extensively the term ostranenie: “making strange,” 
“defamiliarization.”  For too long had form been viewed as something imparted onto the object 
and, thenceforth, belonging to it as an unalienable property; what Shklovskii wanted to point out 
was not a property, but a process, a function, rather than a shape.   
The function of “making strange” constituted for him the positive phase in the life of 
form; the negative phase was that of “habitualization” or “automatization.”  The former 
encompassed the realm of the artistic proper, but the latter was equally integral in the generation 
of aesthetic shapes.  Each phase not only presupposed the other, but actively called it forth: every 
artistic form fades with time, making necessary the emergence of a new one; conversely, as soon 
as a new form appears, its irrevocable aging begins, bringing ever closer the twilight hour when 
it will sink below the threshold of vivid perception: “Each art form travels down the inevitable 
road from birth to death; from seeing and sensory perception, when every detail in the object is 
savored and relished, to mere recognition, when the object or form becomes a dull epigone 
which our senses register mechanically, a piece of merchandise not visible even to the buyer” 
(Khod 88).10  Above and beyond the particular forms that supersede each other through the 
                                                 
10  Shklovskii’s pronouncements were not always consistent with such a dynamic definition of artistic creation.  In 
The Knight’s Move (from which the quoted passage was taken) we also read: “Texture [faktura] is the principal 
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history of art, there is Form as the general mechanism of this supersession, as that which 
perpetuates itself in ever-new instances.  Iurii Tynianov described this mechanism as the 
evolutionary unfolding of pure oppositions:  
And so in the analysis of literary evolution, we encounter the following stages: 1) 
in regard to the automatized principle of construction, there emerges, dialectically, 
the opposite constructive principle; 2) its application commences—the 
constructive principle seeks the easiest employment; 3) it spreads over the largest 
possible mass of phenomena; 4) it becomes automatized and calls forth the 
opposite principle of construction. (“Fakt” 108) 
And so art traverses time in the dialectical shuttle of oppositions, perpetually rediscovering itself 
in what the Formalists called “differential quality” (Differanzqualitaat)11—an evanescent quality, 
to be sure, since it exists only in the momentous motion with which the new form distances itself 
from the old.  
Human intelligence, skill, imagination, talent, are, of course, involved throughout the life 
of form; at each moment in time, it is general human experience that brings about the 
habitualization of the object, and it is human creativity that rescues the object from its tarnished 
existence.  But the agency of the individual, of the human subject in the singular, is now 
subsumed within the impersonal agency of the mechanism.  Even if he reached to the most 
intimate of his being, to the most idiosyncratic of his subjectivity, the individual author cannot be 
the originator of the artistic work.  To a very significant degree, the object over which he labors 
                                                                                                                                                             
characteristic of this peculiar world of deliberately constructed objects, the totality of which we call art” (102).  Here 
it seems that the aesthetic is not the evanescent blossoming reached in the renewal of form, but a more or less 
identifiable property (“texture”) that clings to the object and ascertains its belonging to art (which is, thus, also a 
supposedly stable “world… of objects”).  
 
11  The term first gained currency in the theoretical work of Broder Christiansen. 
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is “conceived” somewhere else: in the impersonal logic of his craft’s history, in the diachronic 
automaton of form.  Of course, such a “conception” does not prefigure every detail of the object; 
there is an inner wealth in the man-made thing of beauty that cannot be accounted for by the 
simple interplay of differentials; this wealth is still the work of the artist.  And yet, what sets him 
to this work, what “employs” him in the task of creativity, is the necessity underlying the life of 
form: “Art is not created by the individual will, by the genius.  The creator is simply the 
geometrical point of intersection of forces operative outside of him” (Shklovskii, Khod 22).12  
What previous ages referred to as the “calling of the artist” still resounds, only now it is the logic 
of history that calls: “The freedom of the individual writer lies in his capacity to hear the voice of 
history. [….]  Creation is an act of historical self-awareness, of locating oneself in the stream of 
history” (Eikhenbaum, Skvoz' 236).13  For the aesthetic thought of the past, it had seemed 
obvious that the individual selects the devices for his artistic expression.  But now it has become 
possible to conceive of a scenario in which the artistic devices “select” their master: “a set of 
artistic forms brought forth by the inner laws of their development, seeks out an adequate milieu 
or creative personality for its realization” (Jakobson, “Randbemerkungen” 373). 
By what name should we call the producer of the artistic text in such a scenario?  Does he 
deserve the title of “author,” if the formative impulse guiding his steps antecedes his creative 
will?  It is best to call him operator of the device, since the device—even if only in potentia—is 
                                                 
12 In another place, Shklovskii compares the laws of artistic tradition to those of Brownian motion:  “The artist, 
whether he be the inventor of the internal-combustion engine or a poet, plays the role of just such particles, which 
make manifest [vyiavliaiut] motions that are, in themselves, invisible to the naked eye” (Khod 70). 
 
13 It does not take a particularly keen critical eye to notice the kinship between such Formalist pronouncements as 
Eikhenbaum’s and totalitarian discourses on history.  Is not the “Soviet establishment,” from its very first day, 
grounded in just this hearkening to the immanent laws of historical evolution?  Are not Stalinist policies, 
purportedly, guided by some “Marxist science of history,” no less worthy of its name than the Formalist “science of 
literature”?  This would be a facile analogy if it sought to incriminate the Russian Formalists with incipient 
totalitarian thinking.  Formalism is no more “totalitarian,” than Stalinism is “formalist.”  The kinship of ideas tells us 
only that Formalist theory and Stalinist ideology grew from the same ground, emerged from the same “plot.”   
 
  
 24
there before him (“brought forth by the inner laws” of form), and needs to be put to work.  
“Hitched” to it by objective predestination of which he is not aware, the artist works with it, on 
it, and for it.  So that form can implement its new operative principle,14 it must employ a human 
agent.  And thus the individual, in realizing his “artistic calling,” becomes just that: an employee 
of form.  
But there may be, still, a prouder mission and a higher title for the human subject in the 
world of art.  Does he not exceed the role of a mere technician when, in a sudden leap of 
consciousness, he comes to recognize his craft for what it really is: a contrivance, in which 
there’s nothing more than the interplay of conventions?  When in self-awareness he undertakes 
to unveil the play of form as play, to show us the artifice of art, does he not become once again a 
subject of the text in the full sense of the word?  
This promise is burdened with the same ambiguity that characterizes the problem of 
authorship.  An individual, it is true, is capable of consciously apprehending the conventionality 
of this or that form, even of art in general; it happens all the time.  Innumerable are the instances 
in which a particular aesthetic convention has been the object of parody, stylization, 
exaggeration, inversion, etc.—all the different modes in which the device can be “laid bare.”  
The individual consciousness, however, cannot claim too much credit for such revelations.  For 
here, too, consciousness only registers—sometimes early, sometimes late—an effect that 
proceeds from the objective movement of form through history.  Carried in the abrasive stream 
of human experience, art itself manifests its conventional nature.15  When a form wears out and 
                                                 
14  The term the Formalists used was “constructive principle.”  See the quotation from Tynianov above.  
 
15  Here is how Jakobson describes the workings of this automaton in the history of painting: “It is necessary to learn 
the conventional language of painting in order to ‘see’ the picture […].  This conventional, traditional aspect of 
painting to a great extent conditions the very act of our visual perception.  As tradition accumulates, the painted 
image becomes an ideogram, a formula, to which the object portrayed is linked by contiguity.  Recognition becomes 
instantaneous.  We no longer see [the painting].  The ideogram needs to be deformed.  The artist-innovator must 
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its mystical union with the object is no more, it shows itself in its true nature as just a manner of 
presentation.  Its routine perpetuation becomes, then, “mannerism,” and the time comes for it to 
be exposed, for the device to be “laid bare.” 
Let us pause here in order to appreciate, if only in vague outlines, an event that is to have 
enormous repercussions not only for the thought, but also for the history of the twentieth century.  
In Formalist theory we already sense the emergence, beyond the human subject, of something we 
might call a “subject effect.”  In the immanent life of objectivity something behaves like a 
subject or, rather, postulates a subject, where there is no place for human agency.  For the realm 
of objectivity called “art,” or “literature,” the laying bare of the device produces precisely such a 
subject effect.  A text—let us say, Pushkin’s Tales of Belkin—shows a reflexive inward turn, a 
“coming to consciousness” of form, in that the various contrivances of Romantic and 
Sentimentalist fiction are made perceptible as such.  But this coming to consciousness, while 
implemented through the human subject (Pushkin), is made possible outside of him (by 1830, the 
year the Tales were written, under the sheer weight of tradition and imitation, the trappings of 
Sentimentalism and Gothic Romanticism had become exposed, “obvious”).  In such moments, 
when art reveals its true face, there is always a human subject on the scene.  But he is there only 
“in attendance.”  There is not enough of him, of his inwardness, to encompass this movement 
through which form comes to celebrate its being-for-self (Fürsichsein).  He can only attend to it 
in the final, climactic instance.  
The diachronic life of form is a sequence of deformations, in which each new instance 
does violence to a pre-existing norm.  But synchronically as well, artistic form is just that—
                                                                                                                                                             
impose a new form upon our perception, if we are to detect in a given thing those traits which went unnoticed the 
day before.  He may present the object in an unusual perspective; he may violate the rules of composition canonized 
by his predecessors”  (“Realism” 39-40).  The imperative “must” (dolzhen), which Jakobson uses repeatedly, issues, 
of course, from the evolutionary logic underlying the history of art.   
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deformation, an instance of “organized violence” (Jakobson, O cheshskom stikhe 15).  In the 
simultaneity of every moment, no less than in a historical perspective, form deforms.  It is 
actively opposed and effectively negates its other—the habitualized life of the medium.  Verbal 
discourse, for example, is at its most habitual in its quotidian communicative function.  And so 
poetic language can be defined, for each moment in time and generally, in opposition to 
conversational, practical speech16: “poetry, which is nothing other than utterance oriented 
toward expression, is ruled […] by immanent laws; the communicative function, which 
characterizes both practical and emotional language, is minimized here” (Jakobson, 
“Noveishaia” 30; emphasis in the original).  Such a definition does not mean that poetry or 
literature can be grasped as substance, even if, a little further in the same article, Jakobson speaks 
of “literariness” (literaturnost′) as the distinguishing quality of literature and the object proper of 
literary studies.  The expressiveness, or literariness, of literature is a relational quality,17 indeed, 
an effect: this quality is “in effect” only against a specific background (a linguistic norm, a 
textual tradition)18 and for as long as this background remains pertinent.  This is why the value of 
a literary text can be appreciated only after a careful historical study.  The task of the literary 
                                                 
16 The Formalists soon recognized the overly-general character of such definitions.  In 1925 Boris Eikhenbaum 
wrote: “But these general acknowledgements that there are differences between poetic and practical language and 
that the specific quality of art was shown in its use of the material were not adequate when we tried to deal with 
specific works.  We had to find more specific formulations of the principle of perceptible form so that they could 
make possible the analysis of form itself—the analysis of form understood as content.  We had to show that the 
perception of form results from special artistic [devices] which force the reader to experience the form” (“Theory” 
113).  
 
17 “The existence of a fact as literary depends on its differential quality (i.e., on its relation to either the literary or 
the extra-literary series), or in other words—on its function” (Tynianov “O literaturnoi” 35; emphasis in the 
original).  
 
18 “We apprehend every fact of poetic language in an inevitable juxtaposition with the following three moments: the 
current poetic tradition, the practical language of the present, and the poetic tendency preceding the emergence of 
the given fact” (Jakobson, “Noveishaia” 19-20) 
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historian is to recreate faithfully the background against which the text had “actualized” a certain 
set of devices.19  
In every text now—in the place of the old duality of form and content—we have the 
dynamics of the deforming and the deformed, dynamics that belong wholly in the domain of 
form.  It is only by way of a sloppy abstraction that we could speak of “content” that inertly 
awaits its other—a shaping force approaching from somewhere else.  When analyzing narrative, 
Shklovskii could distinguish between fabula and siuzhet—a series of events recounted in the 
proper temporality and sequence of their occurrence versus the manner in which they are 
presented in narration (“Tristram” 296-98)—but this does not mean that the “story told straight” 
is somehow prior to its “deformation.”  On the contrary: the story can only exist as deformed, as 
siuzhet; only in retrospect, after the siuzhet has taken its course, can the fabula be reconstructed.     
The Formalists were particularly fond of those moments in literature when form could be 
shown to engender “content” from its own inner necessity.20  Is not the plot of the fairy tale—this 
purest of narrative forms—at its purest as an enchanted meandering whose sole destination is the 
postponement of the end?  For this enchantment to proceed along its winding paths, there is a 
need for material, for some pliant stuff from which twists and turns can be made.  The little hen 
cannot just take water from the sea and bring it to the choking rooster; first, she must give the sea 
a wild boar’s tusk; but the wild boar will part with his tusk only in exchange for an acorn; when 
                                                 
19 “If we are dealing with poets of the past, these three moments must be recreated—a difficult work, which can only 
be partially successful” (Jakobson, “Noveishaia” 20). 
 
20 Here Shklovskii quotes Tolstoy on the conception of Andrei Bolkonskii’s character in War and Peace: “In the 
battle of Austerlitz, which will be described, but with which I began the novel, I needed a brilliant young man to be 
killed; in the further course of the novel, I needed only the old Bolkonskii with his daughter, but since it was 
awkward to describe a person who was in no way related to the rest of the novel, I decided to make the brilliant 
young man a son of the old Bolkonskii.  Then I got interested in him, a role turned up for him in the further course 
of the novel, so I spared his life, severely wounding, instead of killing him” (“Sviaz′” 55).  As we can see, what 
spares the life of Andrei and allows him to grow into a major literary character is, really, the formal need for 
cohesion in the character scheme of the novel.   
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asked for an acorn, the oak tree, for some reason, demands cow’s milk; the cow, of course, wants 
hay; the reaper needs bast for his shoes; and so the little hen’s journey continues through another 
dozen places and another dozen helpers (Shklovskii, “Sviaz'” 43).  “Of course, these crooked 
roads are caused by specific conditions—by the requirements of siuzhet” (Shklovskii, “Sviaz'”  
48).  In seeking its fulfillment, a form calls forth “content” not as an antinomic, if 
complementary, other, but as its own second term.21  Therefore, instead of “content,” it is better 
to speak of “material,” since “the idea of ‘material’ does not lie beyond the limits of form; the 
material itself is a formal element” (Tynianov, “Fakt” 15).  Unlike content, material does not 
exist for itself: it exists solely for the functioning of the dominant formal device; it is there to be 
molded, deformed. 
Somewhat oxymoronically, form is violence and deformation only to the extent to which 
it is, also, law and organization.  Shklovskii’s early definition (1921) of the text as the “sum total 
of all artistic devices employed in it” (Rozanov 15) quickly gave way to the vision of a 
systematic ensemble of functions:  
We should no longer speak of a literary work as a ‘sum total’ of its various 
aspects: plot, style, etc.  These abstractions are far outdated: plot, style, etc., exist 
in an interaction—the same interaction and relation that exist between rhythm and 
semantics in verse.  A work of literature represents a system of interrelated 
factors.  The relation of any one factor with the rest constitutes its function in 
regard to the whole system” (Tynianov, “Oda” 48; emphasis in the original).   
Since formal devices are not planted haphazardly in it, but are coordinated into a totality, the text 
itself is a device, a higher-order mechanism. 
                                                 
21  “A new form engenders new content” (Shklovskii, Khod 38). 
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And if the question is asked once more, “Who is the subject of this mechanism? Who is 
responsible for this organization of elements and functions?”, the author would be, again, the 
wrong answer.  The author’s interiority is, once again, insufficient to “cover” the formative work 
performed by the text.  The mystical conception of the Genius in Romantic aesthetics had served 
to account for the organic unity of the work of art.  But no depths of the human being, no matter 
how mystically conceived, can account for the same work of art seen as a systematic totality.  
Such a totality has no subject, no human “coordinator.”  What totalizes the sum of elements into 
a textual whole is their subordination to a governing constructive principle: 
It is abundantly clear that every literary system is formed not by the peaceful 
interaction of all factors, but by the domination, prominence, of one (or a group) 
of them that functionally subordinates and “colors” the rest.  Such a factor bears 
the name […] dominanta (Christiansen, B. Eikhenbaum).  This does not mean, 
however, that the subordinated factors are not important and that they deserve no 
attention.  On the contrary, the action of the governing factor, the dominanta, is 
manifested precisely in this subordination, transformation, of all factors.  
(Tynianov, “Oda” 48) 
In Gogol’s “Overcoat,” for instance, it is the “devices of verbal mimicry and gesture” that have 
the leading constructive role (Eikhenbaum, “Kak sdelana” 46).  As they are “actualized,” the 
element of plot is subordinated, deformed.  The slim story line is there to support (“motivate”) 
the employment of the dominanta.22 
What the constructive principle “does” can never be entirely intended by the author.  Just 
as the author cannot control the ways by which the constructive principle of his work was 
                                                 
22 “Thus, the plot in Gogol has only a superficial significance and is, therefore, quite static […].  The true dynamic, 
and, hence, the composition of his works, consists in the construction of the skaz, in the play of language” 
(Eikhenbaum, “Kak sdelana” 50; see also 46). 
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generated—here the evolutionary laws of differentiation have their say—so he is incapable of 
controlling the ways in which this constructive principle fulfills itself within the text.  His 
intention is inevitably overridden by a necessity programmed into the very functioning of the 
device: 
Let us add: the author’s intention can be no more than a ferment.  In handling the 
specifically literary material and obeying it, the author departs from his intention.  
Thus [Griboedov’s] Woe from Wit was supposed to be in a “high,” even 
“magnificent,” style, but turned out to be a political, “archaistic,” pamphlet 
comedy.  Thus Evgenii Onegin was supposed to be, at first, a “satirical poem,” in 
which the author “chokes on bile.”  But while working on Chapter Four Pushkin 
already writes: “where is my satire?  There is no trace of it in Evgenii Onegin.”  
The constructive principle, the relatedness of elements within the work, turns 
the “author’s intention” into a ferment, no more.  The “creative freedom” proves 
to be an optimistic slogan, which does not correspond to reality, and gives way to 
“creative necessity.” (Tynianov, “O literaturnoi” 42) 
It is rather easy, from our current place in history, to take issue with the theories of the 
Formalists, to approve or disprove, to be critical (in the good sense of the word), to interject with 
a “Well, yes” or an “Oh, no.”  We are, understandably, tempted to evaluate their writings in the 
light of subsequent developments and to apply to them the standard of more current truths.  
“Well, yes, we know that the author’s intention matters little, that it tells us next to nothing about 
what the text really does.  Wimsatt’s intentional fallacy is a truism for us.”  “Oh, no, the text is 
never such a fully coherent system of elements and functions as to warrant analysis in terms of 
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some absolute laws of artistic construction or aesthetic evolution.  Post-structuralism has taught 
us to be wary of such holistic and mechanistic conceptions.”  
I am consciously resisting this temptation to be critical, to arbitrate between the Formalist 
“contribution” and subsequent theoretical thought.  The perspective I have adopted excludes the 
very idea of “contribution,” of the “lasting value” of this or that conceptual legacy.  It is not even 
a question of whether the Formalists were right or wrong, whether their notions did justice to the 
object of their study.  Once again: the theories of the Formalists must be considered not from the 
point of view of truth, but in the perspective of pure happening, i.e., as plot.  We must refrain 
from asking, “Is this knowledge adequate to its field?”, in order to ask, “What happens in this 
field, what events transpire there?”  In this kind of perspective, analytical concepts are not claims 
to truth; they are figures, in the present case—figures of thought.  They are arranged in a 
topology, where they “take place,” do something.  We are allowed to view them as “actants,” 
“heroes” of sorts.   
A declaration made by Jakobson in 1921 encourages such a vision: “If the study of 
literature wants to become a science, it must recognize the artistic device as its only ‘hero’” 
(“Noveishaia” 32).  Seven years later, Vladimir Propp faced a terminological dilemma when 
analyzing fairy-tale plots in terms of typical actions (“functions”).  Since these were performed 
not only by humans, but also by animals and all kinds of fantastic creatures, the designations 
“hero” and “character” were bound to be misleading.  Propp labeled this larger category of 
narrative agents “dramatis personae.”  To accommodate the same non-coincidence between 
human subjects and subjects of the narrative action, A. J. Greimas introduced the term “actant.”   
Are we not in a similar situation when we discover that, in the world of art, a function 
traditionally centered in the human subject is suddenly being performed by the decidedly non-
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human figure of the “device,” or the dominanta?   Considered in a purely functional way, the 
dominanta does, approximately, what “genius,” or the “poet’s immortal soul” have done before.   
They all have the same function in the plot of artistic creation; they are the same “actant” in 
different guises.  Here is how Friedrich Schlegel spoke of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, more than 
a century before the first Formalist manifestoes: 
But the reader who possesses a true instinct for system, who has a sense of totality 
or that anticipation of the world in its entirety which makes Wilhelm so 
interesting, will be aware throughout the work of what we might call its 
personality and living individuality.  And the more deeply he probes, the more 
inner connections and relations and the greater intellectual coherence he will 
discover in it.  If there is any book with an indwelling genius, it is this.  And if 
this genius could characterize itself in detail and as a whole, then there would be 
no need for anyone else to say what it is all about, or how it should be taken. (65; 
emphasis added). 
I have highlighted the word “system” as a reminder of its central place in Formalist 
poetics.  Like Schlegel, the Formalists spoke of the artistic text as a system, they too saw in it a 
“totality,” a “coherence” of “inner connections and relations.”  Yet, for them, it was not the 
“indwelling genius” that, by fulfilling itself, makes the text into a totality, but the “governing 
constructive principle.”  The “personality and living individuality” of a work was, for them, not 
the correlative of a subjective presence (the author’s), but the result of an objective process, 
which could be analyzed in its discrete moments.    
As the text thus loses its anchorage in the figure of the author, another human figure 
enters the plot in what seems, at first, to be a merely ancillary role.  I have in mind the figure of 
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the analyst.  In the Romantic “work of genius,” the genius is immanently present, it is always 
already realized.  From then on, it is up to the “reader with a sense for system and totality” to 
apprehend it.  But if this reader never comes along, the text would certainly not be deprived of 
the genius that inhabits it.  Not so in Formalist poetics, where the effectiveness of the artistic 
device is always relational.  For any moment in the past, there is reconstructive work to be done, 
so that all the differentials of novelty, originality, transgression, etc., can re-emerge in their 
original pertinence, no longer felt today.  But in synchrony, as well, the text’s “in-itself” is never 
given to us directly.  What for the reader is the half-conscious experience of individual “style,” is 
the objective work of a dynamic system, whose elements and functions are susceptible to 
meticulous and exhaustive analysis.  Only when this analysis is complete can the preconscious 
experience of style become the conscious apprehension of the text’s identity.  
Thus, in order to show itself as what it truly is, the text must now “pass” through this new 
place—the repository of hermeneutic knowledge.  The analyst is, to be sure, a mere stand-in for 
it; he is hardly more than the “guardian” of hermeneutic cognition.  But since the place over 
which he presides is indispensable to the existence of the text, the importance of his role cannot 
be underestimated.  
To convince ourselves of this, we need only to consider the place of the analyst in 
Freud’s theory of the unconscious, which is roughly contemporaneous with the Formalist 
movement in European art criticism.  The “text” that issues from the subject in the Freudian 
analytical situation behaves no differently than the artistic text in the vision of the Russian 
Formalists.  We find the same plot operative here, albeit, in the perspective of content.  With the 
Freudian dream—to take the most famous type of psychoanalytical “text”—we are, once again, 
at the site of a deformation: the dream thoughts (the “latent content” of the dream) appear 
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disfigured in the dream representation (the “manifest content”).  Their ostensible author—the 
dreaming subject—cannot be expected to know what the dream truly represents.  All he sees is 
the enigmatic, ludic hieroglyphics presented to him in his sleep (the manifest content).  These 
are, of course, related to the original “message” by hard links of determination.  But between 
“message” and “presentation” a deforming instance intervenes, a mechanism, a device.  
Employed by what Freud calls the “censor,” this device has every right to be called “poetic,” 
since the principles of its functioning—displacement and condensation—are also the principles 
of figurative speech. 
[A] psychic force is expressed in dream activity which on the one hand strips 
elements of high psychic value of their intensity, and which on the other hand 
creates new values by way of over-determination from elements of small value, 
these new values subsequently getting into the dream content.  If this is the 
method of procedure, there has taken place in the formation of the dream a 
transference and displacement of the psychic intensities of the individual 
elements, of which the textual difference between the dream and the thought 
content appears as a result.  The process which we assume here is nothing less 
than the essential part of the dream activity; it merits the designation of dream 
displacement.  Dream displacement and dream condensation are the two 
craftsmen to whom we may chiefly attribute the molding of the dream. 
I think we also have an easy task in recognizing the psychic force which 
makes itself felt in the circumstances of dream displacement.  The result of this 
displacement is that the dream content no longer resembles the core of the dream 
thoughts at all, and that the dream reproduces only a disfigured form of the dream 
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wish in the unconscious.  But we are already acquainted with dream 
disfigurement; we have traced it back to the censorship which one psychic 
instance in the psychic life exercises over the other.  Dream displacement is one 
of the chief means for achieving this disfigurement.  Is fecit, cui profuit.  We may 
assume that dream displacement is brought about by the influence of this censor, 
of the endopsychic repulsion. (Freud, 286-87) 
A couple of places in this lengthy passage warrant added emphasis.  Firstly—the 
personification of objective psychic forces as “craftsmen,” which, after the earlier remarks on 
typical actions and “actants,” I take as more than a stylistic embellishment.  These are Freud’s 
new “heroes,” just like the device will be the “only hero” for Jakobson and his colleagues.  
Secondly, there’s Freud’s note concerning “textual difference,” which should remind us of the 
textual difference that exists between fabula and siuzhet in Formalist theory.  Is not the latent 
content of the dream precisely the fabula that becomes distorted in the plane of representation 
(siuzhet)?  The fact that Freud operates on the side of content becomes significant here: while, 
for him, the “this is it” of the dream text is its fabula (the concealed wish-thoughts, which he 
seeks to decipher by undoing the “crooked” ways of their signification), it is just the other way 
around for the Formalists (who seek to make perceptible the “crookedness” itself).23  Yet, from a 
purely formal point of view, the scenario is the same: in both cases, the “this is it” of the text, its 
“truth,” is what is systematically occluded and ought to be systematically recovered by an 
analytic method transparent in relation to the original “method of procedure.”   
With Freud, but also with the Russian Formalists, we enter through the front gate into a 
distinctly modern existence of the textual, characterized as it is by an essential split.  In this new 
existence, what presents itself “initially and for the most part” as the text, the manifest, is 
                                                 
23 See pp. 27-28. 
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manifestly not it.  Behind it, in an obscurity neither too heavy—since it can be dispelled almost 
routinely by a hermeneutic that claims scientific status for itself—nor too light—since it inheres 
in the very being of representation—lies the latent actuality of the text.  Yet this split is not as 
dramatic as the one that underlies epistemological skepticisms in early modern philosophy from 
Malebranche to Hume—the split between the world of human representations (ideas), on the one 
hand, and actuality, on the other.  Starting from some moment in the second half of the 
nineteenth century (in Marx this moment is already current), dissimulation is lodged at the very 
heart of representation.  By its very nature, that which comes forth as the text comes forth as 
something other than it truly is.24  But—a crucial qualification—this is a systematically produced 
dissimulation, and not the chasm of some post-lapsarian divorce between “essences” and 
“appearances.”  Because it is systematically produced and systematically maintained, this 
dissimulation can also be systematically overcome.   
For Freud, the manifest content of the dream is “not it” in the sense that it presents itself 
as a senseless formative activity that juggles the trifles of the quotidian and thus conceals the 
significant message of desire.  For the Formalists, we read in reverse: the text is, essentially, 
dissimulation in the sense that it necessarily comes forth as “substance” (content of some kind, a 
“message”), while its in-itself is non-substantive deformation—the pure negativity of form. And 
this is where the hero of hermeneutics comes in.  He exposes the dissimulation and overcomes it.  
His competence bridges the gap between the two hypostases of the text—in Freud’s terms, the 
latent and the manifest—and makes it One again, restores its identity/truth.  And since this gap is 
structural (not a matter of human ignorance or insufficient perceptiveness), the hermeneia is also 
                                                 
24 It was Paul de Man who captured most memorably this modern being of the textual, when he asserted that 
“literature exists at the same time in the modes of error and truth; it both betrays and obeys its own mode of being” 
(163-64).  For him too, the “error,” the “blindness,” the “betrayal”—all of them referring to what I call 
“dissimulation”—are not pathological or accidental moments, introduced from some detachable outside, but are 
constitutive of the text as such.  
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a structural moment of the text, indispensable to its being.  The hermeneutic act is an act of the 
modern text itself, not a meta-operation.   
The full significance of this fact will become clear in the further course of this study. But 
for now, we have “collected” all the essential motifs that comprise the plot we are considering, 
and can lay them out in a more ordered fashion.   
The object, which, for the time being, presents itself as “text” in the dimension of form, 
is the site of organized deformation.  The one who poses as the ostensible author of “this,” turns 
out to be, in the last resort, a mere pretender.  His role as the subject of the text is an instance of 
travesty, an aspect of the dissimulation that constitutes now the manifest being of the text.  The 
work for which he, the author, can no longer claim credit, turns out to be performed by the 
impersonal agency of the device, or dominanta.  
From the point of view of the dominanta, the objective existence of the text can be 
described as a systematic deformative subjugation (of one order of elements by another).  The 
“dominance” of the dominanta means that the other elements of the system are totalized and 
over-determined by it.  They exist for the governing constructive principle and have no 
independent value of their own.  Their potential is “stopped,” “fixed.” (From the point of view of 
the constructive principle, siuzhet, of the fairy tale, for example, the princess is over-determined 
as “prize,” and cannot possibly be, say, a person torn by existential dilemmas.) 
But it is only through the specialized hermeneutic intelligence that this objectively 
existing state of affairs can become manifest.  Prior to its intervention, in what might be termed 
the (paradigmatic) first act of the plot, dissimulation reigns unabated: the elements of the system 
present themselves as unsystematic, free-floating, unrestrained in their potential for realization 
(the fairy tale does not “say” that the princess is, functionally, not a princess at all, but a formal 
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marker for the successful completion of the hero’s journey).  The second act witnesses the 
triumphant entrance of the hermeneutic hero—a hero by proxy, to be sure, inasmuch as he 
“performs” what is already potentially contained within the modus operandi of hermeneutic 
knowledge: the restoration of the text into its truth. 
Before this first enactment of the plot can be considered done, one seeming contradiction 
remains to be addressed.  Why is it that, on the one hand, artistic form in the writings of the 
Russian Formalists appears—both synchronically and diachronically—as the “work of the 
negative,” while, on the other hand, there is talk of some latent actuality of the text, its “in itself,” 
of the text as it truly is, etc.?  Why does Jakobson speak of the “literariness” of literature in the 
same way Shklovskii speaks of the “stoniness” of stones?  And are not terms such as “device,” 
“system,” “totality,” meant to convey a more substantive understanding of the aesthetic?   
What we are witnessing here is not a contradiction but a peculiarity of the plot that 
interests us.  True, when taken by itself, the textual can only be grasped as unfolded negativity, 
the evanescent interplay of differentials.  And so the object, the “text,” is lost, it is, really, 
nothing.  Yet, it is grasped, and this hermeneutic grasp is inscribed as something substantive that 
pertains to the object.  The performative of knowledge is included within the known as the very 
“soul” of the latter.   
In its most habitual application, the Formalist hermeneutic demonstrates how the artistic 
object systematically defies understanding in terms of content.  But in order for this purely 
negative characteristic to be seen as immanent to the text, as its positivity, we must suppose that 
the text is capable of somehow retaining within itself that which its formal movement negates, 
distances, “makes strange”: “for the older technique or content must somehow subsist within the 
work as what is cancelled or overwritten, modified, inverted or negated, in order for us to feel the 
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force, in the present, of what is alleged to have once been an innovation” (Jameson, Modernity 
128).25  Taken on its own—as printed words on a page, as daubs on a canvas, or audible 
vibrations in the air—the text possesses no such power.  Thus for it to subsist, to be at all, the 
text must be understood to contain and carry through space and time that which appears external 
to it—its own expert reader; but, optimally, it must contain and carry him in such a way that “he” 
is no longer “he”—some principally detachable instance of human intelligence—but somehow a 
part of the textual mechanism itself, a built-in reader, as it were, a reader-device (as in 
cybernetics).  This gives us the opportunity to revisit a point made earlier: the modern text 
invites us to figure the hermeneutic act within the text’s own materiality, as a constitutive part of 
its being, and not a as a meta-operation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 In the words of Shklovskii: “The violation of the canon is possible only while the canon exists, and sacrilege 
presupposes a religion that is still alive” (Khod 73). 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE SUBJECTHOOD OF CONTENT 
 
 
It is bound to seem a scandal of sorts that in my approach to the culture of socialist realism the 
first step was Russian Formalism—a movement that was to be forcefully extinguished at the end 
of the 1920s, a movement whose name was to become the name of a heresy in both aesthetic 
criticism and artistic practice during Stalin’s time.  It would seem much more prudent to have 
gone straight to some properly Marxist aesthetic doctrine, which, whatever its shortcomings or 
unorthodoxies, could not but prove more akin to the spirit and the letter of socialist realism.  
After all, from very early on the Formalist movement was recognized as the main ideological 
enemy of Marxism in the field of aesthetics and art criticism.  
This objection falls with the reminder that we are not tracing the ideal genesis of socialist 
realism.  Hence the kinships and genealogies, the thematic affinities and resemblances, that 
emerge dutifully in that venerable mode of inquiry called “history of ideas,” do not have 
argumentative weight here.  But this means that there are no available criteria for anticipatory 
judgment on whether this or that theory, this or that methodology, “approximates,” 
“foreshadows,” or “prepares the ground for,” socialist realism.  
Soviet cultural history adds a supportive footnote to this methodological position.  It is 
well known that nothing like a Marxist aesthetic doctrine was passed over to the 1930s by the 
1920s.  All more or less sustained attempts to formulate one, to elaborate a critical methodology 
on the basis of historical materialism, did not survive the defiles of Stalin’s “cultural revolution”; 
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in the years between 1928 and 1932, such attempts were branded as so many deviations from the 
proper study of things aesthetic, thus virtually sharing in the fate of Formalism.  Those schools of 
critical thought that had been, only a few years back, the main players in the vigorous debate on 
Marxism in the arts—the followers of Bogdanov, the leaders of RAPP, the group around 
Voronskii at Pereval, Pereverzev and his disciples, the theorists of LEF—were effectively 
neutralized by the early 1930s (the most tenacious of them, RAPP, survived until the resolution 
of 1932).  To the names of their main figures Stalinist culture will add the derogatory suffix “-
shchina” (bogdanovshchina, voronshchina, pereverzevshchina) and use them—depending on the 
context—as either cautionary references or terms of indictment.  And it is difficult to decide 
whether to be charged, say, with voronshchina (standing for a reactionary blend of intuitivism, 
irrationalism, and voluntarism), was any less stigmatizing than the charge of formalism.  Still, 
these instances of knowledge, these schools of (professedly) Marxist thought, which Stalinism 
will eventually abolish, have legitimacy for us, perhaps no greater, but also no lesser than that of 
Formalism—legitimacy not by virtue of anticipating or approximating a later theoretical 
orthodoxy, but by virtue of simply being there, of taking place where, several years later, 
socialist realism was to take place.   
Among them, the most elaborate, internally consistent, and methodologically rigorous 
attempt to formulate a textual analytic and to implement a corresponding practice of critical 
reading should be attributed to the so-called “sociological school”—an academic group, whose 
principal activity falls within the second half of the 1920s.  The programmatic statements of the 
group are contained in a collection of critical essays, Literaturovedenie (Literary Studies), which 
appeared in 1928.26  These were remarkably consistent with the earlier writings of the group’s 
                                                 
26 This volume was projected as the first in a series of publications on literary methodology and criticism; it 
remained the only one.    
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leader, Valerian Pereverzev,27 but went beyond them (especially in two long articles by Genadii 
Pospelov) toward elaborating a full-fledged science of the literary. 
All external indications are there to suggest that with Pereverzev and his followers we 
will find something quite contrary to the theories of the Formalists, whom the former attacked on 
numerous occasions.  For them, as for most Marxist-minded critics of the time, formalism was a 
survival of bourgeois consciousness, an offspring of the divorce between reality and its ideal 
figurations, where the latter came to be perceived as an autonomous realm sustaining itself, in 
the air as it were, through powers all of its own.  The falsity of such a view accounted for the 
principal methodological falsity of Russian Formalism: its fundamental disinterestedness in the 
genetics of the artistic fact, the propensity to treat this fact descriptively rather than etiologically.  
Against the Formalist science of literature, based on studying the intrinsic laws of the “literary 
series,” the Pereverzevians never tired of repeating that the only objective knowledge of the 
literary fact lies with explaining its causal relation to the extra-literary.  More than a mere 
principle of scientific investigation, etiology was for them but synonymous with the scientific 
itself:  “All that is required is that the critic see the work of art as a causally conditioned 
phenomenon of life, that he consider his main task to be discovering this causal relationship, i.e., 
the scientific explanation for the appearance of the work of art” (Pereverzev, “Pisarev” 39). 
Obviously, we are dealing not with mere differences, but with a fundamental rift, which 
is as much methodological, as it is ideological.  Formalism, on the one hand, and the brand of 
Marxist analysis of literature practiced by Pereverzev’s group, on the other, present themselves 
as irreconcilable experiences of the textual.  With the latter, as, indeed, with all Marxist literary 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
27 During a discussion at the Communist Academy in 1930, whose outcome was the de facto elimination of the 
sociological school, one of its critics, N. I. Efimov, remarked: “Methodological unity was represented in their works 
with such exclusive consistency that the ‘Pereverzevtsy’, or members of the Pereverzev School, like the Formalists, 
were always identifiable by their style and by the methodological orientation of their works” (qtd. Scott 7).  
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criticism, an entirely new dimension is adjoined to the manifest “thereness” of the artistic text, 
the dimension of socio-economic being, which is absent as such from Formalist theory.  And yet, 
as we register this heteronomy, we must also register the dialectical twist whereby it is taken up 
and sublated within a higher-level homology.  For did we not witness, in the discussion of 
Formalism, that the experience of the textual is characterized precisely by a displacement such 
that what is manifestly there as the text is, really, not it or, at least, cannot be relied upon to 
ground any truth about the text?   
And so it is that precisely when they opposed themselves to “formalist” readings of 
literature, when they denied the self-sufficient existence of the literary series, the Marxists 
showed themselves as fully partaking of this very experience.  When they insisted that the 
seeming autonomy of the aesthetic realm, its (mis-)representation as something detached from 
the coarse reality of social existence, should be unmasked as the ideology of one particular social 
formation (the bourgeoisie), they too were confronting this realm as a scene of dissimulation.  
For the Formalists, it was the “overgrowth” of content and referenitality, of ideas and subjective 
expressions, from under which the mechanisms of formal construction must be brought out; for 
the Marxists, it was the independent and ideal existence of the literary that had to be dispelled in 
order for us to see the mechanisms by which social life reproduces itself.   
To identify and dispel the dissimulation of literature’s ideal being involves identifying 
and dispelling also the illusion of its privileged relation to the personal “inner world.”  Thus, just 
as inevitably as Formalist methodology “displaces” the individual author by “hitching” him to 
the broader movement of objective “forces operative outside of him,” we find this displacement 
in the methodology of the sociological school.  Here, the movement of external forces is also 
objective, but the objectivity in question is different:  
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It is not in subjective process that a literary scholar operating on the basis of 
Marxist methodology should seek an explanation for poetic phenomena, but in 
objective reality, not in the movement of ideas but in the movement of material 
reality. [….]  Nothing in the poetic fact can be explained by the poet’s intentions, 
because from the Marxist standpoint it is not thought that is definitive, but being.  
It is not the idea on which a work of art is based, but being; and literary 
scholarship must discover not the idea but being as the basis of the poetic 
phenomenon [….]  A literary scholar’s task consists in discovering the objective 
reality in a work of literature which provided the material for it and determined its 
structure.  Marxist research consists in discovering this being and elucidating the 
organic, necessary connection between the given work of art and the being in 
question. (Pereverzev, “Premises” 55-56)  
Once again, there is no need to arbitrate between the Formalists and Pereverzev, to decide which 
“outside” should count as the truly or ultimately determining one: the outside of the objective 
dynamics of form or the outside of objective social being (just as there is no need to arbitrate 
between Marxism and psychoanalysis as to whether the ultimate “Unconscious” is not, after all, 
the socio-economic).  All we need to do is take note of the fundamental fact that emerges at the 
formal confluence of these two, otherwise irreconcilable, currents of thought: the author is not 
the author, the individual subject is not enough.  
But this fact does not emerge in isolation; it stands as the centerpiece, the main event, of a 
plot, whose constitutive moments were suggested in the discussion of Formalism.  Now, in the 
writings of the sociological school, we can follow this plot as it unfolds in the dimension of 
“content.” 
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Anterior to every literary text stands the social being of which Pereverzev speaks, as a 
unity of objectivity and subjecthood, i.e., as an objective world, which is also, and equally, 
consciousness (Pereverzev, “Pisarev” 41-42; “Premises” 59).28  The textual is always a 
manifestation of the latter, but such that the duality-in-unity which we find outside the text is 
also to be found within it.  Since consciousness cannot become manifest except through 
representations (“images,” obrazy, as Pereverzev calls them), the literary text also gives us a 
“world” (depicted objectivity) that is, equally and simultaneously, a self (depicting subjectivity). 
Pereverzev’s monism allowed him to solve rather easily the question of whether literature 
is capable of adequately reflecting the objective world beyond the page—a question, which had 
been a stumbling stone for the materialist critics of the preceding century (Chernishevskii, 
Dobroliubov, Pisarev).  They had thought literature fully capable of proffering such a reflection; 
but in those cases—hardly incidental—when the world appeared crooked in the mirror of 
representation, there was little for them to do but to deliberate on the inadequacies of this or that 
author’s “world view.”29  Now Pereverzev could dispense with the problem altogether by 
confidently announcing that representation is always adequate to reality, if the two terms are 
properly understood: “Yes, art reproduces reality exactly, retaining its unity of object and 
subject; it reproduces the objective basis of consciousness, which is actual reality” (“Pisarev” 
                                                 
28 Pereverzev finds support for this monistic view in Marx’s critique of earlier materialist philosophies: “The main 
defect of materialism up to and including Feurbach consisted in the fact that it regarded reality, the objective world 
perceived through the external senses, as only an object of contemplation, not as concrete human activity, not as 
practical activity, not subjectively” (“Premises” 58). 
 
29 “[The] main contradiction [of the materialist critical thought of the 1860s] consisted in the fact that having 
advanced the strictly materialist proposition that art reproduces reality and having denied the idealistic view of art as 
the fruit of free thought unencumbered by objective conditions, the mechanists immediately began talking about art 
as engendered by thought, and very often thought that diverged from reality.  This contradiction was inescapable for 
those who, in speaking of the reproduction of reality, meant not subjective reality with its inherent consciousness but 
the objective world opposed to consciousness, for those who did not include the consciousness peculiar to reality in 
the reality reproduced by art.  Under such circumstances, art was not the result of a single actual reality but of the 
interaction between two essences—reflected reality and reflecting consciousness, the objective world and subjective 
thought, i.e., a fact of both real and ideal order” (Pereverzev, “Pisarev” 42-43).  
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43).  The key word in this statement is “reproduces.”  Art does not “reflect” reality; it is the 
reproduction of reality; it participates in the larger process through which a form of social life, an 
instance of social being, perpetuates itself.  When “reality” is understood to be synonymous with 
this very social being, its reproduction can only be more or less successful, never “false.” 
Of course, it is possible, in a preliminary abstraction, to separate the world depicted from 
its depictor and to speak of how the former is a distorted copy of the world as it actually is or 
was; just as it was possible, for the Formalists, to make a distinction between the story “as it 
really took place” (the fabula) and the story as told (the siuzhet).  But such an abstraction should 
not lead to the idea of an objective world predating and awaiting a consciousness that may or 
may not represent this world adequately.  Just as the story can only exist as narrated, i.e., as (de-) 
formed in the movement of storytelling, the world can only be given to us as a world: an 
objectivity already in the shape of subjecthood.  As with the Formalists, where formal distortion 
is ontologically prior to (what comes to be perceived as) the distorted material, in Pereverzev the 
“subjective” deformation is ontologically prior to the deformed “reality.”  He often uses the 
pleonasm “actual reality” in order to dispel a vision of some naïve and simple objectivity 
unadulterated by the presence of the subjective.  “Actual reality” is one into which the 
“subjective,” hence also the “distortive,” is figured from the very beginning.   
 Because the distortive work of consciousness (including, of course, artistic 
consciousness) has no positive “outside” (this consciousness, at least in Pereverzev, can never be 
fully transparent to its own objective determinations), distortion itself turns into a positive 
characteristic of the object under investigation, i.e., the text, in a broader sense.  Since every 
representation is, at the same time, a misrepresentation (of the objective conditions underlying a 
given form of social life), misrepresentation does not come with a negative sign, as a “lie” or 
  
 47
“obfuscation.”  For those same objective conditions of social existence which have been 
“misrepresented” in the text have also determined, in some moment anterior to the text, the 
specific character of this very misrepresentation.30  Because we can always count on it to be 
there, and because—even more importantly—we can always count on it for the key to “undoing” 
its own masquerade, misrepresentation must be thought as one with the objectivity it 
camouflages, as, in fact, belonging to it.  But thus conceived, what we have been referring to as 
“misrepresentation” is, really, dissimulation; and the new objectivity, to which dissimulation 
belongs not as a negative moment, a deterrent, but as a positive determination, is none other than 
Pereverzev’s “actual reality”: objectivity grasped together with the immanent laws of its 
“subjective” deformation.  
Pereverzev was fully aware that the Formalists had spoken of deformation as an essential 
fact pertaining to the nature of things artistic.  Yet, he insisted that the Marxists “knew [this fact] 
long before Shklovskii,” and that they knew it differently: “They [the Marxists] know that the 
mechanism of deformation, a device through which social reality is formed, is determined by the 
base and causally dependent on the base, and that it is in the base that an explanation and 
understanding of deformation must be sought” (“Formalists” 138; emphasis added).  When the 
base, i.e., the material conditions of social existence, is thought in a dialectical unity with the 
mechanisms whereby these conditions produce consciousness, we end up with Pereverzev’s 
                                                 
30 We might recall here the passage in Marx’s “Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy” in which Marx 
criticizes the “Robinsonades” of eighteenth-century economists—their attempts to derive the principles of socio-
economic development from fictional scenarios in which the human individual appears as a fully independent agent 
in confrontation with “nature.”  Marx proceeds to expose these scenarios as misrepresentations characteristic of a 
specific phase in the historical life of bourgeois society.  The human individual in question, “the joint product of the 
dissolution of the feudal form of production and of the new forces of production which have developed since the 
sixteenth century” (267) is represented as most independent precisely when, in actuality, “the inter-relations of 
society […] have reached the highest state of development” (268).  Yet this misrepresentation is due neither to 
accidental blindness, nor to some inborn defect of human reason; it is itself a product—and a necessary product, at 
that—of the very actuality it obscures—the actuality of bourgeois existence, in which “the different forms of social 
union confront the individual as a mere means to his private ends, as an outward necessity” (267).  
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monistic “social being.”  As it “deforms,” the base also determines and structures social reality 
(in its “subjective” manifestations). 
The same mechanism of dissimulation/organization is to be found operative within the 
artistic text, which is always a concretion of a particular class “character,” “attitude,” or “will”—
of the subjective aspect of social being.  On the most general level, the text “dissimulates,” 
inasmuch as this concretion of social being inevitably comes forth as a reified world, as depicted 
objectivity, thus concealing its subjective dimension and occasioning the “realist,” or 
“referential,” illusion.  We fall prey to this illusion when we try, for example, to relate Pushkin’s 
Captain’s Daughter to the historical reality of Pugachev’s rebellion.  By doing this, we fail to see 
the “depictor within the depicted” (Pereverzev, “Premises” 59-60).  In this particular case, the 
“depictor” is a rather different reality: the class reality of the urbanized and well educated small-
landed gentry.  The reality of Pugachev’s rebellion, in being depicted, is also being subjected.  It 
is constructed in accordance with the “laws of perspective” immanent to another world.  But this 
means that it is also subjected to deformation.  The irreducible measure of non-coincidence 
between the artistic representation and its real-life referent had been seen by the Formalists as a 
result of the peculiar laws of artistic construction.  The critics of the sociological school 
attributed the same discrepancy to the immanent laws governing the historical process.31   
It should be amply clear by now that when the latter spoke of the subjective, they did not 
mean the individual subject, the author.  The subjectivity they were referring to was that of a 
social group taken as a whole, a transindividual consciousness, which manifests itself on the 
level of the text as a depicted world, a concrete organization of images.  The text is the place 
                                                 
31  “The non-coincidence between reality and its depiction is inherent in the historical process itself.  The 
convergences between reality and representation are always relative; they are limited in respect to both history and 
class” (Bespalov, “Problema” 25).  
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where the immanent laws of social organization become the immanent laws of the unfolding 
artistic content: “In the artistic works’ system of imagery, social reality (a unity of representation 
and essence, ‘form and content’) presents itself as detached and consciously apprehended in the 
image.  The whole system of images, in its interconnection and logic of development, is none 
other than the interconnection, logic, and lawfulness [zakonomernost'] of reality itself, given as 
an artistic consciousness” (Bespalov, “Problema” 26).  This consciousness, which amounts to 
nothing less than the subjectivization of social reality,32 both “contains” and transcends each 
individual subjectivity.  Clearly, the individual subject is incapable of knowing, willing, and 
intending everything that the transindividual consciousness “does” by way of representation.  
Much of the work takes place behind his back, eludes him.33   
In regard to the bourgeois author, this drama of consciousness is particularly poignant, for 
he misrecognizes even the basic fact of his belonging to a class collectivity and writing as part of 
it.  His understanding of himself is that of a unique consciousness, free to encounter the world on 
its own and to make sense of it.  In its manifest being, therefore, his text offers us, typically, a 
personal quest for knowledge and beauty, for self-expression and identity (usually within the 
narrow limits of individual ethics and existential credos).  But we discover “the depictor within 
the depicted,” the latent actuality of the text within its manifest being, when we ask, “What 
                                                 
32 As Bespalov explains a little further in the same article, the best way to conceive of this consciousness is to see it 
as the artistic consciousness of the social group as a whole (“Problema” 33-34).  
 
33 “We should judge about style neither from the author’s pronouncements, nor from his belonging to this or that 
literary group, neither from manifestoes, nor from the author’s plans and intentions.  Historical scholarship studies 
not the wills and desires of people, but the facts that emerge, at times, despite the will of people, behind their back.  
The formation and individuation of a given style occurs not on people’s will, but, sometimes, regardless of their 
will, albeit through them” (Bespalov, “Problema” 32).  Bespalov’s thesis recalls this classical passage from Marx’s 
Eighteenth Brumaire: “Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an entire 
superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of life.  The entire 
class creates and forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social relations.  The single 
individual, who derives them through tradition and upbringing, may imagine that they form the real motives and the 
starting point of his activity” (47).  
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social reality is immanently capable of presenting itself as a ‘world’ to be known and conquered 
through the individual’s own powers and skills (including artistic skills), through independently 
accumulated experience and hard-won sense of self?”  The answer is forthcoming: the reality in 
question is one in which the relations of production imply the (latent) fact of ever-greater 
interdependence between the individual members of society, while also posing the (manifest) 
imperative for competition, specialization of skills, disassociation from traditional forms of 
collectivity, etc.34   
As social being is reproduced in the text, the dissimulation peculiar to it is also 
reproduced.  Manifestly, Maksim Gor'kii’s early stories depict the conflict between two character 
types: the “restless”—those who yearn for a way out the bleak reality of their social existence— 
and the “fellow-travelers”—those who acquiesce to it.  Around these two poles, a series of 
semantic oppositions is set up: “the exceptional and the ordinary, the free and the bounded, the 
rebellious and the self-satisfied” (Bespalov, “Stil'” 301).  In Gor'kii’s legendary-allegorical tales, 
the conflict is usually recast as one between the anarchic and virulent freedom of the “natural 
man” (Larra, Danko, the Man) and the stifling enclosures of the man-made world (the world of 
culture).  Yet, these manifestly irreconcilable opposites are, in fact, the two sides of one and the 
                                                 
34 In The German Ideology we read: “First the productive forces appear as a world for themselves, quite independent 
of and divorced from the individuals, alongside the individuals: the reason for this is that the individuals, whose 
forces they are, exist split up and in opposition to one another, whilst, on the other hand, these forces are only real 
forces in the intercourse and associations of individuals.  Thus, on the one hand, we have a totality of productive 
forces, which have, as it were, taken on a material form and are for the individuals no longer the forces of the 
individuals but of private property, and hence of the individuals only insofar as they are owners of private property 
themselves. Never, in any earlier period, have the productive forces taken on a form so indifferent to the intercourse 
of individuals as individuals, because their intercourse was formerly a restricted one.  On the other hand, standing 
over against these productive forces, we have the majority of the individuals from whom these forces have been 
wrestled away, and who, robbed thus of all real life-content, have become abstract individuals, but who are, 
however, only by this fact put into position to enter into relation with one another as individuals (83-84; emphasis in 
the original). 
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same “socio-psychological tendency” (sotsio-psikhologicheskoe ustremlenie)35: in the age of 
triumphant capitalism, the urban petty bourgeoisie in Russia is threatened with extinction by the 
spread of large-scale industrial production; its unstable position above the social bottom and 
below desired material prosperity, translates into a psychological oscillation between rejection of 
reality and hopeful reconciliation with it (Bespalov, “Stil'” 301).36  This is a single psychological 
“complex,” whose moments have been separated in artistic representation and embodied as 
different, indeed, conflicting, realities (Bespalov, “Stil'” 300-301).  But the masquerade of 
representation does not end here; it scrambles also the vectors of desire.  It is the desire for stable 
prosperity on the part of the lower urban bourgeoisie, frustrated as it is by the actual socio-
economic conditions in Russia at the turn of the century, that dissimulates as a dreamy striving 
for freedom opposed by the conceit of a habitualized and stagnant life.  Along the same lines, an 
idealized “state of nature” emerges as a redeeming alternative to the artificiality of human 
culture.  The actual fear of an impoverished declassed existence (bosiachestvo) is represented-
deformed in Gor'kii’s stories as a romanticized vagrancy (brodiazhnichestvo) outside the bonds 
of a social group, family, and property (Bespalov, “Stil'” 297); while the actual, but impeded, 
desire (to belong truly to the prosperous bourgeois world and its culture) is represented-deformed 
as its own wishful denial.   
And lest we think that these transmutations are due to some idiosyncrasy or “bad faith” 
on Gor'kii’s part, Bespalov sets the record straight: “The social tendency expressed in the central 
                                                 
35 In most other cases, “tendency” would be an inadequate translation of the Russian ustremlenie, which is 
traditionally rendered as “striving” or “aspiration.”  For translating Bespalov’s usage, however, the teleological 
connotations of “striving” and “aspiration” seem out of place.    
 
36 At this point, Bespalov’s reading echoes Pereverzev’s early study of Dostoevsky, in which the position of the 
petty bourgeoisie is described in the following terms: “Over the petty bourgeoisie a curse hangs, as over the biblical 
fig tree: it is sociologically fruitless, incapable of a historically constructive role.  The tragedy of this class lies in the 
fact that its revolutionary impulse neutralizes its reactionary impulse, and its reactionary impulse neutralizes its 
revolutionary impulse; the stormiest tensions of revolutionary energy are resolved in reaction, and the most intense 
reaction must be resolved in revolution.” (11)  
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image [of the “restless”] is not the author’s commission, his conception or intention, not his 
political, ideological convictions; this is the objective directionality [napravlennost'] and social 
content expressed in the image, independent of the will and intentions of the author” (“Stil'” 
280).  If, in the writings of the Formalists, an objectively ascertainable dynamic of form 
traverses-overcomes the individual consciousness of the author, in the theories of the 
sociological school the same function is performed by the “objective […] social content.”  One 
and the same cognitive scenario is played out in two ostensibly heterogeneous dimensions.  
Ostensibly, two different sets of phenomena are being encountered, divergent realities are being 
asserted and known as “real,” incompatible positivities are being called upon to ground 
epistemological certainties.  And yet, on their divergent paths, the “idealist” poetics of the 
Formalists and the “materialist” formulations of the sociological school insistently point to and 
affirm one and the same “situation”: the formidable weight of a new objectivity has come upon 
the individual subject; it now envelopes him and “instrumentalizes” his consciousness toward its 
own ends; it calls him along in a voice that is misheard and, as misheard, it is always obeyed; it 
acts through him, so that he is never equal to what he himself has “done”; an impersonal agency 
is now accountable for this work, concretized within each particular text as the agency of a 
particular “device” or, as we are about to see, the agency of a particular “image.” 
To identify an extra-literary determinant, a socio-psychological “character” (Pereverzev), 
“tendency” (Bespalov, Ulrikh Fokht), or “complex” (Pospelov, Vasilii Sovsun), was insufficient, 
if this determinant could not be shown to be immanently of the text, to have a uniquely textual 
existence.37  Just because they denied the autonomy of the literary series, the critics of the 
sociological school were not going to deny the specificity of literature among other 
                                                 
37 “Being immanent in relation to the socio-historical conditions which have brought it into existence, the [socio-
psychological] complex is also immanent in relation to the structure of the [text].  The latter is a result of this 
complex’s realization” (Pospelov, “Stil'” 162).  
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superstructural phenomena, nor, for that matter—the possibility of poetics as a discipline distinct 
from economics, sociology, social psychology, and socio-economic history.  Closely following 
Plekhanov, they saw “play” (igra) and “image” (obraz) as the distinguishing determinations of 
artistic phenomena, in general, and literature, in particular: 
The concept of art is closely associated with that of the image as a specific 
feature of art.  Art is always action; it consists in reproducing behavior 
characteristic of a particular form of life, behavior otherwise known as 
psychology or character.  When this form of life reproduces the system of 
behavior characteristic of it, apart from the immediate battle for life, it is playing.  
The system of behavior reproduced or, what is the same thing, the character or 
psychology reproduced, is the image.  It is impossible to reproduce behavior, to 
play, without the image.  The image constitutes the essence of play.  Play without 
the image, without reproduction of the system of behavior or character, is simply 
unthinkable, it is simply impossible.  Art is play and art is image are essentially 
equivalent formulae, because play can be realized only in the image, because to 
play means to present an image.  In play, the image is merged with the organism 
at play and has no existence apart from that organism. [….]  In art, the image 
becomes separated from the player; it becomes objectivized and takes on an 
independent existence. [….]  It is in this objectivization that the act of artistic 
creativity consists.  It is through the objectivization of play, through its 
embodiment in the matter of the external world, that the artist creates images.  In 
art, social character, the subject of play, becomes the object known as the image. 
(Pereverzev, “Problems” 155)  
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Partly due to the lingering connotations of its former use as the word for “icon,” obraz 
resolves more easily the tension between sensuousness and sense, between the pictorial as such 
and its semantic fulfillment, that characterizes its English counterpart.  So that even when 
Pereverzev speaks of the “objectness” of the image, its independent existence in the materiality 
of the artistic medium, the next step is inevitably implied: to show that a representation is always 
inhabited by the (social) subjective, that it is not only a sensuous concretion (“image” in its most 
literal meaning), but also “character.”  The transition is more than facilitated by the fact that in 
one of its standard uses, obraz means, indeed, a depiction of a person, character, a verbal or 
iconic figuration-individuation of the human.   
While the capaciousness of the Russian term allows Pereverzev to think the artistic image 
as an agency, almost a living entity,38 it also allows for a common misreading of his argument.  
The misreading in question collapses the social character (kharakter) reproduced in the text with 
a fictional character (obraz, geroi, personazh) from the text.39  Although a fictional persona (a 
literary “type”) can exemplify a class psychology,40 such a relation does not exhaust the 
reproduction mechanism of which Pereverzev speaks.  The first thing to be said of this 
mechanism is that it is one of structural reproduction.  A structure of social relations, once 
subjectivized as a “system of behavior,” is then reproduced (objectivized) in the text as a 
                                                 
38 See, for example, “Problems” 161-63, where Pereverzev speaks of the text as a “complex organic structure” 
constituted by the interaction of “living images.” 
 
39 Thus a simplistic version of Pereverzev’s “sociological” analysis may give us something like this: In the image 
(obraz) of Pechorin we find the embodiment of a distinct social character (kharakter)—that of the Russian large 
landowner class at the moment of its historic eclipse; Pechorin’s psychological make-up dominates the semantic 
aspect of Hero of Our Time; characters and events are seen “through his eyes”; etc.  
 
40 See Fokht’s reading of the character of Lermontov’s Demon, Pospelov’s analysis of Lavretskii’s character in A 
Nest of Gentlefolk (“Stil'”), and Pereverzev’s discussion of character types in the novels of Goncharov (“K 
voprosu”). 
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structure of images.41  In other words, the social “character” is to be identified with the structure 
as such, and not with separate instances of representation within it (fictional characters).42 An 
appeal, therefore, must be made to a more general meaning of obraz, as well as “image,” 
which—not without some strain—would allow them to stand for the totality of what the text 
depicts (an “image of the world” or an “image of reality”) and, thus, be virtually synonymous 
with two broader terms: respectively, izobrazhenie and “representation.”  
Here is the place to remember that in the Formalists’ theorizing of artistic construction 
“device” turns up on two distinct levels of analytical description: as a designation of a particular 
instance within a totality (an individual device within the text) and as a figuration of this very 
totality (the artistic text, or even art itself, as a device).  But the same is the case with obraz in 
the poetics of the sociological school: it appears both as an individuation within the text (a 
portrayal of something or someone) and as an individuation of the whole (a historically and 
class-specific representation of reality in its subjective dimension).  In that it is a dynamic 
interaction of formal devices, the text in Formalist poetics can be said to be itself a “Device,” 
                                                 
41  “Style is a phenomenon relative to class.  The psychology of this or that class is imprinted in the whole aggregate 
of elements in the literary work, which represents a unity.  In each historical period, the psychology of a given class 
possesses certain basic features that define the psychological character of that class.  These basic features are, so to 
speak, the foundation, the kernel, around which the other elements of class psychology are concentrated; they serve 
as the organizing principles of the given psychology, giving it a definite form […]. 
These organizing psychological elements are reflected in the formative principles of the artistic work, in general, 
and of literature, in particular; they are realized, materialized, so to speak, in the laws of literary construction.  
We must emphasize that the basic elements of [class] psychology are not, by themselves, [identical with] style; 
style is the product of class consciousness objectivized in the literary work; being objectivized, its basic elements 
serve as the principles of organization of [literary] images” (Khrapchneko 27; emphasis in the original). 
 
42 Pospelov explains the relation between particular character-images in the text and the overall “image” of the text 
in the following terms: “Within the limits of the poetic work, an order of social group experiences manifests itself as 
a concrete system of motifs.  When speaking about poetic structures, we will refer to this system as a complex of 
psychological motifs—a socio-psychological complex, by which we understand that very same subjective aspect of 
social relations between people, which has been poetically canonized” (“K metodike” 67; emphasis in the original). 
“If we call [this] entire complex, in all of its aspects, an ‘image,’ it is because the distinctive being of the socio-
psychological complex becomes particularly visible and intelligible for us exactly in the plane of poetic imagery, 
within the well-defined logical confines of the ‘image.’  The images of the ‘dramatic personae,’ of the agents in the 
work of fiction, are its main constituents […]” (“K metodike” 78; emphasis in the original).  
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something that functions in a certain way, a working mechanism.  Similarly, by virtue of being a 
peculiar organization of images, the text can be imaged forth by Pereverzev and his followers as 
an entity that behaves in a certain way, an Obraz, a character-image.43  
In Formalist theory, the identity of these two levels—the particulars of artistic 
construction and its totality—is secured through the so-called “governing constructive principle” 
(dominanta): because all formal elements in the text are governed in their functioning by this 
principle, they function as a whole, a Device.  A similar situation obtains when the text is 
considered from the point of view of socio-psychological content.  Here the totalizing mediator 
is called, variously, a “tendency,” “principle,” or “complex.”  Because, as bearers of meaning, all 
individual image-motifs serve to articulate a tendency or principle, they are not a mere 
cumulation, but constitute a systematic whole.  Hereby a transition is also implemented from 
object to subject, from the depicted to its depictor: through the manifest “thereness” of a 
represented world, a trans-individual agency becomes intelligible, so that this image of the world 
is now, equally, a Character.  For the analyst, therefore, it is a question of identifying the 
“tendency” or “principle” that has thus totalized the text: “Marxism approaches literary 
phenomena with confidence, in full awareness of the fact that it will be able to dissect the whole 
fabric of the poetic with the sharp scalpel of its method, reaching the core where the object and 
subject, both the depiction and the expression of being, are organically combined, where the 
principle of its regular laws and necessity reveals itself” (Pereverzev, “Premises” 63).44 
The scalpel referred to above is, obviously, a tool of dissection only to the extent to 
which it is, also, a tool of reconstitution.  For it is through this surgical intervention alone that the 
                                                 
43  Robert Louis Jackson has used the compound in its reversed form (“image-character”) to render Pereverzev’s use 
of obraz. 
44 See also Pereverzev, “Pisarev” 16 and Pospelov, “K metodike” 59. 
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text can be reinstated into its truth.  Only at the site of the analytical incision does it reconnect 
with itself, revealing its true nature as a reproduction of social being.  That this truth is in no way 
manifestly given, but is subsequent to the hard labor of the analyst, is emphasized time and time 
again by Pereverzev and his colleagues: 
[The] first step in a Marxist investigation of the poetic text consists in finding the 
subject in the object depicted in the literary work, in discovering the depictor in 
that which is depicted.  It is not so very easy to do this.  Finding the subject in 
question in the object depicted requires a close examination of all the elements of 
the poetic structure, strenuous attention to the smallest details of the scene 
portrayed, persistent thought, scholarly sensitivity, and even vigilance and 
perspicacity. (Pereverzev, “Premises” 60)   
In the moment when the textual Darstellung is shown to be a necessary and lawful 
structuration governed by a single principle/tendency, is the moment when the anagogic level is 
attained, when the “scene portrayed” acquires the features of a living being, a trans-individual 
personality (Obraz).45  But, from this, it follows once again that the anagogic (Social-)World-
cum-Character should be identified with the textual structure as a whole, and not with a 
particular embodiment within it (a fictional character, “hero”);46 it is to be found in the totality of 
interrelations that constitute this structure.47  He who brings these interrelations to the light of 
                                                 
45 In Northrop Frye’s system, the anagogic is the last level of figural representation, the furthest possibility for a 
figural embodiment of meaning.  See Frye 151-58. 
 
46 Thus, from Bespalov’s analysis of Gor'kii’s early stories, it becomes clear that the “character” reproduced in the 
text is not to be confused with either of the two central character-types; it emerges from their structural opposition, 
which articulates the vacillating social position of the urban petty bourgeoisie. 
 
47 “The order of experiences of a given social group, fixed in a verbal structure, creates through its features the 
characteristics that permeate all aspects of this verbal structure, thus forging a distinctive poetic style” (Pospelov, “K 
metodike” 66). 
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knowledge and shows their “regular laws and necessity”—the carrier of specialized knowledge, 
the analyst—is an indispensable agency in the plot of the text’s exitence.  
Once the content-generating principle/tendency has been identified, the textual elements, 
on all levels of the structure, can be seen as falling into two distinct categories: the “autogenic” 
and “heterogenic” ones (Pospelov, “K metodike” 101).  The former are those in which the 
organizing principle has been realized more or less directly; the latter—those that contribute 
indirectly to its realization.  In the former, according to Pospelov’s terminology—the said 
principle is “subjectified” (sub''ektivirovan), while in the latter it is only “objectified” 
(ob''ektivirovan): 
The organizing [socio-psychological] complex can be subjectified in the literary 
work, in which case the work would contain an organizing image or images, those 
images into which the organizing complex is subjectified.  In the other case, the 
organizing complex can be only objectified in the literary work, and then the latter 
would not feature an organizing image.  [Griboedov’s] Woe from Wit can serve as 
an example of the first instance: the socio-psychological complex subjectified 
here in the character of Chatskii organizes the structure of the play.  [Gogol’s] 
Dead Souls can be cited as an example of the second instance: none of the socio-
psychological complexes subjectified into the character-images of the “poem” 
organizes it fully; the organizing complex here is objectified in all these images 
and organizes them from outside. (Pospelov, “K metodike” 83-84; emphasis in the 
original) 
Through Pospelov’s abstruse language we can still glimpse the reason for the rather 
symptomatic misreading discussed earlier.  Although, in principle, all character-images in the 
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text are equally important for the realization of the “organizing complex,” in certain 
circumstances some of them (i.e., the “autogenic” ones) stand as “more equal than others.”48 
Under these circumstances, one character-image—let us say, Chatskii—could seem to have 
determined from within, through an agency all of its own, the textual presentation.  Now all other 
characters in the play, their roles and trajectories, the manner in which they are presented, would 
appear to be subordinated to the character of Chatskii.  They would exist for another, i.e., as 
sheer “material.” 
But is it even possible to think a character-image as fully autochtonous in relation to the 
structuring principle of the text-as-totality, and thus—as fully embodying the anagogic Character 
(Obraz) that reproduces itself through the text?  For the critics of the sociological school, the 
answer was firmly negative.  A positive answer would imply that the much-sought-for nexus of 
the representational structure—the point where a represented world “turns” into self-
reproducing/representing subject—is not hidden at all, but is there, on the surface of 
representation, in the body of a fictional character.  Rather than residing in the space of 
hermeneutic cognition, this nexus would be found in the space of the diegesis itself: in the figure 
of one of its characters, the text would appear to have always-already “read” itself; its latent 
actuality would be, also, its manifest “face,” and the intervention of specialized knowledge 
would be quite superfluous.    
 
                                                 
48 The same ambiguity emerges also in the Formalist dialectic of “device,” where, in relation to the governing 
constructive principle (dominanta), a given formal element or group of them can stand as privileged carriers of the 
said principle.  Thus, for instance, in Sterne’s Tristram Shandy the device of narrative digression is, clearly, in 
privileged relation to the operating dynamic of the whole.  But this is so because—to remember—the dynamic in 
question consists simply in the fact that a given creative gesture (in the case of Tristram—the idiosyncratic 
meandering of fictional narration) is promoted at the expense of others (namely, those associated with the habitual 
unfolding of an autobiographical story).  Although the latter are equally “form,” they necessarily appear as less 
“formal,” or not “formal” at all (which makes Tynianov’s reminder—that the subjugated elements, i.e., the so-called 
“material,” are also formal—a necessary one). 
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CHAPTER THREE: ORGANIZATION 
 
 
The life we discern in the general realm called “artistic text” is not exclusive to it.  Beyond the 
artistic text proper, other spheres of human experience are configured similarly around the basic 
fact of lost authorship.  Twentieth-century Western knowledge has made three of these spheres 
especially prominent: the economic sphere, human interiority, and semiosis.  For us thus far, 
“this” was “text,” and “this” turned out to be a systemic organization of elements and functions, 
a dynamic ensemble of interrelations, a totality, whose objective determinations exceed the 
purview of the individual who is its putative master.  For the historical moment loosely identified 
as “Western modernity,” the same crucial fact is “discovered” by political economy, 
psychoanalysis, and linguistics: “this” exceeds the grasp of him who owns it by an irreducible 
shadowy margin.  After Marx, the “market” exceeds the simple intercourse of production and 
consumption, just as “commodity” exceeds “product”; after Freud, the psychic apparatus exceeds 
the comfortable self-possession of the ego-cogito; and after Saussure, “language” exceeds the 
immediacy of speech.  The measure of excess is called, respectively, “exchange value,” “the 
unconscious,” and “signification.”  Instituting a peculiar modern cryptology, these items are 
more (or less) than mere facts, more (or less) than “real.”  For they set the terms for a completely 
new experience of what is “true” and what is “real”, and are, to that extent, immune to 
ontological or epistemological challenges.  They define, in relation to the individual subject, the 
extent to which the fullness of the empirical, of “this,” evades him.  These are the names of 
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modern hungers, the respective obstacles that prevent the full consumption of material life, the 
full absorption of the inner into the self, and the full availability of speech to expression.  
Because there is “exchange of commodities,” “an unconscious,” and “signification,” existential 
value, identity, and meaning are not fully present to the individual subject.  Rather, they are 
presented away from him, re-presented. 
What separates the thing of use from the “commodity,” the intended from the realized 
meaning of speech, the psychic act from its true significance, is a movement of re-presentation 
with no subject (at least not in any traditional sense).  I want “re-presentation” here to stand for 
the process of casting-away of values supposedly present to the individual, where “casting” is 
equally “throwing” and “giving shape.”  Through the market, signification, and the “primary 
process,” the elements that constitute my material, linguistic, and psychic life are “cast away” in 
another place, on “another scene” (Andere Schauplatz, as Freud has it).  In this sense I am giving 
it here, “re-presentation” is tantamount to trans-valuation: both a transposition and assignment of 
value somewhere else.   
Who is the author of representation, understood in these novel terms?  Who imparts the 
definitive value-form to the materialities of outer and the intangibles of inner life?  Thus far we 
encountered only very particular answers to this question, coming from two particular 
experiences of “this” as “artistic text,” and the answers were: “formal construction” and “socio-
psychological complex.”  Other particular answers, in respect to the experience of “this” as 
“economic life,” “interiority,” and “communication,” could be phrased as the “system of 
exchange,” the “psychic complex,” the “mechanism of signification.”  Obviously, the nominal 
terms in these phrasings are readily substitutable for one another (we can just as well say the 
“complex of economic relations,” the “psychic mechanism,” the “system of signification”), 
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which points us to the general answer: the generator of representations, their true “author,” is the 
system in its systematicity, the Device as such.  Far from being mere cummulations of facts or 
events, the economic, the psychic, and the semiotic were found to be systematically working 
aggregates.  Never mind that the “work” in question appeared sometimes with the grinning face 
of deceit and sometimes under the countenance of play (the play of the signifier, the tricks and 
jokes of the unconscious, the ludic existence of the commodity form49).  To be sure, 
deceitfulness or dissimulation are not characteristics of the Device and the work it performs, only 
of its relation to the individual subjective consciousness.   
This basic situation—which warrants the label “predicament” only insofar as we are 
assuming the point of view of the “castaway,” i.e., of the supposedly centered individual 
subject—becomes “plot” when we figure into it the act that ends the masquerade and puts an end 
to the dissimulation.  Thus far, we have encountered it as a hermeneutic act, an exercise of 
method, a conquest of analytical knowledge.  But this is only half of the story.  For this climactic 
act can equally well take place on the other side, the side opposite knowledge, usually called 
“reality.”  It is a true double act full of ambiguity: what knowledge accomplishes in regard to 
“this” can also be effected internally by the immanent logic by which “this” exists.  The same 
event—the overcoming of dissimulation—can occur “in analysis,” but it can also occur “in 
reality,” in the very objectivity that knowledge observes.   
                                                 
49 “A commodity appears at first sight an extremely obvious, trivial thing.  But its analysis brings out that it is a very 
strange thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.  So far as it is a use-value, there is 
nothing mysterious about it, whether we consider it from the point of view that by its properties it satisfies human 
needs, or that it first takes on these properties as the product of human labour.  It is absolutely clear that, by his 
activity, man changes the forms of the materials of nature in such a way as to make them useful to him.  The form of 
wood, for instance, is altered if a table is made out of it.  Nevertheless the table continues to be wood, an ordinary, 
sensuous thing.  But as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness.  
It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and 
evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free 
will” (Marx, Capital 163-64). 
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Let us consider the example we already encountered in the discussion of Russian 
Formalism.  There we saw that the hermeneutic act unveils, “lays bare” for us, the 
conventionality of the artistic text and of art itself in its historical being.  The act becomes double 
when we realize that there, in art’s actual existence, quite independently of scholars who might 
or might not heed it, an objective movement also brings about the “laying bare of the device.”  
Contemporaneous with (and very much aligned with) the Formalist movement in criticism, the 
poetic practice of the Russian Futurists was to bring about “in practice” that terminal episode in 
the existence of art when the artistic text is nothing more than the blunt exposure of its own 
formal determinants.  Most conspicuously in the work of Velimir Khlebnikov and Aleksei 
Kruchenykh, Russian Futurist poetry became a “practical analysis” of textuality and language.  
Here the creative act itself demonstrated the hitherto concealed being of poetic speech.  And this 
concrete demonstration was, in turn, always ready to become a general statement, to be 
abstracted into “theory” by those who performed it.  Thus Kruchenykh could cite the example of 
his own famous piece “Dyr-bul-shchyl” after he wrote on the nature of verse:  
The structure [struktura] of the word or of verse consists of its component 
parts (sound, letter, syllable, etc.); let’s symbolize them as a—b—c—d. 
The texture [faktura] of the word consists in the arrangement of these parts 
(a—d—c—b,  or b—c—d—a , or in still other ways); texture is the making 
[delanie] of the word, its construction, layering, accretion, the distribution in one 
way or another of syllables, letters, and words” (qtd. Al'fonsov 55; emphasis in 
the original).50   
                                                 
50 In Kruchenykh’s usage, struktura refers to the systematicity of language and poetic speech as latent, while 
faktura refers to the moment when this systematicity is made manifest through literary practice, through poetic 
“making.”  
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So we shall now turn to that other side, the side of the “real world,” where the making of 
words and things takes place: from the systematicity of “this” as discovered by knowledge, to the 
systematicity of “this” as a field of practices.  This is not only a methodological turn called for 
by the purposes of the present discussion; it is just as much a call that resounds in Soviet culture 
of the post-revolutionary years: 
Our epoch is characterized by the fact that mankind, because of the increasing 
collectivization of the productive forces of society, is moving from systematicity in 
knowledge (in this case, theoretical linguistics) to systematicity in practice, to 
organization (the construction of language).  Mankind is beginning consciously 
and intentionally to create and advance those elements of life that, up to now, 
seemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of society’s organizational-practical 
interference (psychology, the laws of physiology, the labor process and along with 
these, language). (Arvatov, “Rechetvorchestvo” 91; emphasis in the original) 
Addressing primarily the possibility of creating a new language for a new society, Boris Arvatov 
had, obviously, a much broader frame of reference.  He envisioned a transition “from 
systematicity in knowledge to systematicity in practice” across most various spheres of human 
experience, of which the linguistic was but one.  The “elements of life” in all these spheres, 
hitherto constellated in the shadow of subjective consciousness, had begun to emerge from that 
shadow.  And there had opened now the prospect of a human creation, of “construction,” as 
Arvatov calls it, of “making” (delanie), as Kruchenykh calls it.  But this proud, revolutionary, 
activity shall not reinstate the individual’s alienated rights to authorship, nor shall it simply 
transfer them onto some collective subject.  Whoever their subject, “making” and “construction” 
do not quite amount to authorship, for “making” here does not mean original creation, and 
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“construction” is not to be understood as erection ad nihilum.  The kind of praxis these acts 
constitute is less originary than regulatory.  And thus it is not by chance that where Kruchenykh 
uses “making” and “construction” he also speaks of “arrangement,” and where Arvatov says 
“construction,” he equates it with “organization.”  
“Organization” became a slogan word in the 1920s in large part due to the theoretical 
work of Aleksandr Bogdanov (pseudonym of Aleksandr Malinovskii, 1873-1928).  Long before 
becoming the founder and leading figure of the Proletkult movement (initiated in 1917, on the 
eve of the Revolution), Bogdanov was working on an analytic of “life” in which the project of a 
revolutionary culture to come would be immanently grounded.  He believed that the scope of 
Marx’s hermeneutic had to be expanded toward the utmost horizons of the empirical world 
(Bogdanov, Tektologiia 134).  The positive knowledge to be derived from studying the historical 
experience of mankind was to be coopted by the positive findings of the natural sciences 
(Bogdanov, Tektologiia 77-79).  At their meeting point, these two hitherto disconnected pursuits, 
were to coalesce into a new, truly universal science (Bogdanov, Tektologiia 50-52, 78-79).51  The 
Tektology (1912-1929), Bogdanov’s grand theoretical project, was to institute such a science by 
generalizing the apparently heterogeneous existence of the empirical.  Where others saw 
heterogeneity, Bogdanov saw a common mode of being for all things available to experience.  
The name of this common mode of being was “organization”: 
Drawing on the facts and ideas of contemporary science we reach the only 
exhaustive, the only monistic understanding of the universe.  The universe 
presents itself as an endlessly unfolding panoply of forms at different degrees and 
levels of organization: from the unknown to us elements of the ether to the human 
collectives and the planetary systems.  All these forms—in their interweaving and 
                                                 
51  See also Bogdanov, “Taina” 404-405. 
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mutual struggle—constitute the universal organizational process: endlessly 
dividing itself into parts, boundless and seamless in its wholeness.  Thus, the 
realm of organizational experience coincides with the realm of experience as such.  
Organizational experience is nothing other than all of our experience considered 
from an organizational point of view, i.e., as a world of organizing and 
disorganizing processes. (Tektologiia 73; emphasis in the original). 
Every empirical fact can be understood as composed of activities and resistances, of 
“organizing” and “disorganizing” elements (Bogdanov, Tektologiia 118-25).  To that extent, 
every moment of experience, regardless of its provenance, falls under the competence of 
tektology, the general science of organization.   
As Bogdanov explains (Tektologiia 92), the word “tektology” derives from the Greek 
sememe for making, building, and construction (teuchô, tekton).  A science of organization it is, 
yet a science that wants to make and do, just as much as it wants to know.52  Like Pereverzev53 
and many other revolutionary critics of the time, Bogdanov was wont to quote Marx’s imperative 
for a cognition that does not just interpret, but transforms the world.54  That the world is 
ubiquitously “tektological” means that it is ubiquitously open to “organizational-practical 
interference.”55  If everywhere we turn we only find a factually existing organization of things, 
ideas, or activities, then all these fields of objectivity, in their bewildering multiplicity, offer 
themselves as fields for the praxis of organization (Bogdanov, Tektologiia 106).  And it is a 
shame that language, as we have it and use it, does not bear out this universality.  For we can say 
                                                 
52  See Bogdanov, Tektologiia 57. 
 
53  See note 28. 
 
54  The reference is to Marx, “Theses” 243. 
 
55  See the quotation from Arvatov above. 
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“to organize a party,” or “to organize a meeting,” but why do we still say “to write,” and not “to 
organize” a book, to “construct,” and not “to organize” a building (Bogdanov, Tektologiia 95-
96)?56  Yet the construction of a building and the writing of a book are equally organizational 
activities, as they involve the coordination of multiple elements into an effective whole 
(Bogdanov, Tektologiia 99).  The linguistic impediment proceeds from the impediment of 
history; it is the stuttering of an imperfect historical world in which human endeavor has been 
disjointed, split up into specialized “occupations,” and is no longer recognized as common and 
one.57 
It should be noted that Bogdanov uses “organization” in two different senses, which hold 
in English usage, as they do in Russian: organization as a fact and as an act, as an objectively 
existing state of affairs and as praxis.  As long as we are in the world of nature, this distinction 
poses no problem.  Crystals, planetary systems, and living bodies are all organized entities; the 
subject is implied and irrelevant: nothing is to be gained by identifying Nature as the “organizer” 
of these structures.  The fact has precedence over the act.  As soon as we cross over into the man-
made world, however, the ambiguity sets in.  “A society of men” is both a fact and a hidden 
imperative, it is both a neutral description and a call to action.  The genitive works both ways: to 
assign to the organizational structure (society) its constitutive elements (men), leaving in 
abeyance the question of agency; or to charge these same elements (men) with the responsibility 
                                                 
56  See also Bogdanov, “Taina” 407-408. 
 
57 “The problem is that specialization […] undermines the homogeneity of the [class] collective, it engenders 
disunity, mutual misunderstanding, and thence also contradictions between its differentiated elements; then [the 
class collective] is no longer one in its life and constructive work, and is incapable of producing a unified and 
wholesome structure for the entire society.  Such was the case with the bourgeoisie: it never became a true 
collective, it could not devise any form of organization other than the anarchic.  And to the extent to which the 
proletariat is ruled by the specializing powers of bourgeois culture, it too manifests disunity, which turns into direct 
contradictions” (Bogdanov, Tektologiia 50). 
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for their own creation (society). Alternately, man stands as that which is being “organized” and 
as that which organizes, as the object and subject of organization.   
In thinking and toiling, ordering and executing, man is the organizer of ideas and 
materialities, of life.  Yet through the entire expanse of history, this very life, as an objective 
system of interrelations, has exceeded the purview of its supposed organizer.  The fact of 
organization has been in excess of the act.  In the bourgeois world, this discrepancy manifests 
itself as a conflict between an individual, “specialized,” subjective consciousness and the 
objective-latent communality of human experience: 
The “absolute” individual “I” expresses the socially fragmented experience of 
man and his existential opposition to others.  It is clear that the unity of the social 
whole is outside of his field of vision.  Not only is this unity invisible to the 
individual: it is also imperfect, elemental, unorganized, full of existential 
contradictions.  The individual is overcome by these contradictions of the 
unattainable and incomprehensible whole; he is powerless in front of them; the 
elemental forces of social life reign over him.  (“Sobiranie” 37; emphasis in the 
original) 
Closely following Marx,58 Bogdanov rehearses the already familiar scenario in which a 
totality of interrelations outstrips the powers of the individual and thus remains transcendent to 
his consciousness.  When he says “man,” Bogdanov, clearly, does not mean this individual.  
Rather, “man” is an ontological imperative addressed to the individual.  As he explains earlier in 
the same essay, “man” is more than either the corporeal or psychic-ideal identity of the 
individual subject.  “Man is the entire world of experience” (“Sobiranie” 29; emphasis in the 
original).  Such a definition, of course, in no way means that a person could possibly possess all 
                                                 
58 See note 30. 
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experience accumulated by humanity through its history (Bogdanov, “Sobiranie” 43).  What he 
could possess, however, is the common content of all human experience: those organizational 
forms and methods that underlie and unify the life of nature and human culture.  This optimal 
condition would permit each person to relate to and assimilate, if necessary, the experience 
accumulated by any other (Bogdanov, “Sobiranie” 43-44).  
We are given to understand that the individual is the historical distortion-dissimulation of 
man’s genuine being.  A historically specific organization of socio-economic relations has 
“presented” man away from himself and into the “individual.”  The predicament of this re-
presentation can be reversed through what Bogdanov calls the “conscious-systematic gathering 
of man” (“Sobiranie” 42).  Man is to be gathered back from his incomplete and dissimulative 
existence as an individual-subjective monad, he is to be retrieved from his being-represented.  
But what and whose is the agency through which such a lofty project would become 
reality?  Does this agency rest with “us who know”?  Is it a matter of “us who know” installing 
consciousness in “them who don’t,” of educating the masses, of organizing their communal 
existence?  The answer is equivocally affirmative: the “conscious-systematic gathering of man” 
can be “our” doing only because it is the immanent doing of the historical process itself.  For 
there, in the historical reality of today, the gathering of man is already under way.  The same 
inexorable mechanism that has fragmented human being is now working toward manifesting the 
truth-reality of that being.   
Inherent to the productive activity of every individual—the measure by which this 
activity is never equal to itself—is the fact that it takes place within an immanent organization of 
society’s productive forces.  As the forces of production develop, they obscure ever further this 
essential fact.  In advanced bourgeois society the process reaches a crisis, which is at the same 
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time anastasis.  The specialization of the production process, the farthest alienation of labor from 
labor’s true character, has made man a “cog in the machine,” it has reduced him to a mere 
accessory.  Yet also there, where he is at his most atomized, where he has become one blind 
motion, man is inexorably driven back to the fullness of his being.  And what thus brings him 
back from re-presentation, what “retrieves” him or “gathers” him, is, once again, a device: 
The machine was born in the world of competition and social antagonism.  As 
we know, the machine sharpened and brought to the limit this competition and 
this antagonism.  But, thereby, it also sharpened and increased the need for 
development.   In each sphere of [capitalist] competition there arises the need for 
ceaseless, planned perfection of technologies.  This need is satisfied through the 
elaboration of new technical methods. 
The common technical methods bring machines ever closer to their highest 
type: the automatic mechanism.  This process […] decreases, immediately and 
directly, the importance of specialization by increasing the homogeneity between 
various forms of labor. (“Sobiranie” 41-42; emphasis in the original)59 
And further still, the increased homogeneity of various labors calls a future in which the machine 
will relieve man of all but one task: that of supervision and organization (Bogdanov, Tektologiia 
108).  Becoming more self-sufficient, the machine progressively eliminates the great divide in 
man’s existence—that between intellectual and manual labor, between command and execution 
(Bogdanov, “Obshchestvo” 93; “Stroi” 300).  It calls into existence a new type of human being 
in whom the “practical” is immediately the “intellectual,” and vice versa: his practical 
involvement is the exercise of his organizational intelligence. 
                                                 
59 See also Bogdanov, “Obshchestvo” 91-94; “Stroi” 296-99. 
 
  
 71
As it works, the automated mechanism of the machine also works out the latent reality of 
human existence.  As it produces, it also produces the realization that this existence is communal 
and shared, that it is, essentially, organization.  In other words, the machine produces 
consciousness.60  And thus, as history draws closer to its great turning point, the machine comes 
to symbolize-embody in a powerful metaphor the nature of the historical process itself.  For isn’t 
history just such a mechanism that works systematically and works out in the determinate course 
of its operations the genuine organization of human life?  
 If the machine can be experienced as a maker of a veritable historical revolution, it is just 
as true that the Revolution taking place in history can be experienced as a machine-like 
mechanism, inexorably precise and effective in the execution of its “iron formulas”: 
The materialist dialectics of class struggle—here is the genuine algebra of the 
revolution.  What the naked eye sees on the arena [of history] is chaos, turbulence, 
formlessness, and boundlessness.  But this chaos has been calculated and 
accounted for.  Its stages have been foreseen.  The lawfulness of their succession 
has been anticipated and clasped into iron formulas […].  Revolutionary strategy 
is not formless, like an elemental force, but complete, like a mathematical 
formula.  For the first time in history we see the revolutionary algebra in action.  
(Trotsky 2) 
This experience of history, which belongs properly to the domain of politics, is not 
altogether different from the experience of the text that we observed in two instances of early-
                                                 
60  “[…] machine production transforms the proletariat […] into a class infused with working consciousness, infused 
with positive attitude toward labor, a class that realizes the meaning and value of labor […]. In the worker’s 
thinking, the idea of labor occupies a central position: it serves as a starting point for him.  In his inner world […] 
there develops, firstly, the love of labor and, secondly, the pride in labor, because he sees constantly […] how labor 
overcomes nature, overcomes the elemental forces.  All this is done by the machine, which carries the self-
consciousness of labor […].” (Bogdanov, Elementy 38-39). 
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twentieth-century poetics.  Both “text” and “history” offer themselves to the “naked eye” as 
something other than what they truly are, and what they truly are is a systemic aggregate that 
works according to its immanent laws.  (It matters little whether this systemic aggregate is called 
“device,” “complex,” “living organization,” “dynamic structure,” or something else.)  What we 
must now observe is the peculiar kind of praxis engendered when an “eye” no longer naked, but 
properly equipped, approaches “this” and regards it as a field for “organizational-practical 
interference.” 
At the most general level, this kind of praxis is characterized by a fateful hesitation 
between subjective agency and objective determination, a hesitation that is not an overture to 
some fulfillment in the subsequent act, but is what constitutes and characterizes the act itself.  As 
soon as revolutionary will demarcates its “arena,” it discovers that this arena—whether it be 
society, language, psyche, art, etc.—possesses an immanent dynamic of its own, that it functions 
as an autonomous device.  Hence, the ensuing cultural act, whether it calls itself “organization,” 
“construction, “making,” etc., must recognize as authoritative the objective movement that takes 
place “there,” in the arena; it must synchronize itself with this movement and somehow belong to 
it.  This means, for example, that a project of radical education, aimed at transforming human 
consciousness, must take into account the transformation already taking place there through the 
actual alteration of socio-economic conditions; it means that any impulse toward radical 
reorganization of language must recognize that language is already being remodeled “there” by 
the objective demands of the revolutionary present; it means that any project aimed at producing 
the true revolutionary text must reckon with the movement through which reality itself is already 
“writing” this very text.  Because there is such a wager between agency and objective 
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determination, no praxis can be authoritative without ceasing to be authorial.  For its authority 
would come from nowhere other than the objective and autonomous functioning of the Device. 
Now that we are on the side of praxis, the culminating act of our plot is, of course, not a 
hermeneutic intervention, but an act of “organizational-practical interference.”  Whether political 
or artistic, this act is always double, for as it “makes” and “creates” it, simultaneously, gives up 
authorship and gives in to the authoritative power of a new objectivity working independently of 
it.  The theoretical knowledge that we considered earlier in the two “scientific” approaches to 
artistic creation does not count its activity as anything substantial, as in any way altering the 
object under investigation (the text), but as a pure translucency toward the object’s latent truth.  
The kind of cultural act we are about to consider is similarly constituted.  Just as the intervention 
of that knowledge does not really create the truth of the text, but merely “lets it show,” so the 
praxis that corresponds to it does not really create a new reality, but, rather, helps to bring into 
the light of day the essential, yet hitherto concealed, reality of “this.”  As it “interferes” into a 
given field of objectivity, it thereby merely “lets it be.”  
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CHAPTER FOUR: IMPERATIVE OBJECTHOOD 
 
 
 
 
“The things are coming!” 
       (Mayakovsky, Mystery-Bouffe) 
 
In one of the inaugural statements of the newly constituted Left Front of the Arts (LEF), Nikolai 
Chuzhak was able to express eloquently this essential relationship between a nascent practice 
and the imperative objectivity of its field: “There—an entire uprising of things [is taking place] 
as a result of some process of dialectically developing matter, produced by an unknown 
collective artist-creator; and here—even the very construction of the thing, even the production 
of values [exists] as some barely reachable, dreamed-of ideal!” (“Pod znakom”13; emphasis 
added).  Ostensibly, “here” is my studio, my writing desk, the place where something called 
“art” is still being made—the sanctified domain of aesthetic creation.  “There” are the streets and 
the masses, the factories and production, the exertion of labor at its most pragmatic and the 
procession of life at its most mundane.  But “here” and “there” are also the essential coordinates 
of representation in the traditional sense, the places, respectively, of the representing subject and 
the object to be represented.  And the project of the Soviet left avant-garde should be understood 
as an attempt to collapse the distance between the two, to make them one.  This project, in its 
various modes and phases—from the “making of the thing,” through constructivism and 
production art, to the biography of the object and the literature of the fact—unfolds in the 
dramatic divide between “here” and “there,” between a point of departure, where the subject and 
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his expressions still subsist, and a point of anticipated fulfillment, where they are to be abolished, 
swallowed in the movement of “dialectically-developing matter.”   
A cultural agency is thereby constituted whose essence lies in the active disavowal of 
one’s being-here.  Saying this amounts to quite a bit more than restating Bakunin’s famous “I 
don’t want to be ‘I’, I want to be ‘We’.”  Certainly, the space from “here” to “there” can be 
understood as the separation between the individual and the collective and further thematized 
within the ongoing drama of the Russian intelligentsia: its desire and inability to merge with the 
masses, to be the true voice of the narod, etc.; much in the history of the Soviet left avant-garde 
would testify to similar desire and similar inability.  But if we are to avoid uncritical conflations, 
we must see how the masses of the 1920s are different from “the masses” of the nineteenth-
century Russian populist movement, or, for that matter, from any other figuration of the 
communal in Russian history.   
For one, the masses of the 1920s are working and producing masses, by which I mean 
some fairly obvious and some not-so-obvious things.  Most obviously, these are proletarian 
masses, and so they are working in factories and manufactures, they are producing goods and 
material goodness.  In so doing, the masses stand in, “fill in,” for something that is beyond them: 
the totality of production and consumption, the economic mechanism as such.  The masses are 
not quite it.  They are not quite “there” yet.  These millions of bodies, minds, and muscles are 
still not one with the Device that works through them, the Device whose most truthful figuration 
is not the organized working collective, but the perfect cohesion and regularity of the machine.  
In this sense, the Soviet machinism of the late 1910s and early 1920s was driven much less by 
Taylorist utilitarian concerns, than by the realization that the human mass is an imperfect 
subsidiary to the mechanism of production.  In those days it was possible to claim, as Aleksandr 
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Gastev did, that the people are not yet worthy of the infrastructure created through Lenin’s 
electrification program (Vosstanie 21).61  Gastev’s attitude was echoed by the peeved words of 
Sergei Tret'iakov, one of the leading spokesmen of LEF: “Every movement, every step of the 
people, their inability to achieve harmony in work, even their inability to walk in the street in a 
sensible way, to get on a streetcar, to get out of an auditorium without crushing each other, is a 
sign of the couterrevolutionary action of tonguetiedness, blindness, and lack of training” 
(“Otkuda” 202). 
Just under the streets, with their hustle and bustle, beyond the exertion of labor at its 
most pragmatic and the procession of life at its most mundane, lies the essential reality of all 
these things: the actuality of the masses as an organized communal collectivity, the actuality of 
labor as a totality of productive activities, and the actuality of life as a process of “dialectically 
developing matter.”  To say that the masses, the forms of labor, and quotidian life in general are 
“not there yet” is to say that these are things to be worked on, organized, interfered with, that 
these are the insistent targets of a revolutionary practice.  For the Soviet left avant-garde, this 
practice begins (phenomenologically) from an inherited “state of affairs” characterized by 
falsehood and distortion, a “here” as a dissimulative plane of being.  Here is the proletarian 
multitude, still not living, still not acting as the total unity that it is; here is language, whose 
communicative efficiency lies dormant beneath the plethora of unnecessary conventions passed 
down from hoary pasts; here are all the things we use in our daily life—food, furniture, 
                                                 
61As the director of the Central Institute of Labor, Gastev’s most nagging preoccupation was that of reducing the 
gap between the “human, all too human” nature of physical labor and the inexorable functioning of the machine: 
“The contemporary machine, especially the machine complexes, have their laws of calibrations, executions, and 
respites, which are not in correspondence with the rhythmics of the human organism. [….]  We must introduce some 
corrective coefficients in [the machine’s] iron, disciplined oppression; but history insistently demands that we 
address not these small problems of individual safety, but the bold engineering of human psychology in accordance 
with such a decisive factor as machinism” (Gastev, Nashi zadachi 10). 
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clothes—still cast in obsolete shapes and volumes; and, finally, here are all the things called 
“works of art.”   
In the realm of artistic production, the predicament of not-being-there-yet derives from 
the inherited relation between a representing instance and represented objectivity.  The very 
difference and distance of one to the other was seen by the cultural workers of LEF as the source 
of falsehood and distortion.  For them, the page, the canvas, and the stage—those traditional 
enclosures of artistic representation—framed the disingenuous existence of the object.  It 
seemed quite obvious that, if the object is being made in absentia, re-presented, it could not 
possibly be the “real thing,” as it exists out there in the real world.  The blatant truism of such a 
proposition did little to tamper Mayakovsky’s passionate rejection of “celestial delights and 
bookish passions” in favor of “rye bread to chew […]/living woman to live with” (Misteriia 
170). Art as the distortive making of the object was to be abolished in favor of a true “creating of 
things” (tvorenie veshchei).  From the pages of the Futurist “Art of the Commune” (Iskusstvo 
kommuny, December, 1918-April, 1919), Osip Brik demanded: “Not to distort, but to create 
[tvorit'].  And not an ideal haze, but a material thing […].  We love our living, material, carnal 
life […].  If you, artists, are capable of creating, of making, then make for us our human nature, 
our human things” (qtd. Mazaev 134).   
The task was simple: to produce useful, material things, things to be chewed and lived 
with.  If the word “art” was to retain any positive meaning, it had to refer exclusively to this 
task.  In Brik’s definition, “art is the direct, material creation of things” (qtd. Mazaev 136).  
Those who, like Vsevolod Dmitriev, Nikolai Tarabukin, or Aleksei Gan, felt that the word “art” 
was irredeemably tainted by what it had previously designated, preferred to speak of “craft” or 
simply “qualified labor.”  By virtue of being “aesthetic,” the objects of traditional art were not 
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“real” or “material” enough; the process of their (previous) making was understood as 
dematerialization or de-realization.  Now this movement had to be reversed: leaving the 
illusionistic space of bourgeois aesthetics, creativity was to rediscover itself in the open “there,” 
where social life produced and reproduced itself.  Malevich’s famous Black Square had seemed 
to mark a turning point, or rather, an exit point: having reached the utmost limit of 
dematerialization here, on the canvas, the object now had only one way to go: piercing the 
surface of representation, moving outward, and taking place on the other side, among the 
material things of life.62  Referring to Malevich’s painting, El Lisistskii wrote: “If the slab of the 
square has blocked up the narrow channel of painterly culture (perspective), its reverse serves as 
the foundation for a new, volumetrical growth of the concrete world” (El 334).  Representation 
“in reverse” is simply the fattening of the world’s consumable materiality, the task of 
augmenting “our living, material, carnal life.” 
The cultural act that overcomes the dissimulation of the object or—which is the same 
thing—overcomes re-presentation, deals initially with something called “material.”  It imparts a 
form on this material en route to producing useful things.  Whatever the object is to be made 
from—stones, wood, linen—is found “out there”: a prosaic fact, which now acquires an 
additional significance.  The material for what Brik christened as the practice of “objectism” 
(veshchism) is found in such a state that it does not lend itself to arbitrary/voluntaristic 
appropriations.  It most certainly cannot be dragged “over here,” into the sphere of subjective 
artistic invention, into the studio, this parlor of aesthetic pleasures and idealistic elevations.  It 
must be worked “there.”   This means that the material is locked to a determining environment 
                                                 
62 The turning inside-out (or here-to-there) of the traditional space of representation is perhaps most visible on the 
example of theater.  In the projects of Vsevolod Meyerhold and Liubov' Popova (as in those of Berthold Brecht in 
Germany), the stage was to encroach onto the space formerly reserved for the audience and become the site of 
political demonstration, or the training ground for the rhythmics of movement and the efficiency of labor 
(Meyerhold’s school of “biomechanics”; see further in this chapter).   
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of social need and cannot be extracted from it.  It also means that the formative work performed 
on the material is of a peculiar kind: in creating, it does not really create; in transforming, it 
merely brings out what is already “there” (as the material’s immanent use value).  Here we 
might recall the stone from which Michelangelo made his famous statue, carving away 
everything that was not David.  Just as mysteriously as David had resided in the formless slab 
about to be sculpted, social need inhabits the material about to be made into a veshch'.   
Unlike the Formalists, who were also deliberating on the relationship of form to material, 
the theorists of objectism and, later, of industrial art and constructivism, saw the material as the 
active agency and form—as its subsidiary function.  As if pre-soaked in potential social use, the 
material is, thereby, endowed with an immanent preliminary structure, a utilitarian tectonic.  The 
formative activity is the bringing-out (vyiavlenie), actualization of this structure: “In ‘industrial 
craftsmanship’, the ‘content’ is the utilitarianism and expediency [tselesoobraznost'] of the thing 
[veshch'], its tectonism, which determines its form and construction and justifies its social 
purpose and function” (Tarabukin 18).  The reference to Bodganov is explicit not only in 
Tarabukin use of the word “tectonism,” but also in the significant encounter between 
organization as an act (the making, or construction of the object) and a fact (the material’s 
inherent texture).   
An associate of Bogdanov’s in the early years of the Proletkult movement, Boris Arvatov 
believed he had found the moment in history when the act had begun to betray the fact, when the 
construction of material things had departed from social utility as pre-invested in the material.63  
Through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, art had existed as craft, and the aesthetic quality 
of the object had been coincident with the level of its technical perfection.  The celebrated 
“artists” of those days had been simply the most qualified artisans.  “Giving form” to the 
                                                 
63 In the rest of the paragraph, I gloss Arvatov, Iskusstvo 3-13. 
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material at hand had meant realizing its social value in a technically competent manner.  In the 
seventeenth century, there occurred a radical break with this tradition.  Highly qualified artisans 
began forming workshops for the production of luxury items.  No longer part of the communal 
process of social construction, they saw their own work as somehow different from that of 
manufacture workers.  Their craft became “art.”  “Now artistic production was guided not by 
socio-technical tasks, but by socio-ideological ones” (Arvatov, Iskusstvo 12; emphasis in the 
original).  The material was now conceived as a means to an end, and this end (in itself) was 
“form”: 
They started making the legs of chairs in the shape of paws, door handles—in the 
shape of lilies, book covers—in the shape of grottoes, that is, they completely 
perverted the essential meaning of every production: instead of turning the 
elemental forms of nature into socially-utilitarian forms, they started modeling the 
socio-technical forms after the forms of nature, began copying their external 
appearance, forgetting that this appearance is the result of an organic structure 
[…] that has nothing in common with the construction of the particular objects. 
(Arvatov, Iskusstvo 13). 
No longer experienced as the carrier of social function, the material became the material for 
“representation.”  In that it now served to represent a lily, the metal of the door handle had been 
violated, its socio-technical structure/texture (faktura) obscured.   
 With this history (putative or not) in the background, the cultural project of the left avant-
garde becomes the restitution of the object into its latent-genuine being.   In their early days, the 
Formalists saw the purpose of artistic construction in “making stones ‘stony’” (Shklovskii, “Art” 
12); for Arvatov, “construction” works toward a similar end: it is the act that demonstrates the 
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texture of materialities.  Veshch', the thing, is simply the product of this demonstration.  Yet, it is 
not enough to say that a constructivist table, for example, is the result of making wood “woody” 
(instead of “pawy”).  Constructivism demonstrates not the natural properties of the material, not 
its “organic structure” (see above), but rather its socio-utilitarian texture (tectonic).  Marx’s 
table, which “stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas,”64 is stood 
up on its feet and firmly supported by objective social demand.  And yet, in the hands of the 
Soviet constructivists, it continues to be a curious thing.  While still a piece of wood, it already 
possesses a brain of sorts, for it knows in advance that it will become a table with a very 
determinate shape. 
To show how another material, textile, can “know” its socio-utilitarian texture, let us take 
an article on clothing design from the second issue of the journal LEF.  The article begins with a 
fairly typical declaration: in the revolutionary present, design that hearkens to the whims of 
aesthetic taste and market-dictated vogues must give way to “clothes [purposefully] organized 
for specific social action” (Varst 65).  Of course, taken by itself, the textile from which these 
clothes are to be made does not “know” anything, it does not dictate any specific cuts or stitches.  
But this is exactly the point: the material does not come by itself; it comes with its own 
particular “there”—the place where this or that costume is to be employed—and must be worked 
“there.”  The work itself is only partly the tailoring of the costume.  Just as important is its 
demonstration in “action,” at the work place: “The most important component [of workers’ 
clothing] becomes its texture [faktura], i.e., execution.  It is not enough to offer a design for a 
comfortable, ingeniously conceived costume—the costume must also be made and demonstrated 
at work; only then we can see it and have a conception of it” (Varst 65; emphasis in the 
                                                 
64 See note 49. 
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original).  If in the experimental poetic practice of the Futurists the linguistic faktura is the 
functioning of language made visible65 (predicated on demystifying language’s non-functional, 
“poetic” effects), the faktura of the material in constructivist practice is the making-visible of the 
material’s functionality (similarly predicated on demystifying its aesthetic appropriations).   
What the constructivists work with is never raw matter (syr'e).  Woven into the textile for 
workers’ clothing is an objective social commission (zadanie; Varst 65).  This commission 
should not be thought of as something separate, detachable from the material at hand—an ideal 
moment that must be “consulted” and “applied” in the process of making clothes.  Like 
Michelangelo’s David, it has somehow entered the material beforehand.  Now all that needs to 
be done is to make it manifest:  “The organization of the contemporary costume must proceed 
from the commission to its material modeling; from the specifics of the work for which the 
costume is intended—to the system of the cut” (Varst 65).  Once again the act of organization—
the modeling of the costume, the “system of the cut”—meets the fact—the specific organization 
of labor within which the costume is to function.  And then the act is no more than the 
demonstration of the fact, a laying-it-bare, letting-it-be.  Nothing is added to, nothing is 
subtracted from “this.”  In “making it,” “giving it form,” I simply let the primordial, essential 
being of “this,” its being-there (as an object within a systemic organization of social forces and 
needs) emerge from latency.  
The essential being of the text—its artistic construction or social character—emerges in 
the act of analysis.  Earlier, I referred to the experimental poetics of the Russian Futurists as a 
“practical analysis of language.”  Constructivist practice can justifiably be called the “practical 
analysis of things”; the end result of this analysis is that the faktura of things—their social 
character cum social construction—is made manifest.  These do not have to be, necessarily, 
                                                 
65 See p. 63. 
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material things: all material or ideological values count as veshchi (Chuzhak, “Pod znakom” 15, 
37-38).66  And so does the entity “man”—itself a complex of material and ideological values.   
Just like the trans-sense verses of the budetliane analyzed language in order to lay bare its 
morphological tectonic, Meyerhold’s constructivist theater was to be the practical analytic of 
human movement that lays bare its physical faktura.  Here the “material” was the human body 
itself, a bio-mechanic ensemble whose “economy”—the efficient generation, distribution, and 
application of force and motion—obeyed determinate laws.  These laws, hitherto neglected, 
mystified, repressed, fall within the practical-analytical competence of biomechanics: 
[On] the basis of studying the human organism, biomechanics strives to create a 
human being who knows the mechanism of his own construction, who is able, 
ideally, to manage and perfect it.  The contemporary person, living in the 
conditions of mechanization, cannot not mechanize the kinetic elements of his 
organism.  Biomechanics establishes the principles for the measured analytical 
execution of every motion, the differentiation of every motion en route to 
achieving the greatest clarity, demonstrativeness, specular taylorism [zritel'nyi 
teilorizm], of the motion. [….]  The contemporary actor must be shown from the 
stage as a perfect auto-engine [avtomotor]. (quot. Kotovich 49) 
It is difficult to imagine a more literal rendition of the Formalist injunction to “lay bare the 
device.”  Freed from randomness and slouch, from all the impediments Tret'iakov bemoaned, the 
body of Meyerhold’s actor is an object of demonstration or, rather, the object-as-demonstration.  
It does not “represent” anything; it simply enacts its own analysis.  In the “measured, analytical 
                                                 
66  In another place, Chuzhak states: “It would be a huge absurdity to understand the ‘thing’ only as an externally 
perceptible materiality—a error committed by the first productionists, who relied on vulgar-fetishistic, metaphysical 
materialism; the ‘idea’ should not be excluded from the concept of the thing, inasmuch as the idea is the necessary 
prerequisite of any real construction—a model for tomorrow” (Chuzhak, “K zadacham” 145-46). 
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execution” of movements the body abolishes representation and manifests what it truly is: a 
device. 
And because this body is not only a motion device, but also the vessel of consciousness, 
the act that demonstrates and the fact being demonstrated coalesce, furnishing the already 
familiar duality of organization: 
In art, we are always dealing with the organization of material […].  The art of the 
actor consists in his organizing of his own material, that is, in the ability to use 
correctly the expressive means of his body.  Within the actor, the organizer and 
the organized (that is, the artist and the material) are brought together.  The 
formula of the actor would be an equation like this: N = A1 + A2, where A1 is the 
constructor, conceiving the task and ordering its execution, A2 is the body of the 
actor, the executive that puts into action the directive given by the constructor 
(A1).  The actor must train his material—his body—in such a way as to make it 
capable of executing immediately the directives it receives.  This is necessary, 
because every expression of force (including the living organism) obeys the 
solitary laws of mechanics.67 (“Akter” 10) 
To all appearances, we are witnessing the traditional encounter between subject and object 
within the human dyad, between “soul” and “body,” between the agency of consciousness and 
its most immediate malleable otherness.  But these appearances are deceptive.  The directives 
given to the body are certainly not the imperatives of subjective interiority seeking expression.  
They are the specific articulations of that same social commission, this time directed at the 
human physicality: “1. absence of superfluous, non-productive movements, 2. rhythmicaity, 3. 
                                                 
67 These laws extend to and encompass the entire space of theatrical performance: “The stage and the theater are to 
be an enormous machine with very complex construction, which works with mathematic precision according to the 
laws  of mechanics” (Sokolov 21). 
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correct positioning of the center of one’s body, 4. stability” (Meyerhold, “Akter” 10).  So that 
even when it is “here,” on the stage, the body of the actor enacts (demonstrates) its being-there, 
its belonging to an objective organization of labor, to the determining rhythms of industrial 
production, to the machine.  Thus it also enacts the disappearance of the subject.  Far from being 
a reinstatement of the creative subject under a new name, the figure of the “constructor” is a 
figuration of that subject’s absence. 
Now we can give the enigmatic “here” and “there” their proper significance, which, so 
far, has been illustrated rather than articulated.  It is time to say that “here” and “there” do not 
stand for anything in particular.  They are not some determinate places in either the actual or 
discursive geography of the Soviet 1920s.  Rather, they are the place-holders of an essential 
ontological relay between the false (dissimulative) being of “this” and its demystified-genuine 
existence.  For every particular practice, these place-holders are “filled” with different realia, so 
that a specific opposition is expressed on the level of cultural discourse.  For constructivist 
theater, such is the opposition between the artistic conventionality of the “stage” and the grand 
stage of real life.  In the anti-passeistic discourse of the Comfuturists (komfuty), such is the 
opposition between the bourgeois art of representation and the revolutionary art of life-building.  
Finally, throughout the history of the Soviet left avant-garde, such is the opposition between the 
individual creative personality (tvorcheskaia lichnost') and the communal creativity of the 
factories and the streets.   
On the whole, the project of the left avant-garde is the abolition of the former for the 
latter, it is a movement from “here” to “there,” which can be thematized differently and on 
various levels.  “The individual and the masses,” “conventions and facts,” “the studio and the 
factory” (“representation and production”), “bourgeois past/present and revolutionary 
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present/future,” “subjective expression and objective social commission”—all these are different 
figurations, articulations, of a profound condition which, a little earlier, I described as the 
condition of re-presentation, hyphenating the word so as to suggest its relevance beyond the 
meanings of artistic, linguistic, or psychological representation.68   
At its most profound, this condition is also at its most inarticulate.  It simply says that the 
particulars of experience are not where they are first encountered, that they are found 
somewhere other than where their true value is determined.  Not “here,” but “there”: not in 
content, but in artistic form; not in form, but in “socio-psychological content”; not in speech, as 
a flow of supposedly transparent sememes, but in language, as a system of differentials; not in 
the savorable flesh of this apple, but in the systemic vis-à-vis between this apple and other 
marketable goods; not in my waking discourse, but in the slumber of my resistances; not in the 
worldliness of the world, but in the retreat of Da-sein (Heidegger’s being-there).   
This is the condition of Western modernity,69 and these are some of its most audible 
articulations.  It is not merely a “condition of knowledge”; it is just as much a “condition of 
praxis.”  The problematic conceptual distinction between the two—as if knowledge can be born 
without any praxis, or practice can proceed in blind, unknowing acts—is attenuated further by 
the particular epistemological and practical attitudes we have been considering.  I have tried to 
show how similar these attitudes are.  The immanentist pretense of modern Western 
knowledge—the analytical act that does not affect the object, but explicates the object’s 
content—is mirrored in a practical act that simply releases things unto their genuine existence, 
                                                 
68  In this sense, the avant-garde revolt against artistic representation should be understood as a particular 
experience/interpretation of a broader cultural situation. 
 
69 “Not here, but there” is, of course, also the condition of every transcendentalism, of every religious transport and 
metaphysical construction, perhaps of desire in general; it is universal and trans-historical.  But it becomes the 
specific condition of Western modernity with the stipulation that the dissimulative “here” is a systemic and lawful 
extension (function) of the genuine being-there. 
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lets them be.  The agency of the “constructor,” no less than the agency of the literary analyst, 
consists in a demonstrative analysis of how things essentially are.  And since they are essentially 
“there,” the job of the constructor is to free the object from dissimulation and demonstrate its 
being-there. 
In the vacated place of the author, we now have a vehicle for demonstration-analysis—a 
vehicle that can still be imagined in a human guise (as a constructor, organizer, or director), but 
whose functioning has nothing particularly human about it.  If we have to give it a name, we 
should call it a “conveyor,” keeping both meanings of the word in play: a vehicle that “conveys” 
objects, taking them from here to there, and “conveys” them, demonstrating what they truly are.  
In regard to the cultural condition I am describing, these two meanings are identical, they are 
one.  For to convey what the object truly is means to convey it “there,” i.e., to demonstrate its 
belonging to a systemic totality of things in the world.   And while it might be flattering to 
imagine that a person, a human being, could perform this function, it is hard not to see that the 
“conveyor” is a mechanism, and, thus, is best represented by a mechanism.  
I am a kino-eye. I am a mechanical eye.  
I am a machine, I am showing you the world as only I can see it. 
 I am in ceaseless motion, I approach objects and move away from them, I get 
underneath them, I get on top of them, I move apace with the horse’s muzzle, I 
spear into the crowd at full speed, I run in front of the running soldiers, I fall on 
my back, I rise together with the airplanes, I fall and soar together with the falling 
and soaring bodies. [….] 
I decode in a new way the world unknown to you. (Vertov, “Kinoki” 141; 
emphasis in the original)   
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This is Dziga Vertov speaking on behalf of the movie camera or, rather, speaking as the movie 
camera.  Although Vertov’s most powerful statement on screen remains his Man with a Movie 
Camera (1929), the most truthful statement of his conceptual position, indeed, of the conceptual 
position of constructivist cinema, is the metaphoric identity between man and the mechanized 
medium of filmmaking: man as a movie camera, the human eye become a cinematic apparatus 
(kino-glaz, kino-oko).70  In the figurative substitution of one for another, “man” is the vanishing 
term, the tenor, whose properties are displaced by the properties of the vehicle.71  And the 
vehicle is the movie camera, also a vehicle in the sense suggested above: a conveyor of things.   
The camera is an intriguing piece of machinery.  By its very construction and 
functioning, it inhabits two places at the same time.  It is here, sitting on a tripod or handheld, 
attached to the eye of the cameraman.  But it is also there, with the things of the world, attached 
to them, spying on them, studying them.  It is, simultaneously, with the “seeing” and with the 
“seen.”  This double residence is a source of tension, of conflict, which can be expressed in the 
terms of a schizophrenic denial: “Where I am is not where I am.”  The dilemma offers two 
alternative ways of being for the movie camera, two modes of existence: a here-being and a 
there-being.  The camera can draw the world to itself, to its own absolute position is space, it can 
                                                 
70  Kino-glaz (“kino eye” or “cinema eye”) was to provide the title of Vertov’s film project of 1924.  From the 
compound kino-oko (“cine-eye”) derived kinoki—the name adopted by a group of documentary filmmakers that 
gathered around Vertov in the early 1920s. 
 
71 “The cinema eye lives and moves in time and space; it perceives and records impressions in a manner entirely 
different from that of the human eye.  The position of our body during observation, the amount of features of this or 
that sensory event that we are able to apprehend, is not at all obligatory for the camera, which perceives more and 
better the more perfect it is.  
We cannot make our eyes better than they already are, but we can perfect the camera endlessly” (Vertov, 
“Kinoki” 138).   
On the superiority of the cinema-eye over the human, “naked” eye, see also Vertov “Kino-Eye” 67 and “From 
Kino-Eye” 87.  In “We: Variant of a Manifesto,” Vertov echoes Tretiakov’s dissatisfaction with man’s imperfect 
motions: “The machine makes us ashamed of man’s inability to control himself, but what are we to do if electricity’s 
unerring ways are more exciting to us than the disorderly haste of active men and the corrupting inertia of passive 
ones” (7). 
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arrange the world around itself, stage it in front of the lens, invent a world of its own making.72  
Or it can surrender to the world, adapt itself to the world’s structure and rhythms, become the 
eye of the world’s objectivities, as they stare back at us.  These alternatives, one false, one 
genuine, are not a matter of abstract choice.  Now that the October Revolution has taken place, 
they can be seen as an actual historical sequence, two moments in the biography of cinema. 
Initially, like many other things, the movie camera is found leading a false life.  At the 
very dawn of cinema, it had been quite sufficient to show the public such simple facts as a 
galloping horse or a train arriving at the station.  Very soon, however, the infantile delight in 
watching moving objects on the screen was outgrown (Brik, “Fiksatsiia” 44-45).  There 
appeared the need to show more elaborate attractions.  What could be easier?  All that was 
needed was to enact some kind of dramatic performance and record it on film (Brik, “Fiksatsiia” 
45).  It was the age of theater-become-cinema.  The audiences were happy and quite willing to 
ignore the glaring distortion of theater’s three-dimensional space on the flat surface of the movie 
screen (Brik, “Fiksatsiia” 45).  But tastes change, and soon the cardboard sham and buffoonery 
of these early spectacles began to offend the eye.  The demand for “photogenic model life” 
(natura) was now to be heard.  It became clear that some objects and situations easily lend 
themselves to the camera’s “naked eye,” while others need some preparatory work (Brik, 
“Fiksatsiia” 45).  New contrivances had to be invented in order to capture the photogenic nature 
inaccessible to the camera: 
The studio appeared.  The studio is a place where photogenic natura is prepared 
through artificial means: from the entire system of lighting devices to the 
complicated constructions with the help of which one could create anything, all 
the way to earthquakes and naval battles; everything in the studio serves one 
                                                 
72  See Rodchenko’s critique of traditional (artistic) photography in “Puti,” esp. 36.  
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purpose: to create artificially that which the camera is incapable of creating in 
living reality.  In this way, the camera’s imperfections, instead of fostering efforts 
to improve its mechanism, led filmmakers to begin from the other end: from the 
artificial transformation of the life to be filmed. (Brik, “Fiksatsiia” 45) 
The studio circumscribes the disingenuous, here-being of the cinematic apparatus.  It is where 
objects are being re-presented.   
The obverse of the concocted studio act is the arrested fact of real life (“life caught 
unawares,”73 in Vertov’s sloganized expression).  Instead of bringing the world to the camera, 
the camera must go out into the world, “to flee—the sweet embraces of romance, the poison of 
the psychological novel, the clutches of the theater of adultery […], to flee—out into the open, 
into four dimensions (three + time), in search of our own material, our meter and rhythm” 
(Vertov, “We” 7).  Although Vertov says “our material,” the warning is still in effect: the 
material is not free to be appropriated in every each way “we” choose.74  Every object, event, 
that captures the camera’s attention is not a free-floating monad, but belongs—less obviously—
to the world’s determinate totality and—more immediately—to society’s economic structure 
(“Kino-Eye” 66).  Only there, as part of that totality, do objects and events become “facts.”  
From within the chaos of visual phenomena, the camera must provide a “scientific illumination 
of reality” (Vertov, “To the Kinoks” 51), placing each event within its effective context.  Vertov 
calls this practice the “decoding of life as it is” (“Essence” 49, 50) or, in another place, the 
“communist decoding of what actually exists” (“To the Kinoks” 50), and, in still another, the 
“documentary cinematic decoding of both the visible world and that which is invisible to the 
                                                 
73 Life Caught Unawares (Zhizn' vrasplokh) is also the alternative title of Vertov’s 1924 film Cinema Eye 
(Kinoglaz). 
 
74  “The newsreel must demonstrate events truthfully, and the forms of newsreel montage are determined not by the 
author but by the material” (Kuleshov 32). 
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naked eye” (“From Kino-Eye” 87).  Perhaps more explicitly than any other constructivist 
practice, Vertov’s “kino-eye” is a practice of analysis.  It rescues the object from its 
dissimulative existence and demonstrates it in its truth (i.e., as a “fact”): “Kino-eye as the 
possibility of making the invisible visible, the unclear clear, the hidden manifest, the disguised 
overt […]; making falsehood into truth.  Kino-eye as the union of science with newsreel to 
further the battle for the communist decoding of the world, as an attempt to show the truth on the 
screen—Film-truth” (“Birth” 41-42).  
Let us briefly observe how the camera does its work as a conveyor of things.  This time it 
is a photographic camera—itself a rather sophisticated device—and the thing at which it is 
directed is a house.  Of course, the house can be captured on film as just a house.  But such a 
perspective, Brik tells us, underlies the falsity of traditional representation: “It is impermissible 
to present in isolation one house, one tree; this might be very beautiful, but this would be art, it 
would be aesthetics, it would be an aesthetic savoring of the particular object at the expense of 
its relation to the other phenomena of nature or the phenomena of human labor” (“Ot kartiny” 
33).  According to Brik, the vision that foregrounds an object, extracting it, as it were, from its 
real-life context, is the artistic vision par excellence; it is somehow inherent to the practice of 
painting (“Ot kartiny” 31).  Photography offers the technical possibility for overcoming this 
limited, distortive, perspective: “Photography is not forced to isolate a particular person in order 
to capture him; it has the ability to capture him together with his surroundings, to capture him in 
a way that would make obvious this person’s dependence on his environment; the photographer 
has the ability to solve a task that an artist is unable to solve” (Brik “Ot kartiny” 32).  In Brik’s 
estimation, photography is somehow uniquely equipped to show the interconnectedness and 
totality of worldly phenomena.  And so, our house is no longer just a house: “this house is not 
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interesting all by itself, […] it is interesting as part of the overall structure of the street, of the 
city […], its value lies not in its visual contours but in the function it fulfils within the social 
environment” (“Ot kartiny” 33).  Through the photographic lens, the house is “conveyed”: it is 
taken to where it belongs—there, on that street and in that city, within the determinate structure 
of urban life—and thus enabled to show what it truly is—a functional element of social 
existence.  It is now a house-fact, a house-truth.  
In an earlier instance I argued that in order to manifest its identity, to be what it latently 
and truly is, “this”—at that time, the text—must pass through a special place in the topology of 
our plot: the analytical apparatus, the repository of hermeneutic cognition.75  As reenacted in the 
project of constructivist cinema, this movement—essentially the same—now passes through the 
kino-eye.  It is by way of the kino-eye that the object—a house or anything else—is conveyed to 
its being-there, that is, to the totality that determines it.  The kino-eye is not just the camera lens, 
nor is it the mechanism of the camera as a whole.  It is a figuration of the entire apparatus of 
analysis—before, during, and after the shooting—that utilizes the camera’s revolutionary 
potential.   The preliminary research, the scouting of locations, the drafting of the shooting plan; 
the determination of angles, distances, cadences;  the actual recording of visual data; the 
cataloguing of the recorded fragments; the process of the final editing—all of these moments 
belong to the physiology of the kino-eye.76  
In the end result, “if the material is correctly analyzed, i.e., if the work of its 
passportization [pasportizatsiia] (the place and time of shooting, the content of the filmed object) 
is completed, and the meaning of the separate fragments is made clear—not only in regard to 
their source, but also in regard to the various juxtapositions necessitated by the thematics—the 
                                                 
75 See pp. 36-38, 56. 
 
76  See Vertov, “From the Kino-Eye” 88-90.  
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[montage] gives facts their true voice” (Pertsov, “‘Igra’” 35).  Although the auditory metaphor 
runs against the silent nature of the medium, Viktor Pertsov’s point is clear: like the material of 
other constructivist practices, the material of cinema possesses authoritative dynamics of its own.  
And like all others, the praxis of kinochestvo must submit to this authority and abandon the claim 
to authorship.  The act of “organizing” the visual world is met and overdetermined by the 
dynamic organization internal to objectivities: “Kinochestvo is the art of organizing the 
necessary movements of objects in space as a rhythmical artistic whole, in harmony with the 
properties of the material and the internal rhythm of each object” (Vertov “We” 8; emphasis 
added).  The immanent logic of visible phenomena, and not the will of the film director or 
cameraman, governs the various analytical operations of the kino-eye.  It is the world itself that 
guides its own “decoding.”  This is a crucial moment in the optics of the kino-eye, as it 
exemplifies the turning inside-out of representation in the visual field.  Directed at the world, the 
kino-eye is, at the same time, governed by the world.  The world is its “socket,” while being also 
its target. 
The subject of visual representation (in the traditional sense) is situated behind the 
focusing point of impressions received from the external world (anatomically, the retina).  
Directly opposite this point, behind the socket that is the world itself, we can now begin to 
imagine a different type of agency, a different kind of “subject.”  This agency is exercised in an 
act that is the obverse of “seeing”: that other subject does not watch; it displays.  And the 
“organ” responsible for this function is, in turn, the functional inversion of the eye: it is an eye 
that shows, one that demonstrates through images, an eye that is, really, a screen.  Cinema, in its 
double nature as a recording and projecting medium is thus situated on a significant borderline.  
Vertov’s method of the kino-eye must be understood as an attempt to traverse the ontological 
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split in the scopic field between seeing and manifesting, to attain the point where “looking” 
vanishes to emerge on the other side and become a pure “letting-it-show.”  But this is none other 
than the movement we have been following all along, the movement from “here” to “there.”  It 
now takes place between seeing and the seen, between the here-being of the visual—watching, 
gazing, observing, discerning—and its there-being: the self-display of things, their 
exhibitionism, the “showiness” of the world in its true colors. 
This movement is not yet complete.  That other agency, residing opposite the traditional 
subject of representation, has not yet emerged and shown itself in body and countenance.  Or, to 
put it in a philosophical jargon, it has not yet been subjectivized.  For now, in the culture of the 
1920s, that agency exists in the amorphous shape of objective necessity and immanent logic, of 
social commission, inexorable mechanism (device), and imperative structure (organization).  
Only later—and why not look ahead?—in the years of Stalinism, will come the time when the 
there-being of things will undergo its anagogic transformation, “when in a Joycean fashion the 
landscape slowly turns into a sleeping giant and with allegorical literality the various ‘members’ 
of society knit themselves together into a genuine organism” (Jameson, Unconscious 72).  At its 
most explicit, the anagogic embodiment will present us with the gigantic figure of the Leader, 
stretched across the landscape of history and society, containing within itself the elements of 
both, imparting on them organic totality and natural necessity. 
But we are not there yet.  In the cultural moment we are now considering, the unity of 
empirical things is not organic, but structural and systematic.  And the mediatory instance 
through which this unity becomes manifest is itself of a systematic nature.  It is an act of 
organization-analysis, a hermeneutic, whose methodological rigor and executive precision make 
it less human-like and more akin to the operations of the machine.  To shed their false, 
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dissimulative being, things must pass through this machine-like apparatus, through the 
“conveyor.”  Therewithal, they are transported back to where they have never ceased to 
belong—there, within the world’s totality of goods, signs, images, labors, ideas, lives. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMPERATIVE SUBJECTHOOD 
 
 
What we have been following so far is a cultural act of “organization” that deals with people and 
things as things, a kind of praxis aimed at the revolutionary transformation of the world’s 
objecthood.  To the extent that “man” is thematized at all within the early projects of Proletkult 
and the (anti-)artistic doctrines of the left avant-garde, he appears as determined by his own 
“thingness” and the thingness of the world.  As he labors, Gastev’s man is composed of muscular 
forces, expenditures of energy strictly quantified in accordance with the task at hand, movements 
tailored (taylorized) to the operations of the machine.  As he acts, Meyerhold’s man is, similarly, 
an aggregate of bio-mechanical variables, vectors of motion and exertions of strength, a device 
under a human guise.77  As he sees, Vertov’s man with a movie camera is an optical device 
synchronized with the device he operates.   Insofar as this general “man” can still be conceived 
as a bearer of consciousness, the consciousness in question has been so fully “instrumentalized” 
that it is indistinguishable from the objective functioning of the device.  And because he thus 
recedes into the impersonal thingness of whatever it is that he “works with,” man no longer 
represents.  He is now one with the conveyor of objectivity—the vehicle that allows things to be 
what they are, to show off their true nature and function.    
 We shall now inquire into a different kind of praxis—still a praxis of organization, but 
one that takes and deals with men in their subjecthood.  The transition we are making is 
                                                 
77 To be sure, Meyerhold’s actor possesses emotions and moods, but these are in strict subordination to the 
physiological-kinetic aspect of human being—what Meyerhold calls “physical disposition” (fizicheskaia 
predposylka; “Akter” 11).  
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analogous to an earlier one, when we passed from the formalist theory of the text to its 
sociological hermeneutic.  What we saw then was, first, the truth of “this” emerging in the mode 
of objecthood: initially dissimulating as something subjective (the author’s “message,” an 
“expression” of one’s views or moods), the text turned out to be, on the contrary, an object-like 
entity, a device, a working mechanism.  And just as convincingly, afterwards, “this” traversed 
the same road, but from the other end: from an initial dissimulative being in the mode of 
objecthood (depicted world), the text showed itself to be, really, a systematic thing possessed of 
subjecthood (Character, Obraz).  In the same way, we now pass from a form of praxis where the 
reality of “what is to be done,” is dictated by imperative organization of things as things, to one 
whose coordinates are set by the authoritative systematicity of consciousness.   
If we remember that deluded house—a yellow house to be sure—standing apart from the 
rest of the world, in a narcissistic display of its picturesque singularity, we could follow a line of 
symmetry to the realm of subjecthood and observe an analogous deviancy.  The false being of 
the object in the world has as its correlate the false being of human consciousness.  And the 
whole movement of praxis that seeks to restitute the object into its truth, to return the house to its 
proper place, will now unfold as an exercise upon consciousness, bringing it back to the 
birthplace from which it has been estranged. 
 
It has become customary for us today to speak of “cultural politics” as an inseparable component 
of culture itself.  The production of cultural artifacts, of any materiality that can be conceived as 
belonging to the domain of “culture,” always takes place from a certain position, it serves a 
certain set of interests, etc.  We can assert confidently that the cultural act is always a political 
act.  And yet, this “always” has not always been “always.”  The realization that culture is 
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unavoidably political is a rather recent one.  Even more recent is the praxis that puts this 
realization into action, the conscious act of “cultural politics” itself.  In this sense, it could be 
argued quite convincingly that nothing like cultural politics existed before December 7, 1922.   
On that day, a rather mundane event took place: a group of young literati gathered in the 
headquarters of the journal Molodaia gvardiia (“Young Guard”) in Moscow and formed the 
group Oktiabr' (“October”).  Oktiabr' was the core of what eventually became the Onguardist 
movement.78  Among the founders were Semen Rodov, Aleksandr Bezymenskii, Iurii 
Libedinskii, Aleksei Sokolov, and Grigorii Lelevich; the critics Il. Vardin and Leopol'd 
Averbakh were to join soon after.  Most of the group’s members were also members of the 
Communist Party or the League of Communist Youth; most of them had belonged to VAPP, the 
All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (Vserossiiskaia assotsiatsiia proletarskikh 
pisatelei).  The immediate enemy of Oktiabr', the enemy against whom the group initially 
defined its identity and purpose, was Kuznitsa (“The Smithy”)—a group of proletarian poets that 
supplied the leading cadres of VAPP.  The split was between two generations of cultural 
activists, but also between two very different conceptions of what constitutes genuine 
revolutionary culture.   
In its first pronouncements, Oktiabr' charged the leadership of VAPP with inability to 
expand and unify the movement of proletarian literature.  For the poets of Kuznitsa literature had 
become the work of self-proclaimed archpriests of art (“Oktiabr'” 206).  Theirs was the religion 
of some mystical union between class origin and truth.  The mere fact of belonging to the 
proletariat seemed to them a sufficient guarantee of the poet’s ability to see the world truthfully.  
The act of literary creation was not so much a product of reflection upon the world, as a direct 
                                                 
78  Named after the journal On Guard (Na postu), which the group published between 1923 and 1925.  From 1927 to 
1931, the journal appeared under the title On Literary Guard (Na literaturnom postu). 
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emanation from the redemptive nature of industrial labor.  The proletarian poet was the medium 
through whom the class character of the proletariat was revealed in texts.  
In opposition to this mystical creed, the Oktiabr' group advanced the demand for political 
indoctrination of both proletarian and non-proletarian writers.  The mere belonging to the 
working class guarantees nothing, “and often the proletarian artist is very detrimental to the 
cause of the working class, just because he is so little familiar with the dialectic-materialist 
method [...], [because he] is unacquainted with his class’ system of thought” (Libedinskii, 
“Temy” 124).  The act of artistic creation is not a spiritualistic séance, “and mere intuition, the 
hope that the proletarian instinct will show the way, that ‘the poet is a medium of his class’ […] 
and truth is, thereby, revealed to him—all this is a simple-minded and dangerous utopia” 
(Libedinskii, “Temy” 124).  What the poets of Kuznitsa had failed to realize is that the cultural 
act is a political act, and that “political” had nothing to do with occupying a place in the socio-
economic structure and everything to do with assuming a conscious position.  In its main thrust, 
the platform of Oktiabr' did not call on writers from other class backgrounds to adopt the 
position of the proletariat.  It was the proletarian writer himself that had still to take the position 
proper to him.  As Libedinskii’s words make it clear, the proletariat was, on the whole, divorced 
from its own “system of thought.”  
In those very days when the movement of proletarian culture in Russia was being 
institutionalized, this seemingly paradoxical condition (the working class’ divorce from its own 
system of thought) was subjected to a most penetrating “psycho-analysis”—where else, but in 
Vienna?—by a thinker who was to play a significant role in Soviet cultural politics during 
Stalinism.  In one of the earlier essays of what was eventually to become the major text of 
twentieth-century Marxism, History and Class Consciousness, Georg Lukács wrote: 
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Now class consciousness consists in fact of the appropriate and rational 
reactions “imputed” [zugerechnet] to a particular typical position in the process of 
production.  This consciousness is, therefore, neither the sum nor the average of 
what is thought or felt by the single individuals who make up the class.  And yet 
the historically significant actions of the class as a whole are determined in the 
last resort by this consciousness and not by the thought of the individual—and 
these actions can be understood only by reference to this consciousness.79 
This analysis establishes right from the start the distance that separates class 
consciousness from the empirically given, and from the psychologically 
describable and explicable ideas which men form about their situation in life. [….] 
Thus we must never overlook the distance that separates the consciousness of 
even the most revolutionary worker from the authentic class consciousness of the 
proletariat. (History 51, 80). 
Without changing its constitutive moments, its “situations,” “movements,” and “acts,” the 
plot we have been following is now to be played out in the domain of class consciousness.  Like 
any other “this” that we have encountered so far, class consciousness is “initially and for the 
most part” displaced-distorted in relation to its authentic being.  As such, it is “false 
consciousness.”  And yet, its “falsity” is not some idiosyncratic aberration that could be 
somehow prevented or avoided.  It is a determinately necessary moment in the life of “this.”  The 
displacement and falsity of class consciousness is systematic, as is its authentic being (the 
“imputed” cognition appropriate for a given class amounts to a determinate “system of thought”).   
                                                 
79  In The Holy Family Marx and Engels had put forward a similar argument shored up by an explicit ontological 
statement: “The question is not what this or that proletarian, or even the whole of the proletariat, at the moment 
regards as its aim.  The question is what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will 
historically be compelled to do” (28; emphasis in the original).  
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With the appearance of the proletariat, there appears the unique possibility for one class 
to overcome this discrepancy and actually to be what it truly is.  Near the end of history, there is 
now a social identity that could be imminently equal to the fact of its latent-authentic 
organization. Yet for this to happen, there must be, first, an act of organization, a political praxis 
that treats class consciousness as its “field.”  In its highest instantiation, this is none other that the 
political praxis of the Party, the vanguard of the working class.  But why shouldn’t there be 
also—as a subsidiary, a specialized extension, of the Party’s function—a cultural, or even just 
literary, “vanguard” of the workers’ revolution?  It was not a secret that, from its very first day, 
Oktiabr' wanted to play just this role.  The group’s official “Platform,” published in the first 
issue of the journal Na postu (“On Guard”), stated: 
§4 
[…] with the commencement of planned socialist construction in all areas […] 
and with the movement of RKP (b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] 
toward a systematic and deep propaganda amongst the widest proletarian masses, 
there appeared the need to introduce into proletarian literature some kind of 
system. 
§5 
[…] the group of proletarian writers “October,” as a part of the proletarian 
vanguard infused with the dialectic-materialist worldview, strives toward the 
creation of such a system and regards the achievement of this possible only on the 
basis of a unified artistic program, ideological as well as formal, which would 
serve as a foundation for the further development of proletarian literature. 
(“Materialy” 194; emphasis added) 
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The institutional framework through which this “system” of proletarian literature was to 
be implemented was established and expanded between 1923 and 1928.  Oktiabr' first initiated 
the creation of a Moscow Association of Proletarian Writers (MAPP, Moskovskaia assotsiatsiia 
proletarskikh pisatelei), which was incorporated, in 1925, into a national organization, a new 
VAPP.  When, in 1928, the latter was itself subsumed within an even broader institutional 
framework,80 it changed its name to RAPP, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers 
(Rossiiskaia assotsiatsiia proletarskikh pisatelei).81  The prodigious growth of institutional 
structures and super-structures within the movement of proletarian literature followed its own 
“natural” progression.  The expansion was to continue until every single proletarian writer in the 
Soviet Union was a member of the organization.  There could be no “outside” to it, just as there 
could be no “outside” to the position that afforded objective representation of reality.    
Around this latter issue irrupted the main cultural polemic of the 1920s: the struggle 
between RAPP and “Pereval,” between Na postu and Kransaia nov' (“Red Virgin Land”), 
between Averbakh, Vardin, and Libedinskii, on one side, and Aleksandr Voronskii, on the other.  
In the early 1920s Voronskii was the undisputed magnate of Soviet literature, the (semi-) official 
representative of the Party, entrusted with uncovering and upbringing fresh literary talent.  When 
the Onguardists appeared on the Soviet cultural scene, Voronskii became their primary target.  
The struggle was for hegemony in the field of literature, for access to publishing houses and 
printing presses, for material support and endorsement by the Party; but it was also a struggle 
over principles.   
                                                 
80 The All-Union Organization of Proletarian Writers’ Associations (Vsesoiuznoe ob''edinenie assotsiatsii 
proletarskikh pisatelei, VOAPP) coordinated the activities of the separate national organizations. 
 
81 In subsequent Soviet history, RAPP became—through a sort of retroactive genealogy—the blanket reference for 
the entire movement of proletarian literature initiated by Oktiabr'. For a historical account of the “proletarian 
episode” in Soviet literature, see Brown, Ermolaev. 
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Famously and notoriously, Voronskii had allied himself with a group of non-proletarian 
writers—the so-called “fellow travelers”—whose Marxism was, at best, personal, and whose 
allegiance to the Soviet regime was, at best, understated.  Justifying this liberal cultural coalition 
were Voronskii’s views on the nature of representation.  In what was to remain his principal 
conceptual exposition, the article of 1923, “Art as the Cognition of Life and the Present Day” 
(“Iskusstvo kak poznanie zhizni i sovremennost'”), he advanced a rather traditionalist, 
gnoseological understanding of artistic representation.  As the title suggested, art was a means 
for knowing the world, and this cognition could rival and complement the objectivity of science 
(“Iskusstvo” 367, 378, 381).  The “objective moment” (ob"ektivnyi moment) was attained when 
the author’s subjective position was assimilated to the objective content of the represented reality 
(“Iskusstvo” 368-69).  A cardinal act of will made possible, in both science and art, this 
cognitive attunement, which excludes subjective “interferences” and allows the immanent 
properties of the object to become manifest (“Iskusstvo” 368-69). 
The Onguardists understood Voronskii to mean that there was some exclusive state of 
cognition, a phenomenological encounter between preceptor and perceived that falls outside the 
lines of political engagement and class struggle.82  In the following issue of Na postu, Vardin and 
Libedinskii led the attack:  
Well, of course, speaking generally, there exists in nature an ‘objective moment.’  
But comrade Voronskii has lost sight of one trivial detail: he has forgotten to point 
out precisely which class, which party, which ideology, which social, political,  
and philosophical movements are the bearers of this ‘objective moment’ [and] 
                                                 
82 Voronskii’s position was certainly more nuanced than that; it was also less remote from the position of his 
opponents.  He insisted that all cognition proceeds from a class-determined point of view.  But when a class gains 
strength, when it is the “progressive” class of its day, objective cognition becomes both necessary and possible for it 
(“Iskusstvo” 378).  It is the objective historical being of a social group that opens to it the possibility for objective 
knowledge of reality. 
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which […] stand as die-hard enemies of objective truth. (Vardin, “Voronshchinu” 
11) 
By this trivial omission, Voronskii had opened the door to an illusory space where truth 
can be possessed solely through abstract ethics, pure exertion of will, and intuitive penetrations.  
Even to begin to conceive of such a space was already an indictment.  For it is only through an 
atavistic mindset—through a disposition characteristic of a previous age—that the artist could be 
seen as hovering above social life and representing it “from the outside” (Libedinskii, “K 
voprosu” 56).  Under capitalism, the artist’s (typically, petty-bourgeois) existence is, in this wise, 
reflected-distorted into consciousness as a disinterested and unfettered pursuit of eternal truths 
(Libedinskii, “K voprosu” 56).  His de-classed no-position in society takes on the form of 
appearance of a messianic license, an appointment to an exclusive non-position outside particular 
“interests” and “agendas.”  “[Such] a quality is being ascribed also to the artist in our present 
time, a time of fundamental destabilizing in capitalist society, when this ‘from the outside’ is laid 
bare [obnazhaetsia] through particular actions in the clash of class forces” (Libedinskii, “K 
voprosu” 57). 
The very relation whereby consciousness disavows its own class nature constitutes the 
basis of its false existence.  Truth is to be found in the obverse.  Consciousness must discover 
itself within the totality of which it is, latently and inalienably, a part: a collection of people, 
events, and lives, to be sure, but as reflected in consciousness.  The true definition of a class and, 
hence, the true home of consciousness, is where this collection of people, events, and lives is 
raised into a system of thought—no longer an inert, “factual,” aggregate, but a whole held 
together by intellected relations and necessary prospects.  If it is to offer us the world as it really 
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is, a consciousness engaged in artistic representation must see the world from there, from within 
that totality.  
The proletarian writer’s road to that new and unique, yet native, point of view is double.  
His “getting there” proceeds in a twofold way: “intrinsically,” he is driven there by the 
momentum of socio-historical change; “extrinsically,” he is taken there by a conscious practice 
of political-cultural organization of which he is the object.  Intrinsically, the Revolution “lays 
bare” the reality of class struggle and redefines the proletarian writer’s relationship to his class 
(Libedinskii, “K voprosu” 55, 57-59).  In the same momentum, “a new reading public creates its 
own proletarian writer and establishes a new type of connection with him through the writer’s 
consciousness of the social significance of his work, [of his] responsibility toward the socialist 
revolution […]” (Libedinskii, “K voprosu” 58).  Extrinsically, “this relationship […] is 
established by the [working] class through its vanguard in the plane of conscious directorship 
[soznatel'noe rukovodstvo] over proletarian literature” (Libedinskii, “K voprosu” 60).  What is 
the essence of this relationship, furthered by both history and organizational supervision?  “This 
is, first of all, a conscious relationship.  The artist must stand equal to his own class’ worldview, 
he must clearly understand every turn in the class struggle and participate in it through each of 
his actions; he must be a conscious participant in the struggle for communism” (Libedinskii, “K 
voprosu” 59). 
As organizations, (the new) VAPP and RAPP were established nowhere else but “in the 
plane of conscious directorship over proletarian literature.”  Their existence as structures 
(“organization” in the substantive) was grounded in the need for that kind of cultural-political 
praxis (“organization” in its other meaning).  And we can see immediately that this praxis, like 
the ones discussed earlier, does nothing to its object—human consciousness—that is not already 
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in potentia contained therein.  For the consciousness in question—the proletarian—has this most 
essential content: that it is not a consciousness (in the substantive), an individual self, but 
consciousness (awareness) of others, of collectivity.  And so, for this content to be laid bare, for 
light to be shed on the writer’s responsibility toward his own class, is really nothing more than 
for him to enter his one and only true existence.  His consciousness is to be, in Hegelian (but also 
Marxist) terms, one whose being-for-self is its being-for-others.  In the more specific terms of 
the post-revolutionary cultural jargon, the consciousness of the proletarian writer is, necessarily, 
consciousness of the “social commission.”  
Yes, indeed—the very same social commission that we encounter in the writings of LEF.  
To recall, “their” social commission had found an ingenious way into the material object, before 
this object was given form as a product, a thing of use; and it had resided there in such a 
definitive and imperious way that the subsequent process of form-giving, or “making the thing,” 
had been simply the laying bare of the product’s dorman funcitonality.  Because of this peculiar 
arrangement, apparently soulless stuff like linen had seemed to “know” its social purpose and the 
tailoring appropriate to it.  It is, therefore, hardly surprising that consciousness should resemble 
that linen in its capacity to possess the social commission latently before it displays it manifestly. 
From the inception of the RAPP movement, its leaders were suspected of seeking to 
regiment proletarian literature, to command its course in a military fashion, through political 
directives and ideological strategies.  Without ever denying that they were a militant formation, 
mobilized to fight on the cultural front of class struggle, the Onguardists rejected the charge of 
administrative authoritarianism.  At the 1927 congress of MAPP, they set out to explain the 
meaning of their “conscious directorship over proletarian literature.”   
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Responding to an open letter from writer Marietta Shaginian, in which she had raised in a 
new context the age-old question of freedom and determination in artistic work, Averbakh 
expounded the dialectic of the “social commission.”  The social commission proceeds 
intrinsically from the individual’s class-specific social experience.  It seeps through and informs 
his consciousness immanently, if latently.  It is certainly not some sort of mandate, conceived at 
Party plenums and imposed “from above” (Averbakh, “O sovremennykh” 11).83  And yet to 
many writers, like Shaginian herself, the social commission could appear as just this kind 
extrinsic mandate, a political imposition that limits one’s artistic freedom.  It is normal, even 
necessary, that it be so.  To a consciousness that has yet fully to reflect its position in the world, 
the social commission takes on the deceptive form of appearance of compulsive externality.  Not 
so in the case of the “artist-Marxist, who understands the mechanics of social relations” 
(Averbakh, “O sovremennykh” 11).  He is aware that his freedom is determined by the “socio-
psychological task” of the current historical moment; hence, this determination “does not appear 
to him in the form of a compulsively imposed requisition for a literary work” (Averbakh, “O 
sovremennykh” 11). 
In this manner, social subjecthood, no less than social objecthood, turns out to be an 
internally segregated field.  Its topology encompasses two moments, a “here” and “there,” that 
could also be grasped and articulated as a progressive succession—a “before” and “after.”  The 
before-, or here-, being of social consciousness is the inert existence of the social psyche 
(obshchestvennaia psikhika).  In its acts and representations, this psyche is objectively 
determined by its belonging to a class; it objectively fulfills a social commission; and yet, 
                                                 
83 Libedinskii went as far as to argue that “it is impossible to assign a particular theme to a particular author, until 
[this theme] has fully ripened in him, i.e., until there is no longer a need for it to be assigned.  We [the organization] 
can direct the author to certain objects, which elude him, we can analyze his work and, translating it into the 
language of ideas, criticize his worldview.  But we cannot ‘commission’ a given author to write about a given 
object, and moreover—to write exactly what we consider necessary in the given moment” (“Problemy” 21).  
  
 108
“subjectively,” it remains opaque to this immanent relation.  Only in the after-, or there-, being of 
consciousness does the social commission immanent to it become also manifest in it.  In this 
second state, the social psyche becomes an assumed ideological position.  “Psyche” and 
“ideology” are not some qualitatively different conditions or phenomena.  They belong to the 
same ontological continuum: “Marxism does not find an impassable abyss between [social 
psyche and social ideology].  On the contrary, [Marxism] views social ideology as a definite 
form of reflected, organized, systematized social psyche” (Averbakh, “O nekotorykh” 6). 
The transition from false to genuine subjecthood, from unreflected class existence to the 
position of true class ideology, occurs as a matter of course in the progressive unfolding of class 
struggle through history.  As noted, socio-economic development itself makes manifest to 
consciousness the “mechanics of social relations.”  But an identical effect can be brought about 
in yet another way, through a shortcut, as it were: through a hermeneutic capable of explicating 
those very same relations.  Quite apart from any actual knowledge that the proletariat may or 
may not possess, there exists a kind of general knowledge—the dialectical-materialist method—
that makes visible what is otherwise concealed.  What interests us here is not the way in which 
the method “works” in representing the world, but, rather, the way in which, anterior to the act of 
representation, it allows the representing consciousness to attain the position of radical 
objectivity.  In other words, we are not yet asking about consciousness’ relation to what is to be 
represented, but, rather, about consciousness’ own disposition. 
Anterior to the actual production of representations, the organization of proletarian 
literature has the task of producing the proletarian writer himself.   This product, as stressed 
earlier, cannot be a “natural” one.  Just as it was not the natural properties of the material that 
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determined the utilitarian fashioning of the “thing,”84 so it is not the natural class origin that 
defines the production of the proletarian writer as genuine proletarian literature.85  A proletarian 
writer is he “who sees the world with the ‘eyes of the proletariat,’ who is infused with the 
proletarian ideals, worldview and sensitivity [mirooshchushchenie]. [….]  It is clear that here the 
cornerstone cannot be one’s profession or social origin, but the point of view, ideology” (Vardin, 
“Revoliutsiia” 79; emphasis in the original).  The cornerstone for the proletarian organization of 
literature is the imperative movement from “here” to “there,” which now occurs within the field 
of subjecthood, within the otherness called “consciousness.”   
The distance separating the two positions of proletarian consciousness, the immediately 
given and the immanently possible, is once again the distance between a misguided singularity 
and a determinate totality.  The first position, the disingenuous here-being of the proletarian, is 
the “subjective” (in a bad sense), particular, contingent, and unmediated absorption of class 
struggle into the psyche (in Lenin’s terms, the position of “spontaneity”).  And yet, there is 
nothing whatsoever contingent, arbitrary, or fortuitous about the fact that proletarian 
consciousness should exist in this way.  Its distortion, its being as a false consciousness, is 
systematically induced; it is a lawful extension of its own true being:   
Regarded abstractly and formally, then, class consciousness implies a class-
conditioned unconsciousness of one’s own socio-historical and economic 
condition.  This condition is given as a definite structural relation, a definite 
formal nexus which appears to govern the whole of life.  The ‘falseness,’ the 
                                                 
84 See pp. 80-81. 
 
85 Confusing the actual consciousness of the proletariat with the class’ imputed system of cognition became, during 
the 1920s, the distinguishing mark (and stigma) of political “opportunism.” 
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illusion implicit in this situation is in no sense arbitrary; it is simply the 
intellectual reflex of the objective economic structure.” (Lukács, History 52)   
Fortunately, to proletarian consciousness is given—by the same systematic and lawful 
determination—the possibility of transcending this partial and illusory perspective.  By a trans-
position, it can get there, “at the heart of that totality” (Lukács, History 52), which is the socio-
economic structure; it possesses the “ability to see society from the centre, as a coherent whole” 
(Lukács, History 69).  That other place of seeing, circumscribes the genuine-predestined being of 
proletarian consciousness. 
When the writer is asked to “see the world with the eyes of the proletariat,” that is the 
vantage point to which he is pointed.  En route, his “social psyche” (the here-being of 
consciousness) must be “organized, systematized.”  The procedure is non-invasive.  It is an act of 
facilitation, a conveyance, really.  The organizational manipulation of the psyche—what Evgenii 
Dobrenko has called the “molding of the Soviet writer” (formovka sovetskogo pisatelia)—is 
conceived similarly to the manipulation of the material in constructivist practice.  Now the 
“material” is consciousness itself, and its molding is aimed at nothing more than the bringing-out 
or letting-be of a latent inner content.  The method of dialectical materialism is the conveyance 
utility that facilitates the process.  In passing through the conveyor, proletarian consciousness 
does not undergo any trans-substantiation.  Remaining self-identical, it merely sheds its false 
being.  The instrumental utility of the method consists in allowing consciousness to become 
transparent to its own “situation,” its “position,” to see itself as in fact determined by both a 
synchronic and a diachronic totality of socio-economic phenomena.  Having been, thus, 
conveyed to itself (in both meanings of the word), proletarian consciousness now possesses as 
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subject, what it has always possessed objectively: its own function and utility, its “present” and 
“future”—a social commission in the shape of destiny.  
In the ranks of RAPP, there was an ongoing debate on whether proletarian literature 
should have its own method, whether next to the general analytic provided by Marxism there was 
a need and a place for a doctrine specifically suited to the purposes of artistic representation.  
Some considered the distinction immaterial.86  Others thought it necessary to speak of 
“proletarian realism,” mostly in order to distinguish a new way of artistically apprehending 
reality from the approach implicit in the bourgeois realisms of the past.87  Quite often, under the 
rubric of “style,” the problem of methodology was conflated with the question of whether 
proletarian literature possessed a special character that separated it from all other literary 
traditions.  Nobody could dispute the axiomatic assertion that, by virtue of working-class 
consciousness’ unique view point on the world, its artistic representations must, indeed, manifest 
a unique quality, a distinct “style.”   
Little could be said of this quality, short of restating in qualitative terms the substantive 
advantages of being “at the heart of that totality,” of being able “to see society from the centre, as 
a coherent whole”; the clarity, objectivity, and comprehensiveness afforded by being there, 
meant that the style of proletarian literature is, necessarily, … clear, objective, and 
comprehensive.  Borrowing a term once used by Marx, B. Reich proposed that the new literary 
style be called “sociographics.”  He went on to explain: 
                                                 
86 Since the organization of proletarian literature, Averbakh reasoned, rested on ideological, not formal, principles, 
the problem of artistic method was overridden by considerations of the author’s ideological position: “The writer’s 
artistic method cannot be torn away from ideology, from his worldview as a whole.  Moreover, the writer’s artistic 
method is fully subordinate to […] his ideological stance” (Averbakh, “Tvorcheskie” 9). 
 
87 See, for example, Zonin 14-15. 
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It seems to me that that the term “sociographics” defines the “special style” of 
the working class, its “special character” expressed in a “special form.”   
The attributes of sociographics are: precision—each of its lines, each of its 
signs is the exact equivalent expression of precisely quantified magnitudes; 
unambiguous, unmediated, demonstrative reproduction—each of its lines, each of 
its signs, conveys content in a form which excludes any approximation, any 
digression into another content, and which demonstrates plainly the 
interrelationships within the content.  [Sociographics] is universally 
comprehensible, concise, concentrated; each of its lines, each of its signs, is made 
clear through universally comprehensible means.  It brings together homogenous 
entities and distills their most characteristic features. (21) 
In not so many words, the envisioned style of proletarian literature is simply the perfect analytic 
of every possible social content.  In it, writing and reading coalesce.  “Each line, each sign” 
appears on the page only to dissolve into a pure transparency toward the object it delineates.  To 
write is to render legible; to apprehend is to demonstrate; to have seen is to have shown.   
It is difficult not to see the conceptual symmetry between Reich’s vision and that of 
Vertov, not only in the shared anticipation of a universally intelligible sociolect88 (one on screen, 
the other on page), not only in the common emphasis on exactitude and scientific rigor,89 but also 
                                                 
88  The term “sociolect” (sotsiolekt) was coined by Mikhail Bakhtin, in whose theory of culture and novelistic 
discourse it designates a modulation of the common language, marked stylistically and ideologically as issuing from 
a particular social position.  In the present context, Reich’s sociographics claims to be an exclusive discourse, in 
which the heteronomy of the various conflicting sociolects has been resolved.  Belonging to the proletariat by 
objective entitlement, this type of discourse cannot be identified with any particular position within society, but 
only with the objective existence of the social as whole (the universal).   
 
89  For example, in Vertov: “Cinema’s unstrung nerves need a rigorous system of precise movement.  The meter, 
tempo, and type of movement, as well as its precise location with respect to the axes of a shot’s coordinates and 
perhaps to the axes of universal coordinates (the three dimensions + the fourth—time), should be studied and taken 
into account by each creator in the field of cinema.  Radical necessity, precision, and speed are three components of 
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in the peculiar dialectic of perception operative in seemingly heterogeneous experiences.  Now in 
the field of consciousness, which lends itself so easily to analogies with sight and vision, we 
once again approach that threshold between seeing and the seen, where the first promises to cross 
over and merge into the second.  The eye of consciousness, like the mechanical eye of the movie 
camera, promises to void the distance that separates it from the object of observation and become 
the pure showing (demonstration) of things as they are.   
And just as the camera, once freed from its false existence in the studio, discovered its 
true position to be, literally, in medias res, in the midst of things, in those interstices of the world 
where its totality is being knit—so does the proletarian artistic consciousness.  It is the same road 
and the same destination.  On the iron tracks of objective pre-destination, “this” accomplishes 
the trip back from re-presentation, from its alienated, cast-away being.  Unlike the theorists of 
the left avant-garde, the “organizers” of proletarian literature did not aim at abolishing artistic 
representation.  On the contrary, they remained, for the most part, strictly within the framework 
of the traditional vis-à-vis of subject and object, author and portrayed reality.  And yet, within 
this old-fashioned framework, a novel relation between the two terms is established.   
The author now bears that title through a new kind of endowment.  Not he is an author 
who, keeping reality at the distance of artistic perspective, “portrays” it in writing, but he who 
apprehends how the reality of which he is part has never ceased to write through him and in spite 
of him.  Aphoristically, we can call an author the individual who maintains this line of 
determination by consciously accepting the “through,” so that it is no longer “in spite.”  Having 
consciously assimilated his work’s inevitable dependence on the historical existence of his class 
(the social commission), the writer enjoys freedom in necessity.  Try as he may, he cannot free 
                                                                                                                                                             
movement worth filming and screening.  The geometrical exact of movement through an exciting succession of 
images is what is required of montage” (“We” 8; emphasis added). 
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himself from the social commission.  He can only accept it freely and freely employ his abilities 
in the task of fulfilling it:  
He is free in the choice of his theme.  He is even more free in his use of methods 
for shaping the material at hand.  But we know that his freedom is a function of 
class necessity […].  In the free choice of theme, the author is determined by the 
social-psychological task of the present day.  This is how we understand the social 
commission.  This is why we say that the artist-Marxist, who understands the 
mechanics of social relations […] does not need the illusory freedom of artistic 
work. (Averbakh, “O sovremennykh” 11) 
Averbakh’s words do not, in the least, dispel the ambiguity pertaining to the author’s 
position in the world.  Is the proletarian writer seizing upon something, or is something seizing 
upon him?  Is he, really, “choosing” his theme, or is the theme “choosing” him?  As conceived 
by Libedinskii—himself a proletarian writer of some renown—the subject of an author’s work, 
its “theme” (tema), documents the author’s objective relation to the social world (“Problemy” 
20).  That relation is, certainly, given, not chosen.  Developing a theme by means of writing is 
similar to solving a mathematical problem.  The problem as given, contains in an embryonic 
form its own solution (Libedinskii, “Problemy” 20).  Hence, the author’s activity is the activity 
of demonstration, of bringing out and making manifest this initially concealed solution.  But 
since he is himself an inextricable part of the problem, since it is his objective relation to the 
social that will emerge at end of the process, he is equally that which demonstrates and that 
which is being demonstrated, the “subject” and the “object” of representation, the portraying and 
the portrayed. 
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Human interiority, consciousness, appears, at first sight, to be something quite different 
from, say, linen or stone.  But just like linen and stone, consciousness emerges from its 
dissimulative being to find itself as one “item” in a field of otherness that is knowable and 
available to praxis.  This field consists of things coextensive with individual consciousness in 
such a way that their cohabitation forms a systematic and “working” ensemble, a totality.  The 
agency that informs the whole, whatever makes the totality “work” and “behave” in rationally 
predictable ways, also “disposes” of each particular item in lawful and necessary manner.  It 
gives to consciousness, no less than to stones and linen, a “disposition”: a tendency to which it 
conforms, a function it cannot but fulfill, a shape it will eventually assume.  It is, therefore, not 
surprising that object-like and subject-like items alike should be immanently invested with 
something called social commission.  This is the operative principle of the whole of which they 
are constitutive parts, just like the dominanta and the socio-psychological tendency were the 
operative principles of textual totalities.   
As something separate from the totality and its operative principle, there exists the 
general hermeneutic of “how it all works” and “what it all comes down to.”  This knowledge is 
neutral.  It does not interfere with the analyzed phenomena, but simply raises them into clarity.  
Under its grasp, “this,” the intellected field, is conveyed to its own “unconscious”: the true, if 
hitherto concealed, interrelations between all of its items. 
 Similarly constituted is the cultural praxis that calls itself now “construction,” now 
“organization,” and now “systematization.”   Whatever this praxis approaches proves to be a 
thing with a disposition and purpose, a thing already headed somewhere.  And so a cultural 
“making” becomes possible that showcases the unobtrusiveness of pure analysis.  To organize 
items, whether they be possessed or deprived of consciousness, means to convey them to the 
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background that has always been “behind” them—to their “unconscious.”  Human or not, 
animate or not quite, they prove to be possessing and possessed of a certain “structure,” 
“tectonic,” or “organization.”  Here the ambiguity sets in, for this property of items, whatever its 
designation, is neither fully within nor fully outside of them, it is neither solely their property, 
nor is it entirely bestowed upon them from without.  The utilitarian tectonic of material things, as 
well as the social tectonic of human subjects, is what relates them to the background totality and 
assigns to them a function therein.  It constitutes their identity and, by the same token, refers 
them to where this identity is no longer theirs to own.   
For human subjects, the issue of identity is also an issue of agency.  It is a matter of that 
very same “making” and “doing,” regardless of whether it comes in the form of seeing, building, 
or writing.  In all these forms, the act issuing, apparently, from the human subject contains, in 
fact, two vectors.  In order to be what he is truly, to enjoy identity, the subject must, in the same 
act, affirm himself and showcase the operative principle of the systematic totality to which he 
belongs.  He must allow another agency to pass through him uninhibited; another, imperious act, 
issuing from the totality as a whole, must come to inform his act.  At the point where these two 
dynamic vectors begin to interact, we shall begin to think totalitarian culture and the institution 
of socialist realism.  And as we do, we shall be forced to find new words and concepts in order to 
describe the act of cultural creation. 
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CHAPTER ONE: MATTERING AND MANNING 
 
 
 
 
Perhaps we can never experience anything concerning things and 
make out anything about them except as we remain in the realm in 
which they encounter us.  Meanwhile, we cannot get loose from 
the question whether or not we approach the things themselves, at 
least within this realm, whether in it we aren’t always already with 
them. 
Heidegger, What is a Thing? 
 
We cannot remain in this dilemma of having to fail to understand 
either the subject or the object.  We must discover the origin of the 
object at the very center of our experience; we must describe the 
emergence of being and we must understand how, paradoxically, 
there is for us an in-itself. 
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
 
At least in one respect, the study of Stalinist culture provides those who pursue it with the 
promise of clarity and almost metaphysical solace.  If culture is, most broadly, a realm of created 
things, Stalinism appears to return us to a realm of ontological simplicity long lost in the history 
of the Western world.  Centuries after the decline of the Western medieval civilization, within 
whose confines ens creata, the entire multitude of beings and things, could be found to issue 
from a single source, we chance upon a similar world in Soviet Russia.  Certainly, throughout 
these centuries, secular metaphysics has sought to restore the lost unity of creation by devising 
various transcendental egos (particular or universal “spirits”) and abstract subjects, which have 
allowed one to say, for example, that German culture is the creation of the German Volkgeist, 
Western civilization—the product of the laws of History, bourgeois culture—the offspring of 
bourgeois Ideology, etc.  And yet, these capitalized and capital abstractions have been quite far 
  
 119
from the simple presence and identity of the Christian Creator; and the act of cultural creation 
had never approached the intuitive immediacy of a magisterial hand directly shaping the 
countenance of worldly things.   
How comforting it is, then, to hear at the end of the twentieth century, words like the 
following, coming from one of the most distinguished and prolific students of Stalinism?! 
23 April, 1932.  On that day, when the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party passed the resolution “On the Reformation of Literary and Artistic 
Organizations,” our national literature and art entered upon a new quality.  Soviet 
literature and Soviet art began, de jure, on that day. [….] [On] that day was born a 
peculiar kind of literature, state literature, and its birth means a lot.  Actually, it 
means everything.  Soviet literature has no authors: the state is its author.  As far 
as the writers who were making it are concerned […]—these were not even 
writers but, above all, employees of the state […]; in I. Lezhnev’s precise 
expression, [they were] “the organ of the Party’s imaginative thinking.” 
(Dobrenko, “Gosudarstvo” 4; emphasis in the original). 
Surely, Dobrenko’s statement can be applied not only to the creations of Soviet literature, but 
also to all the other productions of Stalinist socialist realism and, beyond it, to every other sphere 
of production.  If the State can be conceived as the creator of artistic works (culture in its 
narrowest definition), we are not risking anything by calling it also the creator of “works” like 
tractor plants and irrigation systems.  Across these suddenly isomorphic spheres, one hand 
wields the power of creation.   
Boris Groys’s has been the voice speaking most audibly for treating Stalinist Russia as 
just such a unified realm in which things utilitarian and artistic issue forth from the same 
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demiurgic will: “Because [Soviet leaders] were connoisseurs of the only necessary poetics and 
genre—the poetics of the demiurgic construction of a new world—they were entitled to issue 
orders on the production of novels and sculptures as they were to direct the smelting of steel and 
the planting of beets” (36).  The surface on which beets and novels emerge side by side, 
following the command of a single intentionality, is what Groys calls “the total art of Stalinism.”  
Over this realm, the State stands in the place of God, but the Gospel of creation still reads, “In 
the beginning, there was the subject.”  Instituted through the state, the subjectivity of this 
subject—communist ideology—is not unlike the Biblical logos, which is not an airy “word,” as 
the canonized translation would have us believe, but an “intelligence-design” with the power to 
become flesh unconditionally in the materiality of a created world.  Among the created things, 
there are also people, the Soviet subjects, made in the image of ideal humanity. 
When approaching a sphere of created things—and Stalinist culture is one such sphere—
it is perhaps only natural to want to know “who did it.”  If we have our “who,” the story can 
begin in a traditional fashion, with the introduction of a main hero as the center of action.  This is 
why it is so intellectually soothing to see that, even in a cursory overview of Stalinism, the 
figures of the Party and State, of the Leader and his entourage, of Ideology and Propaganda, 
come forth and suggest themselves as unavoidable choices for the appointment.   
But what if this way of asking is not the way to go about understanding culture?  What if 
the desire to know “who did it” is just a bad habit of thought?  What if the appointment of 
towering subjects at the head of creation, despite the intuitive facility of such choices, is not at all 
how the story of culture should be told?  Unlike the original making of the world, the creation of 
cultural worlds is never a creation ex nihilo.  Whenever we approach it, there are always existing, 
already “made,” people and things.  Whatever originary subjectivity we may devise, we would 
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not be able to conceive of it as something wholly original.  Unlike God, who is capable of 
absolute self-subsistence before anything else properly is, all subsequent demiurgic subjects 
would have to answer as to the ground on which they stand.  In the process, they would 
inevitably show themselves as undeserving of being placed at the beginning of all creation.  Even 
if, in its very name, the state alludes to something standing on its own, the story of Stalinist 
culture cannot begin with the words, “In the beginning was the Stalinist state.”  The state and its 
ideology, the supposed subject of culture and its subjectivity, must themselves stand in a pre-
existing world, which cannot but be a world of people and things.  A human institution, the state 
is itself a cultural product and, as such, its agency cannot be the primal agency of cultural 
creation. 
If, in addressing Stalinist culture, we do not want to reify abstract idols in the image of 
God, we may begin by saying, “In the beginning was a state,” where “state” does not designate 
anything like a subjective entity capable of design and executive will, but is used in the sense in 
which we speak of a certain “state of affairs.”   This state, which precedes—principally, not 
temporally—all institutions of a particular culture, including the institution of the state, should be 
thought as the primary environment for any cultural investigation.  When considering a given 
cultural world, we first encounter a state of affairs, a situation.  Here we find nothing like a 
gargantuan and masterful being from which all creation issues.  No agency announces itself as 
the source of all things.  All we find on this primary level are people and things in a certain state 
of affairs.  In the traces of culture, all we discover are the traces of men dealing with things, 
speaking about things, fighting for things. 
In the first part of this study, approaching Stalinism by way of the post-revolutionary 
decade, I presented a series of such “affairs” between people and things.  My goal was to show 
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an underlying pattern, a common way of being.  The procedure may appear similar to the type of 
modeling Foucault has performed in Les mots and les choses: a historical realm is delineated, 
representative texts are selected and interrogated en route to deriving a proto-discursive 
paradigm, which can be said to account for the essential (in Foucault’s case, cognitive) affairs of 
a particular period.  The similarity is only superficial.  Unmistakably indebted to the Kantian 
legacy, Foucault’s approach seeks to establish for each historical-cultural frame (the 
Renaissance, the Classical age, the modern period) an absolute epistemic horizon that delimits 
the possibilities of how things are known and what kind of things are known.  In the Critique of 
Pure Reason, Kant had elaborated the universal conditions (categories) under which something 
like an “object” of human cognition is at all possible; Foucault historicizes the procedure without 
changing its essential movement: his “episteme” systematizes the conditions of possibility that 
allow things to become objects of knowledge in a particular, historically bounded realm.  
Patently different in both scope and ambition from Foucault’s, my approach differs from 
his also in matters of principle.  Not only in its title, but also in what it has to say, Les mots et les 
choses excludes man.  If he appears at all, it is only when he turns up on the side of the known, 
i.e., as an object of knowledge (the fact that in the modern episteme man is not merely one object 
among others, but the very paradigm for the “order of things,” does not principally alter the 
situation.)  Although no one else but people are the carriers of the knowledges Foucault analyzes, 
man is never addressed as an active participant in the event of culture.  Nowhere is the question 
posed, “Who knows?”  Human subjectivities are subsumed under the objectivity of structure.  
Ultimately, it is the episteme that “knows.”  The authors discussed on the pages of Les mots et 
les choses are there simply to fill out, with their words and the things of their knowledge, the 
frame prepared for them by their own historical finitude.  Only the outline of this finitude 
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matters, as we watch, throughout the book, how the things take place and become ordered inside 
this or that cognitive grid. 
By contrast, my approach (so far enacted, rather than explicated) seeks to account for the 
way man also takes place: not only how something (“this”) is articulated as a cultural matter, but 
also how someone comes to be a cultural agent.  As a consequence, the space where I seek the 
defining affairs of culture is quite unlike the categorical space of Foucault’s episteme.  I conceive 
of it as more akin to the kind of space Heidegger had in mind when he spoke of the “clearing”: 
the zone where things encounter man in a reciprocal event of being.90  Thinking along similar 
lines, I designated this primary space of culture as “plot.”  I rely on both its spatial semantics, as 
well as on its evocation of an interactive, “eventful,” environment. 
In the following theoretical reflections, I will try to anchor the concept of plot in a 
specific understanding of the cultural act.  It should be said from the outset, that this 
understanding is decidedly opposed to demiurgic conceptions and to the triumphant advance of 
the subject/cultural hero (“I came, I saw, I made”).  Plots consist of positions, roles, actions, and 
movements.  They cannot be reduced to or generalized as a single action issuing from a single 
agency (individual or corporate, human or not).  After Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, I 
would like to think of the basic (Heidegger would say, “primordial”) cultural act as an event, a 
“happening,” that contains not just one vector of force (usually mapped along the line subject—
object).  Hence, I am appealing to the other meaning of “act,” the one correlative with “plot,” the 
one intended when we speak of an act in a play.  While preserving the moment of telos—the 
concerted movement toward something—this meaning includes the element of interaction and, 
by the same token, excludes the possibility of attributing the directed movement to one actor 
only.  Thought in these terms, the “act” is not driven by the unleashing of a force; instead, it is 
                                                 
90 See the epigraph to the present chapter. 
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advanced by the very accord, or concert, of the parts (roles) that go into it.  It is to be grasped as 
“composition,” more than as “execution” or “accomplishment.” 
What, then, are the constituents of this composition, what “goes into” the cultural act, 
understood as an interactive happening?  Obviously, man goes into it, and so does something 
else, something other (“this”).  Such a way of speaking, however, although it says very little, 
may suggest that we are still within the old dichotomy, featuring “man” as the subject (taking the 
place once occupied by God) and “this” as the inert matter about to be made into a cultural 
artifact.  I prefer a different way of speaking in which man and matter would not stand opposed 
as substantive entities (one part “man,” one part “matter”), but would figure as complementary 
parts (to be read, here, as “roles,” rather than “ingredients”) in a single event.  With this 
conceptual predilection in mind, I would like to designate the parts constitutive of every cultural 
act as “manning” and “mattering.”  Prior to “man” (and “subject”), there is “manning”; prior to 
“matter” (and “object”), there is “mattering.”  At the most primary level, the cultural act is the 
event of mattering and manning.  
“Mattering” is how things are in a human world.  In such a world—the only one we 
know—things are matters of interest, concern, involvement, cognition, or indifference.  In being 
all this, they “matter.”  I place no axiological weight on this usage, and no ethical proposition is 
forthcoming: “mattering” means less (but, in a way, more) than to be held dear, to be of concern, 
be important, valuable, or worthy of attention.  It means the ability of things to lend themselves 
to man, to be approachable, knowable, and doable in such-and-such a way: their fundamental 
openness toward a historical someone who knows and does.  Heidegger never took for granted 
this openness of things and never ceased to interrogate it.  Throughout his life, he asked 
repeatedly and in marvel one and the same question: how come that there are things available for 
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us to know, love, revolt against, or ignore?  It seemed inconceivable to him that such attitudes 
can be deduced in toto from the activity of some subject intent on knowing, loving, revolting 
against, or ignoring.  That we should have “projects” and “involvements” did not seem to him 
something that we could singularly bring about, regardless of how vastly this “we” is conceived.  
The general disposition of things, their being-at-the-disposal-of-, being-a-matter-of-, for us, is 
what I mean by “mattering.”  The modes of mattering are many; they can be differentiated in 
both a diachronic (historical) perspective, or in a synchronic overview (how things become a 
matter of scientific inquiry is different from the way they become a matter of pragmatic daily 
concern). 
The conceptualization of mattering takes its first, most “literal,” incentive from 
Heidegger’s gloss on Kant in What Is a Thing?  In speaking about phenomenal appearances, 
Kant distinguishes, classically, between their “matter” and “form.”91  Heidegger reads “matter” 
not so much in terms of primary “substance,” but in terms of “pressure” (Thing 189).  From 
matter comes something like a primary rush that presses (im-presses) upon the senses and is, 
thus, responsible for our sensations (Thing 208).  It is important for Heidegger to stress the 
aspect of directedness-toward92 us that pertains to matter.  How does this aspect come about?  In 
Kant’s terms, matter is what is made present in intuition, the given in regard to its content; it is 
the “stuff” of sensation, what affects us.  By contrast, things like space and time are “pure” 
intuitions without sensations: not the matter (content), but the form of intuiting.  They are not 
                                                 
91 “I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter, but that which allows the manifold of 
appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the form of appearance.  Since that within which the 
sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all 
appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can 
therefore be considered separately from all sensation.” (155-56; emphasis in the original). 
 
92 When he writes “toward” or “against” (gegen), Heidegger keeps in mind the morphology of Gegenstand 
(“object”), which he spells out conceptually as something brought to a stand (stand) vis-à-vis man (Thing 184-85). 
 
  
 126
given as something concrete, but are the “wherein” of all concrete appearances (Thing 194, 198).  
The distinction implicit throughout in Heidegger’s interpretation is that between what is given to 
us and the giving (Gebung) itself.93  Expectedly, he is interested in the latter—that which, while 
different from the things themselves, directs them toward us and lets them encounter us.94   
If “matter” is what we encounter in sensations, how should we call that which brings us 
into the encounter?95  Here I would like to say “mattering,” and thereby turn the conversation to 
a context quite remote, but not divorced, from that of Kant’s basic epistemology.  While The 
Critique of Pure Reason deals with the fundamental structure of all experience, it is clear that 
Kant takes the world of nature and the natural sciences as his starting point.  The world for which 
I intend the term “mattering” is the man-made world of culture.  In this world, we are dealing 
with more complex phenomena, which cannot be addressed at the level of elementary sensations 
or perceptions.  The “matter” that encounters us here is never virginal, and cannot be 
decomposed down to primary elements or stimuli; at each point, it possesses a characteristic 
thickness made up of have-been experiences, knowledges, practices.  The weight of these 
material and immaterial traces is what tells us that we are within the horizon of culture, and not 
in that of science.  We cannot lose it without losing, in the same instance, the field of culture.   
                                                 
93 Contrary to canonical (Neo-Kantian) readings of The Critique of Pure Reason, which have treated as primary the 
problematics of judgment, Heidegger, not surprisingly, insists on the crucial role of intuition (144-48).  He calls it a 
“giving” representation (Thing 197), meaning that what we obtain through it comes to us from somewhere else; by 
contrast, he designates conceptual thinking as “spontaneous” representation, one which “unfold[s] itself out of 
itself” (Thing 142).    
 
94 “In human cognition the cognizable must encounter and must be given, because what is, is something other than 
ourselves, and because we have not ourselves made or created what is. [….]  Since we human beings have not 
created what is as such as a whole and could never create it, it must be shown to us if we are to know it. [….] [T]he 
work of art is only one proof that we come to know what is, only when it is specially given to us” (Thing 207-208; 
emphasis in the original). 
 
95 The easy (and somewhat tautological) answer—“sensation”—does not satisfy Heidegger.  He finds it fraught with 
ambiguity (Thing 208-11). 
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A pivotal theme of Gadamer’s philosophy is that this weight—the weight that he 
summarily calls “tradition,”—is not dead.  As, I hope, the following discussion will bear out, the 
concept of “mattering” owes much to Gadamer’s elaboration of the conditions of 
understanding—an elaboration that, for its part, is heavily indebted to Heidegger’s analysis of 
the “hermeneutic circle.”  As Gadamer saw it, the heavy matter of “custom,” “value,” and 
“prejudice,” carried by historical time and deposited into every present—the very deposit from 
which Enlightenment thought sought to free itself—is an indispensable condition for 
understanding.  Tradition is what first makes possible a context of relevance or significance, 
from out of which the act of understanding is, then, able to reach for and grasp its truth.  
Holding-as-true is, in other words, predicated on a prior holding-as-significant; and this latter 
hold, is the one in which our cultural-historical being always holds us.96    
The truth in question is, of course, not some absolute knowledge.  Because in the realm 
of culture we always know and act from a “situation,”97 we encounter not the thing-in-itself, but 
things that are always so-and-so “to us,” or “to them” (we witnessed, for example, that “to them” 
the body is a machine-like mechanism, “to them” the text is a socio-psychological complex, etc., 
etc.).  Separating the cultural thing from the thing-in-itself are not, as in Kant, some abstract and 
universal categories of understanding, but the concrete horizons of a given cultural world.  This 
aspect, which is the phenomenal proper, has the apparent character of limitation.  But it cannot 
be just that.  That something is “to us” in this and that way should not be understood as mere 
                                                 
96 “[D]eterminate thinking of any kind can go on only because being has already been understood in some specific 
way—and in this sense it is not us who grasp being, but being that grasps us” (Linge, lii; emphasis in the original).  
 
97 Gadamer, in whose hermeneutic philosophy the correlated concepts of “situation” and “horizon” play a central 
role, provides this succinct explanation: “Every finite present has its limitations.  We define the concept of 
‘situation’ by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision.  Hence essential to the 
concept of situation is the concept of ‘horizon.’  The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can 
be seen from a particular vantage point […].  Since Nitzsche and Husserl, the word [“horizon”] has been used in 
philosophy to characterize the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and the way one’s range of 
vision is gradually expanded” (Gadamer, Truth 302). 
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privation (phenomenality in the negative sense), as what prevents us from reaching the thing-in-
itself.  If it is understood this way, it is misunderstood.  If we, for example, say that the 
Enlightenment notion of society (as a rational association of free individuals for the benefit of 
each) is a culturally particular presentation of society, this, obviously, does not mean that we 
have recourse, even in hypothesis, to “what society really is.”  The cultural-phenomenal 
appearance of the thing “society” does not have as a background society-in-itself; instead, in the 
background there is only our continuing, but discontinuous and forever unfinished, endeavor to 
understand and make “society.” 
At each particular moment, an endeavor like this cannot but take its bearings from within 
a particular cultural horizon.  This is its limitation, but also its grounding.  Hence, we must say 
that the to-us constitutive of every cultural horizon is perhaps what prevents us from having an 
absolute grasp of things, in either cognitive or practical way, but also what enables us to have 
any grasp at all.  Differently put, the very conditions that constitute the finitude of our knowing 
and doing are—how could it be otherwise?—also the conditions that make possible any knowing 
and doing in the first place.  Consequently we should give these conditions a positive meaning as 
well.  We should read “to us” not only in terms of contingent appearance and bad phenomenality 
(“things only seem this way to us”), but also in terms of engagement and giving directedness: 
that things are addressed—to us.    
This understanding underlies the notion of mattering: what makes present the matter 
(Sache) not as a something in-itself (Selbst), but as something given specifically to us (thus, as a 
possibility for knowing and doing, as an opportunity which is there for the taking), is what I call 
mattering.  It is a succinct conceptual expression of what may be called the pregnancy of 
finitude: the seemingly oxymoronic proposition that the opening to truth is made possible by the 
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enclosure of horizon.  “Mattering” indicates the possibility of conceptualizing a general 
“wherein” from which things emerge to encounter us as matters of…  The opposition between 
the gerund (“mattering”) and the noun (“matter”) seeks—very much in line with the central 
theme of Heidegger’s philosophy—to unsettle the semantics of inanimate passivity and 
indifferent standing-against, and to suggest, instead, the “directed,” “engaging” character of this 
fundamental emergence.   
In that they are cultural things, i.e., since “mattering” is their fundamental mode of being, 
things have their ways of recruiting us into an involvement with them.  When the study of a 
particular culture commences, such involvements are always already under way and in front of 
the observer.  The recruitment has taken place, so that there is always, in concert, mattering and 
manning.  “Manning” is not something principally different from, even less opposed to, 
mattering.  It is, simply, that same recruitment, viewed from the other end.  It is the indispensable 
correlative of mattering.  Mattering and manning are two ways of considering one and the same 
involvement (event).  “Being-a-matter-of-” leaves an open space (graphically, after the last 
dash).  To fill that space with “systematic study,” “life or death,” “political strategy,” etc., 
presupposes a someone who is “into” things (matters), who takes on a part, adopts these 
attitudes, a someone who has the “disposition” of systematic study, life or death, or political 
strategy.  It presupposes manning.  We use the word in speaking, for example, of manning a 
phone line.  This tells us that there is manning only because something calls for it, something 
that “matters,” because there is a call to be answered at the other end.  
Even in their lexical form, the two concepts are meant to evoke each other.   Each is 
nothing in itself, subsisting only through its relation to the other.  “Mattering” is what calls for 
manning (since things can matter only to someone); conversely, “manning” is nothing but what 
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has already responded to the call of things that matter.  Together, the two articulate a primary 
draw constitutive of our being in the (cultural) world—the draw that, among other things, assures 
us that we do not begin our dealing with our matters-of from the distance of once-and-for-all 
constituted subjectivity and objectifying reflection.    
If the cultural act is to be seen as an event, we must see not only how something takes 
place (a text, a monument, a war), but also how someone takes place, through manning.  We will 
then obtain not just an “order of things,” but also, and in accord with it, an “order of man.”  The 
inalienable unity of these two “orders” is presupposed in my understanding of the cultural act 
and in the attendant concept of “plot.”  Summarily: “plot” is the descriptive space proper to the 
cultural act understood as the unitary happening of mattering-manning.   
To understand this happening better, we may conceive of the cultural act by analogy with 
the act of speaking, which Paul Ricoeur has described as an event (the “occurrence of 
discourse”) marking “the simultaneous birth of the spoken being of the world and the speaking 
being of man” (“Question” 261).  In speaking, the things of the world are posited, and so is the 
speaking “someone.”  But even before that, something else must be posited: before a specific 
“matter” is articulated in speech, and through the discursive determination of this “something” a 
certain “someone” receives his reciprocal determination, one must posit, as the fundamental 
condition of the speech act, an engagement with things.  This engagement can be viewed from 
two perspectives, which are complimentary.   
On one hand, for us to speak, something must precede us, as it in fact always does, and 
precede us both determinatively and engagingly.  In Mikhail Bakhtin dialogic conception of the 
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utterance, what so precedes the act of speech is the word of the other.98  Simply put, we speak 
because we speak with or to the other; because what the other has said matters and, thus, elicits.  
In this sense, our own act of speech can never be conceived as pure “expression” (and is, 
consequently, not fully or really our own).  In that it is conditioned by the word of the other, ours 
proves to be a dialogic word; it is “responsive” by its very nature,99 even if it sometimes 
pretends, in what it says explicitly, not to be answering to anything.  By addressing us, the word 
of the other locates us in a situation.  In doing so, it seemingly confines us; but it also gives our 
word its determinate content.   
I am proposing that we think Bakhtin’s dialogic situation further than he intended it: 
beyond the conversation between two people, beyond what he called speech genres, and beyond 
speech itself, to the most general level of our being in the world.   Here we are impelled to ask 
whether the world itself is not “dialogic,” since it is, before anything else, a cultural world.  
What else is culture if not just this word of the Other, a word in the flesh, so to speak, that has 
always-already engaged us, so that our words and undertakings should have ground and 
meaning, and so that, from these words and undertakings, we may learn what we are?  This 
preliminary aspect of enabling-determining addressivity100 is what I call “mattering.” 
On the other hand, for the speech act to take place, another preliminary condition must be 
posited, a condition that is the obverse of the previous one.  “Mattering” is what has called to 
speech, eliciting it, necessarily, as the speech of a possible “one”; what has met this possibility 
                                                 
98 In the present context, Bakhtin’s “other” can be seen as correlative to the function of the “significant other” (Harry 
Stack Sullivan) in psychoanalysis: the one to whom the subject’s vital discourse is addressed, even when it is 
ostensibly addressed to (“insignificant”) others. 
 
99  “[A]ny speaker is himself a respondent to a greater or lesser degree.  He is not, after all, the first speaker, the one 
who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe” (Bakhtin, “Problem” 69). 
 
100  In “The Problem of Speech Genres,” Bakhtin speaks of addressivity as a property of the utterance (“the quality 
of turning to someone” [99]).  And yet, it is clear that being-addressed is also what makes any utterance possible. 
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half way, answering the call, is “manning.”  “Manning” is not yet this “one,” a subject, a 
determinate someone.  Something must animate discourse as speaking (the level of 
“enunciation”) before, as saying (the level of the “enunciated”), this discourse could be the 
verbal concretion a certain “someone.”  Differently put, something must propel speech for 
speech to continue moving toward meaning and, having arrived—no matter how precariously—
to point us to someone as the “one” of that meaning.   
As intended here, the word “manning” is supposed to bring into play also the idea of 
“staffing” and, through it—suggest a kind of work that is not initiated or planned in advance by 
us; we undertake this work only to the extent to which it has, first, taken us in and “employed” 
us.   And this is possible because there has been a determinate “slot” available in advance, an 
“opening” in a certain order of business.  We do not create the opening; it is much more accurate 
to say that the opening creates us, by letting us in and giving us something to do. 
Now speaking presents us with an “order of business” of this kind.  To speak, one must 
have something to say.  This appears as a straightforward and slightly naïve proposition until we 
inquire about the relation between this “one” and this “have.”   How are they situated in relation 
to each other?  Exactly where, topologically speaking, does one “have” what is to be said?  
Within?  This has been the answer traditionally given by all expressionist theories of language.   
In them, man is constituted somewhere outside of language, and reaches for language when the 
content, i.e., what is contained, or found “inside,” presses outward.  After a century of pervasive 
meditation on language and linguisticality within the humanities, in which properly linguistic 
inquiry has been corroborated by the perspectives of philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and 
sociology, these pneumatics of expression cannot but seem hopelessly inadequate.101  One of the 
                                                 
101 Here is how Merleau-Ponty explains the illusion of the anteriority of interiority: “Thought is no ‘internal’ thing, 
and does not exist independently of the world and of words.  What misleads us in this connection, and causes us to 
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great certitudes of this century has been that we cannot speak without entering the dimension of 
the Other, and one of its most gnawing suspicions—that the otherness that is language is our 
primary dimension, and that any “mineness” that claims the profundity of the unrepresentable 
may well be just a profound illusion.   
In view of this suspicion, the very problem of expression now stands in a wholly new 
light, with the poles of the constituting and the constituted reversed:  “It is not a question of 
knowing whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather of knowing 
whether I am the same as that of which I speak” (Lacan, “Agency” 165).  “That of which I 
speak” runs ahead of me.  Before me, it instantiates me as “one”: the one who says what is being 
said.  The “one” does not precede the act, but is constituted in it.  Therefore: “one” has 
something to say not in a contained and privately possessed “within,” but as a constitutive and 
open before, where “before” expresses the notion of precedence (what is ontologically prior to 
the “one” who says it) and, through it, also that of essential possibility (as when we speak of 
having “our whole life ahead of us”).  In other words, “having something to say” does not refer 
to the content of the speaking consciousness—what is “within,” available in advance of the 
speech act—but to there being an “opening” in the event of spoken being (what lies in front, as a 
potentiality).  Mattering calls precisely by making such room available, by creating an opening.  
Manning is what fills the opening and, thus, makes possible the expression of a certain “one.”  
The case of the so called “shifters”—personal and demonstrative pronouns, adverbs of 
place and time—illustrates, on a purely formal level, how speaking is the occupation of available 
room.  Items like “I,” “here,” “this,” are empty signifiers prior to being taken up in a concrete 
instance of speech.  Only then, in reference to the particular situation in which they are 
                                                                                                                                                             
believe in a thought which exists for itself prior to expression, is thought already constituted and expressed, which 
we can silently recall to ourselves, and through which we acquire the illusion of an inner life.  But in reality this 
supposed silence is alive with words, this inner life is an inner language.” (214). 
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instantiated, do they acquire reference and sense.  Behaving as they do, shifters bring out, more 
demonstratively than other linguistic forms, a quality that characterizes the whole of language: 
its existence as potentiality, its being-there for the taking.   In discourse, the potentiality is 
always realized, the room is always filled.  And so we realize: for the vessel of language, which 
would, by itself, float in abstract indeterminacy, to be anchored in a “person,” “time,” “place,” 
“proximity,” in other words, to be anchored in actuality, the vessel must be manned.  
If we assume the clichéd instrumentalist view of language as an inventory of available 
forms (the level of langue) from which we choose, as from the shelves in a store, the ones we 
need in a given situation of speech (the level of parole), we could say that “I” is one such 
selection.102  But this cannot be the authentic experience of speech.  Taking seriously the dialogic 
conception of the utterance, we are obliged to admit that we never take actual possession of the 
“I.”  Rather, we are “slotted for it” by what waits silently to be said.  In each instance of speech, 
we are being possessed by a certain situation that has addressed us—almost always implicitly, 
rather than explicitly—as the potential “thou” of a potential meaning/significance; to make this 
meaning “work,” to realize the significance with which the situation is pregnant, we must inhabit 
the “thou” from the other end; from that other end, the “I” marks the opening given to us in order 
to respond, the slot that is waiting for the “one” who has something to say, so that there is 
meaning.  Our speaking is speaking in this opening, it is the opening’s filling, it is—before being 
the speaking of a definite someone—manning.   
Linguists tell us that “I” can come to designate “me” only because it designates the “one 
who is speaking” at this particular moment.   But, as previously stated, one wouldn’t be speaking 
                                                 
102 Ricoeur is guilty of stating, if not really meaning, this fallacy when, following Benveniste, he declares that “the 
pronoun is waiting there, in my language, like an instrument available for converting this language into discourse 
through my appropriation of this empty sign” (“Question” 255).   
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if he didn’t “have something to say,” if, furthermore, he didn’t have it before oneself—and not 
inside— that is, before the emergence of the “one” as self.   The “one” is posited in retroflection 
by “that of which I speak”:103  
But if reduction must be taken in its positive sense,104 as the necessary 
condition of reference, it must also be taken in its subjective sense, as the 
possibility for an ego to designate itself in the occurrence of discourse.  Positing 
and subjectivity go hand in hand to the degree to which the reference to the world 
and self-reference—or, as we said above, the showing of a world and the positing 
of an ego—are symmetrical and reciprocal.  In the same way, there could be no 
aiming at the real, thus no claim to truth, without the auto-assertion of a subject 
who is both determined and involved in his speaking. (Ricoeur, “Subject” 260-
61)105 
It should be clear by now that mattering and manning are not intended as substitute for the 
relation subject-object and do not “cancel” it.  They are anterior to it.  They conceptualize a level 
prior to the moment discussed in the above passage from Ricoeur: the moment “this” and the 
“one” are given specific content.   
In a historical perspective, we may say that the instantiations of man as “subject” and of 
the things he knows and works on as “object” are of a rather recent descent.  These figures are 
specific concretions within the cultural process, not its points of departure; they belong— to 
borrow from the jargon of discourse analysis—to culture’s level of the “enunciated.”  Only if we 
                                                 
103 See the passage from Lacan quoted earlier. 
 
104 Riceour is referring to Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. 
 
105 In another place in the same essay, Ricoeur states, along the same lines: “the subject, in fact, is what refers to 
itself in refereeing to the real; retroreference and reference to the real are symmetrically constituted” (257). 
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see them as subsequent to what enunciates, i.e., to the cultural act as an event of mattering and 
manning, can we begin to conceptualize a cultural reality (I am tempted to say “eventuality,” so 
as to maintain the emphasis on the event-like character of culture) like that of Stalinism, in which 
it is the very relationship of subject and object that changes.  Mattering and manning are meant 
as the unchanging and primary coordinates of the cultural act, providing the conceptual 
framework within which such inquiry can get under way. 
Just like the speech act, the cultural act is not contained in the primary and ambiguous 
draw of mattering and manning, but is carried by an immanent momentum into a different 
dimension—the dimension in which the “something” and the “one” are co-posited.106  This 
movement, through which alone something determinate emerges and is, is what I call figuring-
out.  When we use the phrase, we usually mean someone’s intellectual activity in solving a 
problem or dealing with a situation.  This someone is the one who “does” the figuring-out.  As I 
mean it here, figuring-out is not attributable to anyone; no one does it.  Quite the contrary, it is 
what first brings about a “one.”  Remaining stubbornly in the form of a substantive gerund, 
figuring-out refuses to take a subject.  In the present context, its proper usage is not “Someone 
figures out something,” but “There is a figuring out of…”  Of what?  Figuring-out is the 
momentum toward the realization (appearance), in accord, of two phenomenal shapes, cultural 
figurations: of man and a certain matter-of.  Wherefrom do these figurations emerge?  Out of 
what are they figured?  Where else, if not from what is prior, from what constitutes the ground of 
the cultural act: from mattering and manning?  The three terms participate in a dialectic, so that 
none of them is to be thought outside its co-articulation with the others.  They are all aspects of 
                                                 
106 The distinction between these two levels may be likened to the distinction, within phenomenology, between, on 
the one hand, the ante-predicative being-in-the world and, on the other, the explicit positing of subject and object in 
reflection. 
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“the same thing,” conceptual perspectives on a single and unitary happening—the cultural act 
understood as an event.  “Figuring-out” is not the conclusion, resolution, or item-like product of 
the cultural act.  It is this very same act and nothing else, but considered, this time, in its 
productive, “genitive” aspect.    
This dialectic, in the comlementarity of its terms, expresses the idea that the “order of 
things” involves man, but does it in such wise that “man” is not initially a definite someone 
standing apart from things and being, subsequently, drawn to them by God knows what attributes 
of those things; nor is he, standing aside like that, the one who first draws things to himself with 
the power of some primal wanting or want, which may serve to define him as an entity (the 
entity that wills, or the one that lacks and, hence, desires).  Man is first, the being-in of this 
involvement, of this draw, from which the answer will be presented to him as to who he is or 
what he is.  Definitions that have him as a “subject,” “thinking animal,” “social being,” “desire,” 
etc., belong on the level of the answer.  Mattering and manning, by contrast, provide us with the 
conceptual measure by which man is always “ahead of himself,” ahead of that answer, which is 
also the measure that renders any answer provisional.    
The unity, or draw, of mattering and manning, which unfurls through figuring-out into 
the dimension of the determinate, can be illustrated by Escher’s well-known etching, in which 
two hands draw each other.  As the two hands execute their reciprocal motions, their just-
materialized presence covers the sheet.  It also covers up the dimension from which they have 
emerged:  that enigmatic space which the two figures share as an unacknowledged origin and 
suppressed background, the space where nothing is yet concrete, where nobody yet draws and 
nothing is yet drawn.  That space is blank, but not empty: behind the ambiguity of who is 
drawing and what is being drawn, lies the draw itself.    
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The draw of mattering and manning is not a “Newtonian” force acting between already 
constituted entities, so that these entities could be understood as principally prior, while the 
force—as the resultant.  Quite the contrary, the draw should be imagined as a kind of attraction 
that first constitutes entities as such,107 drawing them out toward determinateness, i.e., figuring 
them out.  The draw itself is what draws out, it constitutes, it is, essentially, the power of cultural 
ontogenesis.  The onta in question, as already stated, are not just things, but the cultural 
figurations (instantiations, appearances) of man and his matters-of… : the joint emergence and 
co-determination of  the “who” of saying, knowing, and doing, and the “what” of these same.  
The whimsical appeal of Escher’s etching resides obviously in the fact that in the conjoined 
emergence depicted there, it is impossible to know for certain who is who and what is what.  
Both hands are “who” and both are “what,” at the same time, and, for this very reason, each is 
neither.  What is the subject of what is being drawn? And who is its subject?  The patent 
impossibility of answering these questions forces our glance past the two figures, making us look 
attentively into the space where there is no-thing to see.   
It also forces us to think past those two meanings of the word “subject.”  As used so far in 
this study, the notion of “plot” demarcates precisely the conceptual space behind the two figures 
that have traditionally borne the name “subject.”  Plot, as the Russian word for it tells us, is 
something altogether different.  Siuzhet, at least in the sense the Formalists gave it, is neither a 
“who,” nor a “what”; rather, it is a happening-movement.  
                                                 
107 Heidegger might have had something similar in mind when, in discussing Rilke’s poetry, he wrote about the 
“globe of Being” as that unifying presence “which does not embrace [what is present], but rather itself releases 
illuminatingly into presencing” (“Why” 226). If I understand it correctly, the force he envisioned there is not the 
collecting togetherness of a realm of already constituted beings, but the begetting unity of the realm itself, as it 
releases being into presence.  The (non-Newtonian) physics of Heidegger’s thinking here cannot but bring to mind 
the Lemaître-Hubble ideas of cosmic creation (the so-called “Big Bang” theory). 
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 To elucidate this movement further, particularly in the aspect I called “figuring-out,” let 
us consider the following phenomenological description, which seeks to capture the constitution 
of the object (and, as I would claim, also of the subject) on the level of perception: 
 If I walk along a shore towards a ship which has run aground, and the funnel 
or masts merge into the forest bordering on the sand dune, there will be a moment 
when these details suddenly become part of the ship, and indissolubly fused with 
it.  As I approached, I did not perceive resemblances or proximities which finally 
came together to form a continuous picture of the upper part of the ship.  I merely 
felt that the look of the object was on the point of altering, that something was 
imminent in this tension, as a storm is imminent in storm clouds.  Suddenly the 
sight before me was recast in a manner satisfying to my vague expectation.  Only 
afterwards did I recognize, as justifications for the change, the resemblance and 
contiguity of what I call “stimuli”—namely the most determinate phenomena, 
seen at close quarters and with which I compose the “true” world.  “How could I 
have failed to see that these pieces of wood were an integral part of the ship?  For 
they were of the same color as the ship, and fitted well enough into its 
superstructure.”  But these reasons for correct perception were not given as 
reasons beforehand.  The unity of the object is based on the foreshadowing of an 
imminent order which is about to spring upon us a reply to questions merely latent 
in the landscape.  It solves a problem set only in the form of a vague feeling of 
uneasiness, it organizes elements which up to that moment did not belong to the 
same universe and which, for that reason, as Kant said with profound insight, 
could not be associated. (Merleau-Ponty 17) 
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This is one of the examples in the early part of the Phenomenology of Perception through which 
Merleau-Ponty seeks to undermine the objectivist constructions of empiricist psychology and 
epistemology.  He wants to show that the “perceptual ‘something’” (4) is not made up of 
objectively present stimuli, but is made in the very act of perception as a response by 
consciousness to the challenge of what encounters us in the sensory world.  In this particular 
episode, the constitution of the “something” depends on the articulation of figure versus 
background familiar from Gestalt psychology: the figure of the funnel, masts, etc., suddenly 
emerges, as the forest behind them recedes to become a background.   
How is this perceptual figuring-out precipitated?  Merleau-Ponty answers, somewhat 
enigmatically: by a certain “tension,” which issues from the ambiguity of what is being observed, 
and which the observer experiences as a “vague expectation” and a “feeling of uneasiness.”  
Thus, what in the empiricist view is a mechanistic concatenation of resemblances and 
proximities is, in Merleau-Ponty’s rendition, an entire little drama, a siuzhet.  The drama unfolds, 
for the most part, on the pre-objective stage, which, we may add, is also a pre-subjective one: the 
object has not yet emerged in its unity, nor has, for that matter, the subject, as a subject of clear 
vision.  What is there, then?  There is, to repeat, ambiguity and uneasiness.  And these are 
enough to tell us that we are in a humanly inhabited world, a cultural world, and not in the 
universe constructed by the natural sciences.108  Only in the latter is it possible to wonder how 
                                                 
108 As the following passage shows, the distinction between these two worlds is central to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking: 
“By way of guarding against myths it is, then, desirable to point out everything that is made incomprehensible by 
empiricist constructions and all the basic phenomena they conceal.  They hide from us in the first place ‘the cultural 
world’ or ‘human world’ in which nevertheless almost our whole life is led.  For most of us, Nature is no more than 
a vague and remote entity, overlaid by cities, roads, houses and above all by the presence of other people.  Now, for 
empiricism, ‘cultural’ objects and faces owe their distinctive form, their magic power, to the transference and 
projection of memory, so that only by accident has the human world any meaning.  There is nothing in the 
appearance of a landscape, an object or a body  whereby it is predestined to look ‘gay’ or ‘sad’, ‘lively’ or ‘dreary’, 
‘elegant or ‘coarse’.  Once more seeking a definition of what we perceive through the physical and chemical 
properties or stimuli which may act upon our sensory apparatus, empiricism excludes from perception the anger or 
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such states as ambiguity and uneasiness can come about.  Because it begins from a worldless 
man (as no more than a specifically constructed receptor of external stimuli) and an unmanned 
world (as no more than the locative of these stimuli), the empiricist view can only struggle and 
fail to bring them into an authentic union.  In the episode we are now considering, the empiricist 
cannot justify the passage from indistinct to determinate perception.  The pattern of objectively 
present proximities and resemblances, which is supposed to explain the eventual appearance of 
the true object (the ship with its masts and sails), cannot explain the tense duration in which the 
seeing stays with the seen prior to this appearance.  The indefinite time in which the eye 
supposedly scans the said similarities and proximities—why should it last and, drawing itself out 
into a telos, reach a resolution?  Why doesn’t the observer lose interest and turn away from the 
scene before the scanning is completed?  
For the kind of phenomenological analysis Merleau-Ponty undertakes, such a question 
need not be posed and certainly warrants no answer.  As long as we take as an absolute point of 
departure our having a (cultural) world, we do not need to invent special reasons for why the 
seeing should stay with the seen, for why there should be those “vague expectations,” and for 
why something like a “landscape” should hold “latent questions.”  We could say that the 
indistinct vision of the ship ashore holds significance for the eye, drawing it in and on toward 
further explication; or we could say that the eye takes interest in the scene and pursues this 
interest toward greater clarity.  In both cases, then, we would be expressing, in a patently 
inadequate way, one of two sides of the same unitary event, the sides, respectively, of mattering 
and manning.   
                                                                                                                                                             
the pain which I nevertheless read in a face, the religion whose essence I seize in some hesitation or reticence, the 
city whose temper I recognize in the attitude of a policeman or a public building” (Merleau-Ponty 23-24). 
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The original unity of these two, expressed in the concept of “draw,” is evoked when 
Merleau-Ponty’s speaks of a “tension” pervading the scene he describes.  This tension is not a 
subjective state.  It does not refer to our observer’s anxiety; nor does it refer to the matter-of-fact 
mingling of masts and trees in the distance.  It is a more primal moment, in which the subjective 
and objective sides are not yet distinguishable; they are “in a draw.”  The tension belongs to the 
scene as a whole.  As the following sentences make it clear, the tension is that of a pregnancy: 
the scene will soon conceive an “imminent order.”  
The draw is a concept not just of unity, but also of generation.  As stated, the draw is 
what draws out (figures out); it constitutes.  In our scene, we see this in the movement from 
tension to its relief, from pregnancy to the birth of that anticipated order.  At this point Merleau-
Ponty gives us an opportunity to misunderstand the event of perception and take it that the 
“order” refers just to the newly-constituted unity of the object.  But the little monologue in the 
middle of the passage tells us otherwise: it is not only the ship that is rendered complete; 
something similar happens to our observer, as he “comes to his senses.”  Just as the ship existed, 
at first, in the indeterminacy of a vague pattern, so did the observer exist in the indeterminacy of 
a vague apprehension.  He was lost; the recovery of the object is his recovery as well.  The 
figuring-out gives them both determinate being.  What counts as truth, on one end, counts as 
identity, on the other.  The resulting order is double: not only is the pattern of masts and trees 
regulated; the observer too is “put in order.”  He is now the “one” who sees clearly.  
In this reciprocal (re-)constitution something is inevitably lost.  When the ship comes to a 
stand on the shore in its full and true shape, complete with its funnels, masts, etc., the observer 
comes to see it “just as it is” and “just as it was.”  He, himself, finds himself such as he has 
always been.  The assumed permanence of subject and object renders, retroactively, as 
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unessential the previous moment of blurred outlines and vague uneasiness.  This previous 
moment now counts, on the side of the object, as a mere failure to show (due, for example, to the 
masts’ objective resemblance to the trees behind them), or, on the side of the subject, as a bit 
embarrassing failure to see (“How could I have failed to see that these pieces of wood were an 
integral part of the ship?”).  Lost is the duration, no matter how momentary, in which the seeing 
had clung to the seen, not letting it drop, but working until a separation of figure and background 
was achieved.  This concrete activity, which is not a mere clarification of “what is there,” but 
genuine productivity, falls by the wayside.  In general, lost is the understanding that the subject 
and object are not given, but eventful; that they “happen” in the instance of perception, and 
happen in such a way that their just-acquired stability projects backward, as a truth and identity 
that have been there all along.   
But how should we, who have gained this understanding, judge the scene?  We know that 
neither subject nor object was given in advance; but, still, something was there, something that 
manifested itself in a vague foreboding, “imminence,” as Merleau-Ponty puts it.  Where does it 
come from?  Looking back, from the point where the subject and object are already standing, we 
can grasp what was there before—in admittedly negative and retroflective terms—as an instance 
of a not-yet-object and not-yet-subject drawn together.109  To state this in positive terms is to 
restate the gist of the preceding discussion: the “imminent order,” which is always the reciprocal 
order of truth and identity, figures out of the primary draw of mattering and manning. 
 
Can we now look back at the Soviet cultural scene of the 1920s, as presented in the first part of 
this study and, through Merleau-Ponty’s description, see it anew as a scene giving birth to an 
                                                 
109 From here, we can summarize the act of perception, in Lacanian language, by saying: what filled the lack of the 
perceived (the not-yet-object) was the lack of the perceiving (the not-yet-subject).  
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“imminent order”—not just a socio-political order, but a broader “order of things”?  The chapters 
composing this study’s first part described local episodes within this larger scene, particular 
encounters between people and “this.”  In each of these encounters, we can see the constitution 
of “this” in its truth as the articulation of figure against background: formal construction against 
semantic content, depicting (social) subjectivity against depicted world, the thing of utility 
against the object of art, “imputed” against “natural” class consciousness.  In all these instances, 
the object is (re-)constituted in the movement whereby it emerges from “behind the back” of the 
individual subject.  The measure by which “this” exceeds the immediacy of the subjective—the 
immediacy of authorial intent or apparent meaning, the priority of “expression” in the making of 
the thing or in the conduct of the body, the spontaneity of class position, etc.—is also the 
measure of its truth, the measure by which it counts as the “real thing.”  But to notice all this is 
still not to take in the whole scene.   
It is not enough to understand that the appeal of objectivity resides in this coming-out-
from-behind the immediacy of the subjective.  We must also notice how this distance between 
background and foreground holds also the appeal to a certain “one”; we must see it as that very 
opening through which not just a truth, but also an identity is to be had.  To put it in the terms of 
the earlier discussion, it is that space where “one” shall “have something to say” and “have 
something to do.”   In the event of its coming-to-be, truth necessarily features such “room” or 
“opening” within itself, because truth is not just a matter of fact; it is also a matter of 
belonging.110  Expressed differently, “truth” is not just where things count as adequate to their 
essence; it is also where men “count for something.”   (In the Conclusion, I will return to this 
                                                 
110 Is not this the lesson we should learn from Hegel’s Phenomenology?  Does not the quest of consciousness, in 
which it, initially, searches for truth in the mode of the factual, become, eventually, a quest for truth as 
indistinguishable from recognition?   
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point in order to ask, specifically within the context of Stalinist culture, what is this “something” 
for which people count.) 
By the measure of their non-coincidence with themselves, that is, in the self-distancing of 
their cast-away (or re-presented) being, things call.  They make available the opening where 
something “needs to be said” and something “needs to be done.”  That is, they are authoritatively 
and imperatively addressed to a knowing and doing that would (re-)instate them in their 
truth/reality.  The knowing and doing in question are understood as laying bare an organization 
immanent to things, latent in them, and pressing to be recognized—an immanence synonymous 
with imminence.  And so the cultural act is, in each case, what satisfies this pressing desire for 
recognition, a reaction to this felt imminence, an answer to a “question… latent in the landscape” 
of culture.  
To repeat, the cultural act is not the action performed by a person, group, or institution.  It 
is not what one does.  One does only what needs to be done (for instance, in the case of the 
Formalists, we may say that they did what was needed for things literary to become a matter of 
rigorous, “scientific,” investigation).  The cultural act is the movement encompassing this 
“needing,” the responding that responds to it, as well as the assumption of these moments into 
the dimension of the determinate; it is mattering, manning, and figuring-out.  
The kind of truth we dealt with in the preceding chapters was truth as autonomous 
objectivity, the objectivity of a dissimulating device, i.e., one that does its work without 
manifesting itself in immediate consciousness.  And yet this hiding is also a calling.  In evading 
immediate consciousness, this truth makes room for “one.”  The room opens up precisely where 
immediate consciousness is not.  There the subterfuge will be seen through by an eye that is 
properly equipped for the purpose.  Now, clearly, the “one” to which such an eye belongs, exists 
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on an entirely different plane from the possessor of immediate consciousness111 (but it is also 
clear that the two planes are not discontinuous, since the “one” refers to the transcending of that 
immediacy).  He is neither me nor you, nothing personal, but simply the position that 
corresponds to what “has to be said” and what “has to be done”: the “one” of method.    
We can glimpse its nature at the very dawn of the modern era in Descartes’ stipulations 
on how the things of nature are to be known.  Regula IV of his early Rules for the Direction of 
Mind asserts that “Method is necessary for discovering the truth of nature”; while in the 
preceding rule, Regula III, we find the most general content of the method: “Concerning the 
objects before us, we should pursue the questions, not what the others have thought, nor what we 
ourselves conjecture, but what we can clearly and insightfully intuit, or deduce with steps of 
certainty, for in no other way is knowledge arrived at” (8).  We can see that the things of nature, 
which present themselves here as “objects,” also present themselves in a general aspect of 
“needing.”  They need method.  Method is where their truth shall be revealed.  We could partake 
of this truth if we too find ourselves in the method.  To the extent to which the order of things 
needs method, we too are needed there.  There we shall find not just the truth of the said things; 
we will also find ourselves as what we truly, if potentially, are: beings capable of proper 
reasoning.  The truth reflected from things will reflect upon us. 
We need to notice and distinguish between the two “we” in Descartes’ exposition: the 
“we ourselves”—the immediate “we,” which is given to undisciplined intuitions and random 
conjectures—and another one, constituted in a transcendence of the former: the clear and 
insightful “we” of the last clause.  This second “we” exists in the same impersonal dimension as 
the “one.”  Its character is general and potential.  It belongs, simultaneously, to all and no one.  
                                                 
111 The disparity is illustrated nicely in the opposition between the “kino-eye” and the limited field of human vision.  
In the political realm, it is exemplified, famously, in the paradigmatic separation between the main mass of the 
proletariat and its “vanguard,” the Communist Party.  
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We might say that it refers to “the ones who follow the steps of certainty.”  This means that the 
steps are, initially and for the most part, not ours.  They are there for the taking.  When we take 
these steps, this fact would be indistinguishable from them taking us (and carrying us unto 
certainty of who we are).  Until then, they are the empty footprints on the ground that grounds 
truth.  It is certainty itself that has laid them down.  For any specific knowledge to be arrived at, 
for the truth of things to “happen,” human beings must supply feet for the empty footsteps of 
certainty.  Or, more accurately, human beings, in the preeminent sense of the word, shall be 
those who will have done that—those who will have responded to the “needing” coming from 
the very nature of things. 
This “needing”—which, like “appealing” and “addressing,” is just a particular way of 
designating the general aspect of the cultural act I called “mattering”—is different for each 
cultural scene.  Depending on the “nature of things,” different is also that which is needed: 
Now when we encounter the expression “the nature of things,” the point is clearly 
that what is available for our use and given to our disposal has in reality a being 
of its own, which allows it to resist our efforts to use it in unsuitable ways.  Or to 
put it positively it prescribes a specific comportment that is appropriate to it.  
(Gadamer, “Nature” 70; emphasis added) 
To prevent potentially dangerous misreadings, it should be said right away that the 
“nature of things” of which Gadamer speaks cannot be taken literally; this is certainly not how he 
intends it.  On pain of falling prey to naïve essentialism, we must refuse to believe that some 
“natural” truth, an authentic being, guides or should guide our dealings with people and things 
across historical times and cultural places.  The “nature of things” is, of course, always a second 
nature; and the authority that it commands is neither primal nor absolute.  And yet, even as 
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“second,” the nature of things is not a fiction; it is something actual, and no theoretical account 
of the cultural process can be considered satisfactory if it does not take its authority seriously; if, 
furthermore, it does not attempt to account for how things acquire this second nature and how, 
through it, they come to “prescribe,” “appeal to,” or “need” cognitive and practical 
“comportments.”   
On the Soviet cultural scene of the 1920s we witness a kind of “needing” (we can think 
of it as desire that belongs to otherness itself) that needs something other than the 
“comportment” of authorship.  The latter attitude has become inappropriate.  Since the needing 
comes from an imperious objectivity that is about to manifest itself, the corresponding 
comportment is one that provides the means for that manifestation.  It is the instrumental and 
methodical “letting it be” of that imminent immanence.  In one sense, this comportment is 
submissive, for it takes its lead from what needs to manifest itself.   In another sense, it is 
majestic, for it instantiates a “one” of a seemingly super-human stature.  In this “one,” the 
promise and possibility are held out to me that I shall be the willing of history’s objective will, 
the producing of social (re-)production, the seeing of that total perception Vertov envisioned, the 
speaking of Language itself, the writing of the Literary, and the knowing of that consciousness to 
which I have unknowingly belonged. 
The truth of these new objectivities is satisfied (“happens”) through the “one.”  And as a 
“one,” i.e., as belonging to what is true, someone “realizes” himself and finds satisfaction 
therein.  It bears a repeated emphasis that this truth and this identity are, in principle, 
interdependent and coeval.  The former does not precede the latter.  The “one”—the figure of 
none other than the so-called modernist subject—figures out of the same act that lays bare the 
existence of art-as-device, of the social commission, of true class consciousness, and so on.     
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In the following chapters we shall consider a different order of things—one whose truth 
will demand a more complete, if somewhat perverted, satisfaction.  It will not be enough for it to 
have its other, the “one,” the “subject,” in the submissive comportment just referred to.  This 
order will be certain of itself only where it itself makes its other and possesses him on the level 
of the creaturely.  Its truth will manifest itself in a laying-bare in which the subject participates 
only to the extent to which it is he—as knowing and doing—that is engendered in it.  Such is the 
order of things defining Stalinist culture. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE UNBEARABLE LIGHT OF BEING 
 
 
 
 
“And your painting, comrade Arnol'dov, is remarkable for 
being a reflection of the life created by our creators.” 
Panferov, Bruski 
 
A certain straightforwardness of life, an uncontainable 
power of saturation, was staring at him from everywhere… 
Nikolai Zarudin, “The Sleeping Beauty” 
 
The first epigraph, taken from Panferov’s epic of collectivization, is meant to give us a 
first taste of a distinctly new mode of cultural creation.  The taste is not without an admixture of 
bland pleonasm.  Comrade Arnol'dov’s painting, his creation, reflects what is created by “our 
creators.”  This is its value and distinguishing quality.  Some of the creators in question are 
seated around him: a tractor driver, a kolkhoz worker, an aviator, a party activist—a miniature 
model of the new social world.  The person speaking is an old Bolshevik, Bogdanov.  He is 
announcing the arrival of a present in which the ranks of comrade Arnol'dov’s profession have 
expanded enormously.  From Lenin and Stalin to common folk like Pavel and Stesha over here—
are these not also artists, creators?  In all of them, from the first to the last, some new energy 
pulsates, a “dynamic force,” as Bogdanov puts it (980).  Let us begin by asking about this force, 
about its nature, as well as about its pertinence to artistic representation—to the kind of work 
someone like Arnol'dov performs. 
What is so distinct about the situation Panferov describes, other than the pomp of Party 
rhetoric?  After all, people have worked since time immemorial, and inasmuch as they produce 
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something that was not there beforehand, they could be called “creators.”  And the artist—what 
has he done, other than depict an episode of socialist construction, a world being made?  There 
does not seem to be any novelty here either.  Many of his profession, many times before, have 
sought to provide a truthful picture of the world, and more often than not that world had borne 
the traces of an earlier activity, of a making that precedes the artist’s.  How could any 
representational art avoid the encounter with the world as a pre-existing creation, that is, as a 
cultural, man-made reality?  If this is all that there is to comrade Arnol'dov’s creation, why make 
such a fuss about it?  
The scene we are considering seems rather drab as long as we are aware of only one 
picture in it—the picture Arnol'dov has just completed.  But there is one other—the picture that 
the old Bolshevik is drawing for his listeners and for us as he speaks.  This outer frame 
encompasses the “creators,” their creations and their creativity, as it wells up from the very 
foundations of socialist reality.  Here, in the second picture, Fenia, Kirillov, Pavel, and Stesha, 
their labor and their lives, are the immediate outlet and expression of socialism’s “dynamic 
force.”  If they are artists, they are artists in a sense quite different from what is meant in 
Arnol'dov’s case.  Whatever Bogdanov says, our painter occupies an altogether different position 
from that of the other creators.  From all we know about realism—and this is, no doubt, 
Arnol'dov’s method—he has presented on another surface what his eye has captured on the 
surface that is reality; while those around him are part and parcel of that original surface, and 
what they produce blends seamlessly with it.  His painting did not emerge in the same way as a 
tractor station emerges somewhere in the Soviet countryside.  In that sense, it is not the 
immediate blossoming forth of the force generated by socialism, but only a reflection of its 
manifestations.   
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The people in whose midst Arnol'dov now stands are the representatives of socialist 
construction; he is no more than its representor.  His work is a Darstellung of the world now 
emerging; theirs is a Vertretung—not so much a symbolization, as a direct embodiment.  They 
are not only the creators of the new life under socialism—they are also its native creatures.  
Could it be that the artist, by virtue of his age-old craft, is excluded from this immediacy?  The 
praise that he receives, then, may be read as a concealed reproach, and his success—as a success 
in failure.  Or could it be that there is a way to represent that surmounts this dilemma—a kind of 
representation that is not a reflection upon life, but a reflection out of it, when the artistic vision 
is generated not with the subject, but with the object of representation?  What if the vital force 
evoked by the old Bolshevik is so fecund that, apart from directly reproducing itself in the labor 
of people like Fenia, Kirillov, and Stesha, it is able to also “perceive” and “think” its own 
workings in the labor of someone like Arnol'dov?  What sort of thought and perception would 
those be, and how would they relate to the thoughts and perceptions of those who still call 
themselves creative authors? 
In a speech entitled “The Powerful Energy of Class” and delivered at a Moscow Party 
conference on the eve of the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU,112 Maksim Gor'kii spoke of the 
same dynamic force: “This energy, which is being embodied in the grandiose construction of a 
new culture, is at the same time raising new forces, creating conditions and atmosphere that 
quickly transform the great quantity into a superb quality” (“Energiia” 1).  He told a story from 
personal experience in order to show how this energy manifested itself.  Not long ago, he had 
been invited to a meeting of the All-Union Institute for Experimental Medicine.  A dozen or so 
                                                 
112 The Seventeenth Party Congress, which has remained in history as the “Congress of Victors,” was held in late 
January – early February, 1934, in Moscow. It celebrated the achievements of the First Five-Year Plan and, on the 
basis of them, charted a course toward classless society in the next five years.  The congress also celebrated the 
unity of the Party after the neutralization of the so-called “rightist deviation” (led by Bukharin, Rykov, and 
Tomskii). 
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of the Institute’s employees had been, only until recently, factory workers, farm hands, or 
disinterested, apolitical intellectuals.  “But lo, it turned out that, infused with the energy of the 
working class, which fertilizes people’s feelings and thoughts, [this] dozen workers of the 
Institute, while researching the organism of animals, came to the dialectic of development that 
constitutes the foundation of revolutionary thought” (“Energiia” 1).  Gor'kii’s telling of the story 
does not allow us to reconstruct all of its specifics (what does he mean by “it turned out”?  when 
did it turn out? how?  what sort of revelation has come to these people?).  Still, its general 
significance is sufficiently clear: truth had dawned on the Institute’s employees as a 
(predictable?) consequence of their work.  We are supposed to infer that not any work will “turn 
out” this way: only one that proceeds in the atmosphere and conditions created by the victorious 
class struggle of the proletariat.  Whatever we may want to call the medium in which these 
people are immersed, we should see that they come to a state of cognition with no agent of 
enlightenment present on the scene, other than the immersion itself.  From what we can gather, 
the “dialectics of development” that they finally attain is not exactly the fruit of their efforts or 
scientific rigor.  Gor'kii’s words lead us to suspect that scientists working with equal diligence 
and passion for objectivity, but working, let us say, in London, would be presented with a rather 
different picture of how living organisms evolve.  Unlike “their” scientists, ours—even if they 
are the dregs of a former world or the bystanders of the Revolution—are delivered unto 
knowledge/truth by a power that is, at least initially, outside of their awareness.  The fact that, 
prior to being possessed by this power, they had been blind to or had even blindly resisted the 
teachings of dialectical materialism, matters little.  If anything, this fact makes their deliverance 
that much more wondrous.  Wondrously they arrive at the “foundation of revolutionary 
thought”—a thought that, as something distinct from their own thoughts, has been confidently 
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waiting for them in the depths of their object of study.  It is as if, placed in the atmosphere and 
conditions of socialism, the object arrives at the thought proper to its content, and the human 
subject is the site of this happy arrival.  
We can say that the culture of socialist realism dates from the moment when 
“miraculous” stories like the one told by Gor'kii become a common-place occurrence. The 
official founding act of the new culture, the Resolution of the Party’s Central Committee of 23 
April, 1932, told just such a story.  The resolution decreed a radical reform in all spheres of 
cultural production, citing as a basis for the decree the “significant successes of socialist 
construction,” which had resulted in a “qualitative as well as quantitative growth of literature and 
art” (“On the Reformation” 124).  On the same basis, the resolution ordered the liquidation of 
RAPP and its sister organizations, which had become, by that time, a hegemonic presence in 
Soviet culture.  According to the Central Committee, the leaders of RAPP had lost step with the 
times.  After an initial run (during the NEP years), when the organization had played a positive 
role, it had missed a crucial change in the socio-political situation.  The antagonistic treatment to 
which RAPP continued to subject non-proletarian writers (the former “fellow travelers”), could 
no longer be tolerated.  According to the resolution, in the new conditions created by advanced 
socialist construction, the psychology of fellow travelers had undergone significant 
transformation (“On the Reformation” 124).  As an editorial in Literaturnaia gazeta explained, it 
is these newly-created conditions that “had not been understood in a timely way and in their 
depth by RAPP” (“Budem” 1).  Its leaders had failed to see how these conditions “had ensured 
[obespechili] the active participation of the main mass of the intelligentsia in solving the tasks of 
[socialist] construction” (“Budem” 1).  Hence, the organization’s recent activity had been ridden 
with “grave political errors”; and this—despite the demonstrative clarity of the said conditions 
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and the Party’s repeated instructions (“Budem” 1).  According to the Party press, all needed 
clarifications were contained in Stalin’s speech at the Convention of Economic Cadres (23 June, 
1931), in which the Leader had called for a new approach to the old technical intelligentsia and 
indicated their changing attitude toward Soviet power.  As it turns out, something other than 
overt political indoctrination—RAPP’s approach—had brought the broad masses of previously 
apolitical writers to the acceptance of socialism. 
So, what is this “something,” which, despite its blinding obviousness, the leaders of 
RAPP had managed to ignore, and which, almost against the grain of their efforts, had ensured 
the intelligentsia’s participation in the building of socialism?  As we answer this question, we 
get, once again, the taste of tautology, for this “something” is nothing other than socialism itself.  
The resolution says, more or less, the following: “In the process of being built, socialism not 
only creates itself: it also creates the conditions that secure the participation of previously 
indifferent subjects in the building of socialism.”  The tautology arises from the fact that 
socialism is inscribed twice: once as an empirical world in the making, and a second time—as 
pure and practical self-evidence that takes possession of an external consciousness and 
instrumentalizes it toward a predetermined purpose.  Without the need for propaganda, 
socialism’s own growth and ontological plentitude recruits subjects for the cause of socialism113: 
the subjects who are supposed to see. 
In the Central Committee’s resolution, we find these subjects in two places.  First, there 
are the poor functionaries of RAPP, who were supposed to see, but failed to do so because of a 
deeply ingrained “coterie mentality” (grupovshchina), which had isolated them from the crucial 
                                                 
113 In his speech at the First Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers, N. Mitsishvili formulated a similar thesis: “in 
the years prior to the Second Five-Year Plan, the transformation of people’s consciousness, the liquidation of the 
leftovers of capitalism in the consciousness of authors, was determined not so much by ideological factors, as by the 
very progress of socialist construction […]” (Pervyi 155). 
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developments in the life of their country.  Secondly, there are the “broad masses” of the 
previously non-committal intelligentsia, who are—as a matter of fact—able to see.  It seems 
useless to ask whether this official characterization correctly describes the actual position of the 
subjects in either of these groups (how could we ever hope to get reliable answers to such a 
question?).  What matters for us here is that the former, as well as the latter, set out immediately 
to show that they are, indeed, the subjects of socialism.  They began acting as if they were those 
supposed to see.  While the leaders of RAPP (Averbakh, Libedinskii, Ermilov, Selivanovskii, 
Kirshon, Chumardin) engaged in the cathartic exercises of self-criticism (samokritika), former 
fellow-travelers strove to image themselves forth as people possessed by the transformative 
power of the new epoch.  
One such “possessed” subject was Shaginian—the same Shaginian who, in the mid- 
1920s, had difficulties reconciling traditional notions of creative freedom with the compulsive 
necessity of the social commission.114  Speaking in 1932 in front of a group of young writers, she 
saw these difficulties as a thing of the past:  
Much has happened since then.  Since those days, socialism has become reality.  
It exists on one sixth of the world map, and we exist in it.  And from all sides, 
from the depths, as well as from the surface, of our new phenomena, of our new 
practice, socialism gushes at us, surrounds us, infuses us, and not only changes 
our attitude toward things and phenomena, but also opens our eyes to the essence 
and meaning of the transformations taking place within us. (“Besedy” 205; 
emphasis in the original) 
Let us notice that the socialism Shaginian inhabits with her passionate discourse is not 
equal to the sum of its own “things and phenomena.”  Over and above them, it produces—as a 
                                                 
114 See pp. 106-107. 
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kind of para-phenomenon—also clarity.  The said things and phenomena do not live in quiet 
repose, as a world that is merely there.  They gush, surround, and infuse.  Through this restless 
ebullience they are able to take possession of the subject, opening her eyes and giving her the 
ability to see clearly not only outside herself, but also within.  In short, they make sense. 
When we say, in casual parlance, that “things make sense,” we of course mean that they 
do so for someone present at the scene, a person who reaches an understanding of a certain state 
of affairs.  And we believe that, ultimately, it is this person who, despite not being the 
grammatical subject of the expression, is the one actually making the sense.  The case I am 
trying to argue here runs counter to this “pedestrian” logic.  In the state of affairs Shaginian 
describes, it is, literally, the things that make the sense.  “Oh, well,” someone may object, “but 
what about our speaker and the ‘we’ to which she belongs and appeals?  Obviously, it is to them 
that socialism makes sense, and, hence, their activity as subjects is implied.  Is not Shaginian 
saying simply, ‘We have come to understand the society we live in, its mechanisms, advantages, 
etc.’?”  This would be true only up to the point where we notice that the “we” in which the 
clarity of understanding and self-awareness are born is itself a product of what it comes to 
understand.  Socialism manifests itself to consciousness in such a way that it transforms this 
consciousness into something new.  The subject who comes to understand was not there prior to 
the object of understanding (socialist life).  The people included in Shaginian’s “we” are what 
they are in the present moment because they were made by socialism.  Quite literally, they were 
made to understand, made in order to be the site where true vision occurs.  In Stalinist 
socialism—considered as a cultural phenomenon, and not as an empirical state of affairs—we 
have a sort of reality that not only unfurls the inner wealth of its content into a manifest 
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externality, but, by means of this ebullience, also procures its own representation.  That is, it 
creates, as one of its phenomena, the subject for whom this wealth is appreciably real. 
Let us consider the case of another such subject, another fellow traveler who, in the early 
1930s, embraced the cause of socialism.  During the previous decade, Il'ia Erenburg (1891-
1967), had been one of the most prominent figures of the Soviet literary avant-garde.  His 
experimental style of writing and open skepticism toward the social utopias of modernity 
(including the Bolshevik utopia) had made him a favorite target for the zealots of proletarian 
culture.  The fact that Erenburg had taken up permanent residence in Western Europe (Berlin, 
1921-1924; Paris, 1925-1936), only contributed to his image as an “alien” element on the Soviet 
literary scene.  But in 1932 Erenburg made a long sojourn to his home country, during which he 
toured some of the major sites of socialist construction.  Having gathered impressions and 
inspiration, he returned to Paris, where he wrote Den' vtoroi (The Second Day; 1932-1933).  
Despite mild criticism of the author’s lingering penchant for fragmentary narration,115 the novel 
was welcomed by the Soviet press as Erenburg’s highest achievement, his first truly Soviet work.  
In 1933, even before the publication of Den′ vtoroi, an article appeared in Literaturnaia 
gazeta in which a well-meaning critic set out to explain the recent changes in Erenburg’s 
                                                 
115  The following statement from a review of Erenburg’s Ne perevodia dykhaniia [Not Catching One’s Breath; 
1935] highlights these shortcomings, while also providing a revealing explanation for them: “the internal principles 
[zakonomernosti] of our development and their iron logic have not yet fully etched themselves [otchekanilis'] in 
Erenburg’s consciousness, so as to shape themselves [otlit'sia] into the sharply-defined plot lines of his books.  
Hence—the amorphous structure of Ne perevodia dykhaniia, its formless, musical-lyrical construction” (Gal'perina 
233; emphasis added).  We should take note of the way in which the author is displaced as the subject of the 
sentence and his consciousness—as the agency of representation.  They appear, instead, as locatives.  In the place 
they circumscribe, another agency does its work.  This other agency is reality itself, which, through the internal 
dynamic of its “principles,” proves capable of “etching” and “shaping” itself in the receptive medium, en route to 
producing representations of itself.  Since this power of reality is constant and axiomatic, the shortcomings of actual 
representations (Erenburg’s books, with their discordant plot structure) can only be explained through the 
inadequacies of the medium.  The critique’s implicit message is that the place of inscription—Erenburg’s 
consciousness—is still a “dense” one, if the hard tip of history’s “iron logic” cannot inscribe therein the neat lines of 
a coherent story.  
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worldview.  The article is entitled “In Search of the Truth” (“V poiskakh pravdy”).116  It begins 
by presenting to us the Erenburg of old, “a disillusioned, cynical skeptic” (4).  The Western 
world in which he lived and which he depicted as late as 1931 in his novella Spain, appears in 
scenes of chaos, misery, and moral destitution without redemption.  In front of us is the image of 
a writer who does not see.  In the working people of Western Europe Erenburg did not see the 
harbingers of a bright new world; instead, he focused on the “monotony, doom, and boredom” of 
their everyday existence (4).  Divorced from the contemporary life of Soviet society, “he did not 
believe that […] a new world is truly being built, that socialist relations are being created, that 
new, happy people, the genuine people of the future, are being raised” (4). 
After these introductory statements, there is a page break in the article, which is supposed 
to alert us to a meaningful break in Erenburg’s career.  On the other side of the break, we learn 
that at the present moment (1933) the capitalist world has entered the fourth year of acute 
economic crisis.  It turns out that the economic depression in the West has much to do with 
Erenburg’s transformation as a writer and person: “for it laid bare [obnazhil] so deeply the 
essence of capitalist society, revealed [obnaruzhil] with such clarity the rotting foundation of 
capitalist economy, so distinctly defined [opredelil] the real interrelations between classes, that 
even for a person not equipped with the method of Marxism-Leninism, there appears the 
possibility of understanding the deep foundations of events” (4).  Faced with a reality that 
aggressively bares itself, “flashes” the subject, the latter stands defenselessly receptive.  How 
could he help seeing?!  “Naturally, in depicting the crisis, Erenburg could not but see the 
exposed [obnazhivshiesia] lines of class struggle and understand the deep foundations of events” 
                                                 
116  Since Russian lacks markers for the definite form of nouns, their translation into English always involves an 
interpretation of the semantic context.  In this case, the choice is between “in search of truth” and “in search of the 
truth.”  I believe that the latter is more appropriate when the context is Stalinist discourse.  In it, “truth” usually 
figures as something already known, quite definite, and definitive.  
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(4; emphasis addded).  The conviction that Erenburg could not but see is restated a couple of 
paragraphs down, and clearly constitutes the conceptual backbone of this short critical 
biography. 
An interesting picture emerges: one in which the artist is confronted with a vision 
(picture) he cannot refuse.  In the liminal moment at the onset of perception, the moment to 
which the statement “he could not but see” pertains, this vision is not his.  It comes from without, 
already explicated, almost as an assault on him.  If we had to describe the activity of our hero in 
this moment, we could only do it in the passive: the subject is being beamed. 
Under the word “beam” in the Collins Cobuild English Dictionary we find, among 
others, the following definitions: 
1. If you say that someone is beaming, you mean that they have a big smile on 
their face because they are happy, pleased, or proud about something. 
2. A beam is a line of energy, radiation, or particles sent in a particular direction. 
3. If something such as a radio signals or television pictures are beamed 
somewhere, or beam somewhere, they are sent there by means of electronic 
equipment. (emphasis in the original) 
Let us try to think these three meanings as one, so as to bring together into a single conceptual 
knot: 1) the triumphant faces of those new happy people, the true people of the future, which 
Erenburg had failed to see, but which now, we must assume, have become apparent to him (we 
shall return to them in Chapter Four); 2) the energy evoked by Panferov, Gor'kii, and Shaginian, 
the energy through which socialism “gushes at us, surrounds us, infuses us”; and 3) a concept of 
representation in which the representing subject, the author, would appear to be not unlike a 
television set in that the “picture” he presents does not come, strictly speaking, “from inside” 
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(only small children believe that the people and things they see on the television screen live in 
the boxed space behind it), but from some place else.   
Erenburg’s case tells us that it matters little whether the picture is that of advancing 
socialism or rotting capitalism, whether the must-see show are the happy faces of Soviet citizens 
or the desperate miens of industrial tycoons in the throes of economic depression.  These 
phenomena, seemingly so disparate in character, constitute one kind of reality by virtue of a 
function they share: the ability to glare (the contradictions of capitalism, just as the successes of 
socialist construction, can be “glaring”).  Wherefrom do phenomena acquire such an ability?  
Where else, but from the fact that both the blossoming of life under socialism, as well as its 
gradual exacerbation under capitalism were meant to be?  They are equally part of a history 
whose unfolding brings only the confident inscription of its own systematic presuppositions.  
The events and phenomena comprising this history are events and phenomena that could not but 
occur .117  As such, they dictate the position-comportment of the subject confronted with them: 
he becomes the subject who cannot but see.   
“Observer,” then, would not be a good way to describe this subject, if by “observing” we 
imply any sort of analytical faculty.  When something meant to be takes place, it leaves no place 
for the analytical attitude.  It flies in the face of the observer and disarms him.  It says to him, 
“You see!” (in the sense of, “You see!  I told you so!”).  This kind of encounter between the 
subject and reality precludes the possibility of original perception.  “You see!” does not mean 
“Begin to observe the situation.”  It is too late, and there is no need to observe or analyze 
                                                 
117  In the words of Régine Robin: “The general laws that govern nature apply to the realm of History, taking into 
account the specificity of human societies.  History is no longer anything but a natural phenomenon; it produces 
only singularizing effects growing out of the laws of nature-History, illustrations of a general evolution, phenomena 
actualizing an essence […].  History thus becomes a version of nature in the service of the political; it is 
preinterpreted, events are already foreseen; or, if an event takes place that does not coincide with the path already 
traced, this is because the struggle includes resistance from forces hostile to socialism, which may take various 
forms (rightists, Trotskyites, kulaks, saboteurs, spies, neo-Mensheviks, and so on)” (xxvii). 
  
 162
anything at this point: whatever the situation that the subject was supposed to see (but did not), it 
has now turned into one stark exposure; it beams, robbing the subject of the chance not to see.  
In the article chronicling Erenburg’s transformation, the place of the meant-to-be(-seen) 
is marked carefully.  Right after the statement that the capitalist world has entered the fourth year 
of crisis, there follows, without a special transition, a quotation from Lenin in which the leader of 
the Proletarian Revolution explains the inevitable and fatal exacerbation of class struggle in the 
late stages of industrial capitalism (4).  But apart from this explicit indication, the meant-to-be 
persists tacitly as a backdrop to our author’s creative pursuits.  It is clearly from this backdrop 
that socialism stares triumphantly at Erenburg as the inevitability in which he had not been able 
to believe. 
Before it is actually built, Stalinist socialism is, in a sense, pre-built.  Its empirical 
existence is erected on the ground of unconditional certainty about the ways of history and the 
mechanisms of social life.  Hence no collection of empirical facts and observations can give an 
adequate presentation of this world.  For what any conscientiously empirical picture of Soviet 
life in the 1930s will surely miss is one feature that underlies all “hard facts” and endows them 
with a surplus quality.  This additional feature, which only a cultural investigation can 
adequately address, is brought out in Shaginian’s words quoted earlier.  She speaks not simply of 
socialism, but of socialism-become-reality, which is not the same thing.  It is a thing whose 
content is overridden by, folded into, the purely formal feature of fulfillment.  Over and above 
any number of descriptive features that may be proper to it (a particular organization of 
productive forces, a certain standard of living, a determinate structure of government and 
political institutions, etc.), Stalinist socialism is that which was meant to be, that which was fore-
seen. 
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It would be quite pedestrian of us to mistake the voice that says “You see!” for the voice 
of actual people (say, that of loyal adherents of the Party line speaking to previously disheartened 
non-believers).  We should think of it as the voice of the world itself addressing, or rather, 
beaming, the subject with its manifest truth.  The whole point of Erenburg’s biography is that he 
needed no people telling him which way the Western world is headed.  What is more, he did not 
even need the “armament” of Marxism-Leninism.  We are, clearly, in a new cultural frame, if the 
“equipped” eye of the observer is rendered obsolete.  The otherness confronting the subject has 
lost the aspect of systematic subterfuge that can only be overcome by the systematic application 
of method.  It could bear no “decoding”; in its presence, hermeneutical exertions are 
inappropriate.  For it freely emits whatever there is to know and see in the direction of the 
subject. 
While speaking about the cinematic theory of Vertov and the kinoks, I pointed, along the 
dotted line of a hypothesis, to a certain place in the objective world that stands in inverse 
symmetry to the eye of the human subject.  To remember, our subject was not happy with his 
inherited position, he did not want to see the world “subjectively.”  He, therefore, strove to attain 
a position in the world from which the objective interrelationships of phenomena will be visible, 
from which life could be “caught unawares.”  For the purpose, the subject became the vanishing 
tenor of a cultural metaphor: 
eyehuman
mechanismcamera
)(
)( , 
ехpression
method , etc.  At the same time, it was 
abundantly clear that the sought-after fulcrum of the visible world, the space where things make 
(objective) sense, does not exist as such, that it is not an actual place—some sort of “display” or 
“exhibition” of phenomena that one could attend.  Rather, it is the virtual space of the 
hermeneutic operation itself, the point of the application of method.  The same turned out to be 
the case with the world of the literary text: its fulcrum is not an actual place in the fabric of 
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writing, either a formal property or a semantic element, in which the organization of the whole 
comes together to form either a formal or semantic “principle,” “tendency,” etc. 
And yet, in all these instances, I suggested, as a sort of unfulfilled fantasy, a what-if, the 
possible birth of a world that, through some device of its own, would “see,” “know,” “read,” 
itself in our stead.  The last part is to be understood quite literally, in accordance with the 
etymology of “stead”: in the place where the subject is (supposed to be) standing, i.e., in the 
place where seeing, understanding, and knowing have been known to occur.  Now I would like 
to suggest that Stalinist culture is the fulfillment of this fantasy.  In Stalinism we encounter a 
primary cultural substance, which may be called “socialism,” “our reality” [nasha 
deistvitel′nost′], or simply “life” [zhizn′], that requires no mediation, in the ordinary sense of the 
word.  It produces knowledge of itself without the prerequisites of “method,” “system of 
thought,” or “position.”  Rather than being the starting point of consciousness, these are now the 
end results of a new type of cognition.  Let us recall those employees who “arrive” at dialectical 
materialism at the end of their empirical research.  There we have matter (the living organisms 
being studied) that, by being subjected to socialist praxis, “knows” itself in the space provided by 
the individual minds of our researchers.  We may say: in the “stead” of their individual views, 
opinions, prejudices, etc., dialectical materialism takes place, taking possession of their 
consciousness.  M. Rozental', one of the most influential critics of the Stalinist period, gave a 
“theoretical” account of this type of situation, now involving writers: 
Every writer who deeply studies and observes real objects may come into conflict 
with his own views on the world; life itself [sama zhizn′] suggests to him entirely 
different methods than those dictated to him by his limited worldview. [….]  
Reality [deistvitel′nost′] bursts into [vryvaetsia] the writer’s work with tremendous 
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force, and under its pressure the writer’s ideological positions weaken and often 
give in. (qtd. Rozhkov 178; emphasis added) 
Once again, the subject begins by studying objects and phenomena through the distortive prism 
of his parochial mindset.  This fact is nothing to worry about, for whatever in Stalinist culture is 
termed “reality” can generate a thrust that eliminates the distorted perspective and installs, in its 
stead, the proper view of things.  What is this aspect or property of objects that makes the subject 
see?  We are told that they are “real” objects, but the triteness of this description obscures more 
than it tells.  How shall we name the quality of things, the quality bestowed on them by “life 
itself,” through which they assault the eye studying them and pry it open? 
For the purpose, we may borrow a felicitous expression once used by Sergei Eisenstein 
(1898-1948), the famous avant-garde film director.  In an article that appeared exactly a year 
after the Central Committee’s resolution, Eisenstein, who had himself become part of the 
establishment (albeit, not the most reliable part),118 called on Soviet writers to provide better 
texts for the script-starved film industry.  He asked them to convey a certain property of 
contemporary life, which he designated as “sotsial′naia uvidennost′” (Eisenstein 2).  The first 
part of the expression is clear: “sotsial′naia” means “social.”  The noun that follows is a 
neologism, derived from the verb “uvidet′” (“to see,” in the perfective).  Uvidennost′ operates in 
opposition with vidimost′ and vidimoe, both of which pertain to what can be seen, the visible, the 
apparent, and carry a slight connotation of superficiality.  Uvidennost′, on the other hand, is that 
which has been seen and has, as it were, sedimented inside visible phenomena: the “seen-ness” 
or “having-been-seen-ness” of reality.  Eisenstein leaves it at that, not caring to explicate the 
meaning of the phrase or the implications of his injunction to the writers any further.  Still, it 
                                                 
118 The tragic fate of Bezhin Meadow (1935-1937), which the authorities ordered destroyed before final editing, as 
well as the ensuing vociferous campaign against its director, proved that the “sins” of Eisenstein’s modernist past 
were never quite forgotten.  
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does not seem to be much of a stretch to include his pronouncement in the line of the present 
argument. 
The social seen-ness of the world must be a property that pre-exists the eye of the 
subject.  It must be there before he comes along, or else Eisenstein’s counsel makes no sense: 
how can writers capture this property if it were not independent and prior to their artistic seeing?  
If so, the question then becomes, how does one relate to seen-ness, and what does it mean to 
“convey” it?  Is it a property that one is supposed to see?  I would suggest that seen-ness pre-
exists the subject’s eye also genetically.  It is the world’s way of being, its demeanor or 
“disposition,” through which it makes the subject see.  It refers to the world’s ability to beam and 
be, in the colloquial expression, an eye-opener.  This suggestion is in keeping with the two 
instances of psychological transformation we just considered: to both Shaginian and Erenburg, 
the capacity to perceive truthfully comes from the laying-bare of the world’s historical 
inevitabilities. 
If we had to discover the primary source from which the sexual excitation of the 
exhibitionist springs up, our search for a properly corporal point will be—pun intended—
pointless.  His pleasure does not issue from any part or property of the body itself.  And still, an 
erogenic zone exists, even if it is not, strictly speaking, somatic.  To name this surface, we can 
certainly redeploy Eisenstein’s neologism: the exhibitionist’s source of pleasure is his “seen-
ness.”  We can imagine it as an extension of his physical being (since it borders, ultimately, on a 
climactic sensation that is purely physical), an ineffable flesh woven into his natural flesh.  Of 
what does it consist?  Everyone knows that it has nothing to do with the person being simply 
naked.  It consists of appearing naked in front of someone, for that someone.  If we wish to give 
a more physiological flavor to our description, we can say that the erogenic zone of “seen-ness” 
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is made from the same tissue as the enlarged pupils of the other’s eye.  That eye, with the 
perplexity and shame that keep it open, is prefigured at the source of excitation.  The dilator 
pupilae, those tiny muscles of the other’s iris, are somehow also included in the exhibitionist’s 
sexual apparatus.  Their stimulation in the other is strictly co-lateral with the exhibitionist’s 
erotic stimulation.  It is as if we are dealing with a single sexual member that begins with what is 
shown (by itself, quite insubstantial), arches across the way, and incorporates, as its most vital 
function, the arrest of the other’s attention, the capture of her vision, her could-not-but-see.  
Speaking figuratively, we may conclude that the exhibitionist’s real organ of pleasure is not his 
penis, but his eye-opener.  
To say that the other’s eye is prefigured in the exhibitionist’s libido is to say that its place 
in the coordinate system of the sexual encounter is set much before an actual encounter occurs.  
When a real person comes along, she is simply slotted into a position that awaits her.  What for 
her is a moment of surprise, is, from the standpoint of the libidinal structure, a moment of 
confident fulfillment.  In that structure, her eye becomes the concrete instantiation of the pre-
scripted glance-from-there.  In the assault to which she is subjected—the aggressive laying-bare 
that surprises her—her eye turns into an effective continuation of the exhibitionist’s sexual 
member.  Her individual-particular seeing, as the fulfillment of a general condition that 
disregards individual characteristics, is subsumed within the function of seen-ness.  In her, in the 
place her eye has come to occupy, his penis sees itself.   
These are, then, the constitutive elements in the anatomy of exhibitionistic pleasure: at 
the beginning—as no more than a “pathological” prerequisite, there is the actual piece of flesh, 
the carnal member itself; added to it—as the true measure by which it is not merely a penis, but 
an exhibitionistic phallus—is the ineffable flesh of the meant-to-be-seen.  To be sure, it is made 
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from the stuff of (sexual) fantasy, which does not make it any less real.  There, in that place, the 
penis is, so to speak, fore-seen, meaning that the accountancy of the libido knows ahead of time 
what makes our hero go.  It is this part, i.e., the fore-seen (we can imagine it as an intangible 
foreskin), that the libido casts out into the world as a net in which its fulfillment will eventually 
be caught.  The catch arrives in the form of a pair of “eyes wide open.”  When they appear on the 
scene, they do no more than “fill out” the place that was left waiting for them: the place of the 
meant-to-be-…  In short, they ful-fill the fore-seen. 
This reflection in (the place of) the other is the whole point of the act.  In that sense, 
“exhibitionism” is not a very accurate name for it.  The gesture of showing, taken by itself, 
accomplishes nothing.  The dialectic of the act unfolds between these two moments: the fore-
seen, which is there as pure potential waiting to be activated; and the moment of “capture,” when 
an unsuspecting subject saunters into the charted libidinal field and arouses what had lain pre-
inscribed within it.  It is, obviously, difficult to speak of her seeing as an “act”; not only because, 
at this particular time, she is helpless and cannot but see, but, more importantly, because another 
act has swallowed up and negated hers.  This second act, which frames her seeing, is of an 
entirely different nature.  It is not to be understood by analogy with “action.”  Here we must 
appeal once again to the other meaning of the word: “act” as a series of scripted actions—more a 
“scene,” or “performance,” than a single execution.  In this sense, her seeing becomes “part of 
the act,” part of the whole “production” that is the exhibitionistic scene.119 
For the dialectic of seen-ness to be complete, something in the nature of a raincoat proves 
necessary.  We are mistaken if we think of the raincoat as a mere accoutrement of convenience, 
something that allows the exhibitionist to remain unnoticed before the “right moment” comes.   
The drapery is very much part of the right moment itself.  It affects the entire meaning of the 
                                                 
119 The concept of “production” will be elaborated in the following two chapters. 
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performance.  Without it, we may understand the exhibitionist as saying, “Look at my penis,” 
which is not at all the case.  What he really says is, “You see!?  I have nothing on!”  The 
distinction is crucial.  In the first instance, one is showing something (supposedly, an object 
worth showing, something substantial); in the second instance, one is showing the nothing of 
obstruction, the very absence of concealment.  The actual item on display is not the 
exhibitionist’s body, but its non-hiddenness, unconcealment.  To the other, he is showing 
exposure as such.   
Only when we pass from “Look at it!” to “You see!?  Nothing covers it!” do we 
understand the raincoat’s true significance.  Such is the dialectical logic of the moment that the 
obstruction must be present in some form, for its negation to be effective.  The possibility of 
covering the exposed part must be present on the scene in a sublated form.  The Russian verb 
that translates “to sublate” is sniat', which also means “to take off,” “to remove.”  “In sublated 
form,” would then be “v sniatom vide,” which tells us with charming literality about the purpose 
of the raincoat: not only is it there in order to be taken off; also: in being taken off, i.e., when it is 
there v sniatom vide, it represents the possibility of not seeing as denied—the veritable fulcrum 
of the exhibitionistic act.  When its flaps fly open, the raincoat stays on as material support for 
the little but that turns the formula of concealment—“(she) cannot see”—into a preserving 
negation: “(she) cannot but see.” 
My excuse for devoting this much attention to the exhibitionistic performance is that it 
may help us to understand the position of the subject in Stalinist culture.  The parallel should not 
be taken too far—only so far as to clarify the relationship between consciousness and the general 
domain of what is called Stalinist “life” or “reality.”  At a first go, we must reverse Vertov’s 
slogan: now it is not life, but the subject, who is “caught unawares.”  Caught by/in what?  Caught 
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by and in life’s disposition, which is that of seen-ness.  I again intend in simultaneity the two 
meanings of the word “disposition,” which makes it possible to both be captivated by it and 
captured in it: disposition as “demeanor,” a way of being; and as “arrangement,” assignment of 
positions (if someone possesses, say, a melancholic disposition, this fact has bearing on how we 
approach the person, what position we take vis-à-vis him or her).   
In speaking of Stalinist reality’s disposition, I mean to say, in the first place, that we are 
dealing with something more than an object-like entity, just as the phallus on which the 
exhibitionistic encounter centers is more than a bodily part.  By the same measure by which the 
phallus exceeds any physiological definition, this reality exceeds the lifeless abstractions of 
diligent historians, economists, and political scientists, who seek to establish a factual state of 
affairs segregated from ideological illusions and mystifications.  Against such dissections, I am 
arguing for an understanding of the object that would include—as with the phallus—the fantasy 
that permeates it and constitutes flesh of its flesh.  Only when we count in one entity Stalinist 
reality together with the social fantasy woven into it, can we begin to ask how reality can 
captivate the subject, so that she becomes its subject, the subject of Stalinism.  We must reach 
the point where we grasp the constitution of reality as inseparable from and dependent upon the 
constitution of identity.  We must see once again, and this time in specific reference to Stalinism, 
that no “order of things” exists independently of the “order of man.”  Expressed differently, 
something can count as true or real only where someone counts (or is counted), i.e., where there 
is room for “one.” 
In the cultural act of Stalinism, understood as an event, this room is where one cannot 
but….  When the room is filled, that is, when someone like Shaginian, for example, identifies 
herself as the one who has been made to see, we witness the birth of a “subject,” which, in this 
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instance, does not mean the center of sovereign action.  As used so far in this chapter, “subject” 
refers to the “one” who is “part of the act” and who, in this act, is subjected to the glaring 
visibility of “life itself.”  It is the position, or “comportment,” necessary to bring about the 
erection of the true-real.  Where this “one” appears, is also where the order of things called 
Stalinist socialism celebrates its certainty at its firmest.  Remembering the terms of an earlier 
discussion, we may reiterate that this order achieves its satisfaction through the “one.”  The 
satisfaction, which here is synonymous with the celebration of “truth” and “reality,” consists in 
nothing more than this: to have caught this “one” unawares and to have made her see.  She is the 
“one,” that is, the one in whom the act attains its satisfaction, not because of what she sees, but 
by virtue of the fact that she sees.  The content, the “what” of her seeing, is, as noted apropos of 
the exhibitionistic scene, the unessential and contingent prerequisite of the act.  The thing that 
really counts is this purely external characteristic: that her eyes are, now, in fact, wide open.   
“But wait,” someone may interject, “why is the act of the perceiving consciousness 
formal?  Haven’t the workers of the Institute seen the dialectical evolution of living beings?  
Hasn’t Erenburg seen how the West declines?  How does this not constitute determinate 
content?”  This objection misses an all-important component of what happens in both cases, 
namely, the presence of the fore-seen.  When we take this component into account, we are 
obliged to say: the workers of the Institute have seen that indeed living beings evolve 
dialectically, just as Erenburg has seen that indeed the West declines.   
The difference between “what” and “that” is the difference between two types of 
reflection.  The first is the kind we are readily familiar with: the active reflection that akes hold 
of something outside itself, bringing something new out of it, and which, in doing this, feels 
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itself internally,120 thus constituting itself as an “ego.”  By contrast with this seeing, whose 
possession of “object,” is correlative with its self-possession, the second kind, with which we 
have been concerned throughout this chapter, is not self-generative and self-constituting, but 
reactive.  We might say that here, it is the object that “feels itself” and firms up into certainty by 
being reflected in me.  “I see” here means that I display.  I display, externally, the awareness 
through which the artifice called “socialism” is aware of itself, of its own reality.  
With this last formulation, in which a new kind of reflection and a peculiar form of 
identity, on the one hand, are co-articulated with socialism and reality, on the other, we have the 
means necessary to inquire in a proper fashion about socialist realism.  Quite obviously, after 
everything said so far, this cannot be simply an inquiry about representation in the traditional 
sense of the word, even less about aesthetics.  We should not ask how socialist realism reflects 
reality (which will, thankfully, spare us from the tiresome platitudes about the ideological 
“varnishing of reality” and suchlike).  The preceding discussion has allowed us to pose the 
question in the following way: How does Stalinist socialism finds its reality in the kind of 
reflection that underlies and sustains also the institution of socialist realism?    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
120 To remember, Locke defined reflection as the “inner perception” by which the mind is aware of its own thoughts; 
while, before him, Descartes had famously grounded the being of the ego in the self-evidence of this same inner 
perception. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE MATTER OF IDEOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
Disappeared: the term ideas. 
Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” 
This chapter is meant as something of a footnote to the preceding two.  The footnote is 
necessary in order to explain and (only temporarily) dispel, a silence, which, by now, threatens to 
become embarrassing.  The silence concerns ideology.  It must seem quite inappropriate that in a 
discussion of Stalinist culture, a discussion that has gone some way already, no substantial 
reference has been made to an item as conspicuous as ideology.  We have begun to consider the 
Soviet author’s relationship to the world, to “reality,” to “our life,” but there has been no 
indication, other than the ambiguous appearance of quotation marks around “reality” and “our 
life,” of the seemingly obvious circumstance that this relationship is “ideological.”  That nothing 
of the sort has been meant or said so far is made more striking by the fact that the dominant 
interpretation has treated socialist realism as a subspecies of ideology: the former represents, so 
to speak, the artistic workings of the latter.   
Without disputing this interpretation, which has validity as far as it goes, I would like to 
advance in what follows two sets of reasons for avoiding the mention of ideology.  One of these 
has to do with the context in which the concept is used, the second—with the concept itself.  
Where the context is Soviet studies, the use of the word “ideology” elicits almost 
automatic reflexes, some of which I would like not to elicit.  Prime among them is a reflex to 
which I alluded in the preceding chapter: the old and discredited hope that by removing 
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“ideology” we may discover, as an entirely separate body, an unadulterated “reality.”  A 
complement to this sloppy alchemy, which adds “ideology” to “reality,” but is always able again 
to separate the two, is another, which adds “ideology” to the mind as some sort of foreign 
substance.  In this case, the hope is that, by reversing the operation, even if just in theory, if we 
remove all the mystifications and delusion, we may discover the quintessential human, just as he 
is.  A historically specific collection of these will present us with the “Russian people” just as 
they are, unadulterated by Stalinist ideology and propaganda.  In this view, people are the 
neutered something that remains after all “acculturations,” “internalizations,” and 
“indoctrinations” have been wished away. 
Another reflex conditioned by the context of Stalinist culture is that, when used in within 
it, “ideology” refers us directly to power by a short circuit that I find fraught with peril.  Let me 
explain by starting off from the classical definition of ideology in Marx and Engels.  Here we 
find a twofold meaning, which has one positive and one negative side.  Positively, “ideology” is 
related to existing relations of production and, more specifically, to the class interested in 
reproducing these relations of production.  Bracketing the question of whether the 
representations constitutive of it are “true” or “false,”121 ideology, in this meaning, points us to a 
determinate set of (dominant) interests and an equally determinate social body, whose interests 
these are.  Negatively, “ideology” is defined as that which obfuscates or distorts reality, an 
illusion, a “phantom,” whose function is that of sublimation.122  The sublimation is needed 
                                                 
121 In Marx, this question is, of course, not bracketed.  Here ideology is, by default, a distorted representation of the 
world conditioned by a contradictory social existence.  It is only in later Marxism that the term begins to change its 
connotations under the influence of the broader and axiologically more neutral concept of superstructure.  Lenin, in 
particular, should be credited with giving ideology the more descriptive meaning of a system of ideas characteristic 
of a class, which makes the term equally applicable to the proletarian, as to the bourgeois, world outlook.  
 
122 This is the interpretation advanced in The German Ideology.  A controversy surrounds the question of whether 
this early interpretation should be considered representative of Marx’s thinking, or whether it should be discounted 
in favor of—so the argument goes—the more mature and “scientific” insights of his later work.  Jürgen Habermas is 
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because, for most of history, social reality features a contradiction that is constitutive of it.123  
“Ideology,” in the second sense, is what masks this contradiction,124 answering with imaginary 
satisfaction the call of an actual exigency.125   
Now, when applied to Stalinist culture, meaning (1), if we really get serious about it, 
proves to be next to inoperable.  On pain of repeating what Stalinist propaganda itself 
maintained, it is impossible to claim that “Stalinist ideology” encodes the interests of the 
working class or the Soviet people as a whole.  This would be intellectually and politically self-
defeating.  If, having avoided the embarrassment, we still wish to maintain the connection 
whereby ideological representations are coordinated with certain interests localizable in social 
space, we are left with the anemic proposition that Stalinist ideology defends the interests of the 
political and economic elite.  I call the proposition anemic, because it, really, says no more than 
this: “Ideology defends the interests of those in power.”  When we consider, further, that “those,” 
i.e., the Stalinist elite, are not a determinate social group constituted in advance of their accession 
to power, but, on the contrary, a highly perishable extension of the positions they happen to 
occupy at a particular moment in time, the proposition gets impoverished even further.  We now 
                                                                                                                                                             
among those defending the former position.  Louis Althusser and Nicolas Poulantzas are two of the prominent 
exponents of the latter.  
 
123 “Thus society has hitherto always developed within the framework of a contradiction—in antiquity the 
contradiction between free men and slaves, in the Middle Ages that between the nobility and serfs, in modern times 
that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat” (Marx and Engels, 116). 
 
124  The thesis is reiterated by Poulantzas in Political Power and Social Classes: “ideology has the precise function 
of hiding the real contradictions and of reconstituting on an imaginary level a relatively coherent discourse which 
serves as the horizon of agents’ experience” (207; emphasis in the original).  The same understanding, strengthened 
by the insights of psychoanalysis, underlies the cultural theory of Frederic Jameson and much of Slavoj Žižek’s 
writings on ideology.  Most prominently in Jameson’s The Political Unconscious, symbolic production (which is, of 
course, ideological by default) serves to “screen” the traumatic “real” (in the last instance, class struggle), the latter 
functioning as the “absent cause” that sets symbolic production to work and secretly shapes its structure. 
 
125 This definition does not repeat the fallacy criticized in the preceding paragraph.  Here reality is not externally 
opposed to the “illusion” that masks it; instead, the latter is a function of the former, the two forming a mechanism 
of a higher order “reality.”    
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have just this: “Ideology inscribes the maintenance of power” or “Ideology is the (non-coercive) 
mechanism by which power perpetuates itself.”126 
This conceptual short circuit between the two concepts, in which the former turns out to 
be no more than an aspect of the latter, is dangerous in that it reifies, hypostasizes, and ultimately 
mystifies political power.127  In Stalinism, this power is not the power of anything, of any 
interests, other than those of the blind lust for power.  If it is the power of someone, this is 
merely an attendant circumstance, for it has made this someone out of itself.  It is self-referential, 
self-generative, and non-axiological.  Conjugated with it, ideology is illusion pure and simple, 
illusion as such.  If it serves to mask a contradiction, then it masks not a determinate social 
fissure, but Contradiction as such: the failure of the entire project, the fact that “the whole thing 
makes no sense” or at least that “it’s not certain where we’re headed” and, furthermore, that “the 
price is way too high.”   
Since ideology is simply the perpetuation of power, and culture in the narrow sense—the 
culture of socialist realism—is one of the conductors of ideology, then socialist realism could be 
seen as nothing more than a “metaphor of power,” which is exactly how Evgeny Dobrenko sees 
it.  In the study whose title it is, the expression carries a double meaning.  On the one hand, there 
is the meaning we already indicated: the cultural production of socialist realism reproduces 
political power; on the other, socialist realism is the mechanism (“metaphoric” in the sense of 
“transformative,” but also in the sense of “mythic”) through which the truthful language of 
                                                 
126 We may say that ideology, Stalinist style, falls on the second side of Gramsci’s distinction between “organic” and 
“willed” ideologies (376-77).  Organic are systems of representations that arise necessarily from a given socio-
economic structure; willed ideologies lack this necessary connection and, to that extent, are, in Gramsci’s view, 
unworthy of theoretical consideration.  In the context of the present discussion, the sense of Gramsci’s term can be 
related to the will for power: what wills the willed ideology of Stalinism is Power itself. 
 
127 The obverse of this situation obtains when political power is thought as an extension of the Idea.  Here the power 
that is political power is simply the intensity of the Idea itself, transposed into another dimension. Sergei Sel'ianov’s 
film The Russian Idea (1995), which places Soviet history within a trans-historical and inherently Russian project of 
establishing the Kingdom of God on Earth, is a recent emblematization of this view. 
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“reality” is transfigured into a believable lie (34-35).  When these two meanings of “metaphor” 
are brought together, we get socialist realism as the discourse through which power manipulates 
reality in accordance with its will: “The traditional view of socialist realism as some political 
(socialist) – aesthetic (realism) centaur must be revised, recognizing that totalitarian artistic 
culture is, in fact, the language of power, that the discourse of socialist realism is the discourse 
of power” (33; emphasis in the original).  
To recapitulate: First, we have power, which has folded into itself, into its own element, 
and appears, to that extent, as elemental.  Even if it has had, somewhere at its origin, a 
connection to values and aspirations, it has cut itself off from that origin.  The only value it now 
recognizes is power.  In principle, it no longer belongs to culture, meaning that in it we can no 
longer recognize a power that is or could be ours, a power of meaningful creation.  Included in 
the mechanism of power, Stalinist culture, in the narrow sense, ends up, paradoxically, also 
outside of culture.  In this illusory world of representations, created for the sake of power, we can 
no longer recognize the work by which we make and remake our world, the work of culture, in 
the broadest sense. 
The second set of reasons for skirting the notion of ideology relates to the fact that, in 
itself, in its own concept, as we have come to think it, ideology already refers beyond itself, to 
something it is not.  The theorization of culture, as undertaken on these pages, takes place 
precisely in this beyond, indicated by the very development of the notion of ideology, a 
development, it might be said, that has made ideology “non-ideological.”   
This beyond is clearly visible in Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,” arguably the most important reformulation of the concept since Marx’s original 
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definition.128  This text does not destroy the notion of ideology; far from it.  But it undermines 
the object to which the notion has referred previously.  After it, “ideology” begins to refer to a 
new object or, better, to a new “matter.”  I propose that we now turn to the text and, in an 
admittedly partial, but careful exegesis, follow the confident steps through which Althusser 
executes this shift, opening for us the said beyond. 
We begin with the section that has as its heading the assertion, “Ideology is a 
‘Representation’ of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real Conditions of 
Existence” (162), which we should leave aside for the moment.  In this section, Althusser asks, 
without actually spelling it out, a disarmingly simple question: Why does ideology need to lie?  
He then proceeds to argue against two common answers to this question.   
The first answer refers us to a “few bad men.”  Ideology needs to lie because a few bad 
men need to lie to the “people,” and thus keep them in submission (163).  In a footnote, 
Althusser points out that this explanation is prevalent even in Communist circles, where various 
“deviations” are blamed on the action of such “cliques” of bad men.  We may add that for a long 
time this was also the prevalent explanation for the epochal historical deviation called Stalinism.  
Along with the tragedies and crimes of this period, the ideological lies that served to cover these 
up were deduced from the actions of Stalin and his clique.  Although in recent years this type of 
historical demonology has mostly descended to the shelves of semi-scholarly literature, its 
currency in popular consciousness—both in Russia and the West—remains high. 
It should be noted that, in dismissing the “few bad men” thesis, Althusser does not say 
that bad men in power do not fabricate deceptive ideas.  Even less is he saying that they do not 
use such ideas to maintain their domination over the people.  He simply dismisses the thesis, for 
                                                 
128 I say “original,” because, for obvious reasons, I choose not to count the first appearance of the term in the 
writings of Destutt de Tracy.  Ideology, in the sense in which it is taken here, begins with Marx. 
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even though bad men in power fabricate lies to keep the rest of the people in their power, this is 
not what ideology is about. 
From there, Althusser moves on to a second erroneous thesis.  This one comes from 
Feurbach, via the early Marx.  The thesis answers the question, Why does ideology need to lie? 
by pointing not to the tyrants and priests, but to the people themselves: the people (i.e., not just 
the “common folk,” but men in general) create ideal representations that they superimpose onto 
the less-than-ideal conditions of their existence (163-64).  In other words, ideology needs to lie 
because men need to escape, even if just in their imagination, the alienating social world they 
inhabit every day.  Once again, Althusser denies neither that people construct imaginary worlds 
for themselves, nor that they inhabit these so that they do not have to face straight-on the harsh 
real world.  He simply dismisses the thesis altogether, for even though people do all that, this is 
not what ideology is about.    
Having dismissed in this fashion the two wrong answers to the question, Althusser now 
moves on to dismiss the question as well: It cannot be at all a question of anyone “needing” the 
lies of ideology.129  Expressed differently, the “need” through which ideology “needs” to lie, is 
not the need of anyone.  But a need that is not the need of anyone is not a need at all: it is a 
necessity.  Hence: the question of ideology becomes a question of necessity.  And here is how 
Althusser formulates this new question: “why is the representation given to individuals of their 
(individual) relation to the social relations which govern their conditions of existence and their 
collective and individual life necessarily an imaginary relation?” (165; emphasis added). 
In the last three words is to be found, I believe, the key to the thesis that opens this 
section in the article: “Ideology is a ‘Representation’ of the Imaginary Relationship of 
                                                 
129 The way this insight is phrased in the text differs (“in letter, not in spirit”) from my formulation.  In Althusser’s 
words, the question of ideology cannot be a question of “cause” (165). 
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Individuals to their Real Conditions of Existence.”  It is, to all appearances, pressingly important 
for Althusser to distinguish between this formulation and: “men represent their real conditions to 
themselves in an imaginary form” (163).  For those who read the article for the first time, the 
distinction may seem to be a little bit more than a confusing scholastic exercise.  The sense of 
confusion is only increased by the use of the verb “represent” in the two formulas: in the latter, it 
has a subject (the people, who “represent […] to themselves,” etc.), while in the former it is 
subjectless (“it is their relation to [the real conditions of existence] that is represented for them 
[in ideology]” [164; emphasis added]).  But the confusion is dispelled once we have the key: 
ideology rests on a “necessarily […] imaginary relation.”   This should be read along the lines of 
the preceding argument: just as it is not a matter of anyone “needing” the lies of ideology, so it 
cannot be a matter of anyone “representing” what is represented in ideology.   
And thus we come, by small, consequent, and quiet steps, to what, otherwise, has the 
power of a bomb shell—the assertion I highlighted in the epigraph to the present chapter: 
ideology is not a matter of ideas.  How should we understand this sudden inversion of the content 
that “ideology” carries and announces in its very name?  For a third and last time, a caution is in 
order: Althuser does not dispute the fact that people have distorted ideas about the world, ideas 
of which they are conscious and in which they believe.  He simply states: “Disappeared: the term 
ideas” (169; emphasis in the original).  Disappeared from where?—From consideration.  
Although people have “ideological” representations of which they are conscious and in which 
they believe, this is not what ideology is about. 
Ideology is a Representation that nobody “represents.”  Let us be perfectly clear on this: 
although people can think and constantly do think this representation, they do not give it to 
themselves, in the essential sense of the word.  This is why Althusser is very careful to write 
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“representation given to individuals.”  Nor should we be curious to know by whom it is given to 
them: it is simply given, without a “who”; we left the clique of priests and tyrants far behind, and 
no new candidates have appeared since.  Now we should take the next step, which is strictly 
consistent with our previous formula: “A need that is not the need of anyone is not a need at all, 
but a necessity.”  In a similar way, a representation that nobody can “give” is not a representation 
at all, but an immanent relation.  This, then, is what has remained of ideology, after we put aside 
all the things it is not about: an immanent imaginary relation, i.e., a relation whose 
“imaginariness” (Althusser’s expression [165]) is not imagined by anyone (supposedly, standing 
in the real world).  If we wish to retain the word “representation,” as Althusser does, we need to 
say: ideology is a kind of representation that cannot be given; only inhabited.  We cannot be with 
it, only in it.  This is the fundamental meaning of the since-then sloganized assertion that we all 
are “in ideology” (166).   
An analogy with the theatrical stage and the spectacle would not be unwarranted: in the 
play that unfolds on the stage we have just this kind of “representation.”  The actors are in it, but 
they do not “give it to themselves” (the play, as everybody knows, is “given” by the theater).  
They live the imaginary relations between themselves, relations whose totality constitutes the 
“representation” we are watching from the gallery.130  That these relations are imaginary does 
not mean that the actors, while on the stage, are “imagining things.”  The “imaginariness” in 
question is of a completely different dimension: the dimension in which the entire play has been 
“imagined.”  Hence, for the actors, to be “part of the illusion” does not mean to have illusory 
                                                 
130 I should say that, in this little scenario, we, the people watching from the gallery, occupy the seats of “science,” 
in the sense in which Althusser speaks about it.  Although the imaginary relation constitutive of ideology is not 
imagined from somewhere outside of it, from the “real,” ideology in Althusser does have an outside: the position 
from which the mystification is seen through and demystified, the position of (Marxist) objective-scientific 
knowledge. 
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ideas or to be deceived.  Not at all: it means to “play the part,” to do one thing or the other—
whatever the role requires. 
Those well acquainted with the article have noticed that my gloss so far has not followed 
faithfully the order of Althusser’s exposition, but has, instead, jumped ahead and, from there, 
interpreted what comes earlier.  In my defense, I can say that in order to follow the spirit, one 
must often go against the letter.  “By the letter,” the exposition is as follows: after Althusser has 
reformulated the question of ideology (“why is the representation given to individuals […] 
necessarily an imaginary relation”), he suddenly stops and drops the question, promising to 
return to it later; for the time being, he decides to advance a whole new thesis: “Ideology has a 
material existence” (165).  For those who follow the letter, the transition may appear quite 
sudden: “Didn’t we just say that ideology is not only an imaginary, but necessarily imaginary 
relation?  How do we get from there to the thesis that ideology has a material existence?!”  
We, who follow the spirit, should not be baffled.  We should try to understand 
Althusser’s statement by approaching it from a subsequent point—from the thesis advanced only 
later in the article: ideology is not a matter of ideas (representations, in the sense discussed 
above).  If not, then what is it a matter of?  The answer is: it is a matter of… matter, of 
something material.  In the article, the order of argument is: “ideology is material, hence—ideas 
drop out of consideration.”  Our way of proceeding here, which is just the reverse of this order, 
allows us a better grasp of what Althusser means by “material” existence, i.e., the real matter of 
ideology.    
The examples he gives of the material life of ideology are curious, at best: kneeling, 
praying, confessing, signing petitions, protesting (167).  Supposedly to illustrate the 
preponderance of the “material” over the “ideational,” he even quotes Pascal: “Kneel down, 
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move your lips in prayer, and you will believe” (168).  Now these actions can be called 
“material” only in a very approximate and idiosyncratic sense.  Althusser had sought to forestall 
the problem earlier by asserting that “[of] course, the material existence of the ideology […] does 
not have the same modality as the material existence of a paving stone” (166); and then, with a 
wink to Aristotle, “I shall say that ‘matter is discussed in many senses,’ or rather that it exists in 
different modalities, all rooted in the last instance in ‘physical matter’” (166).  So, what is this 
modality of “matter,” different from a paving stone, which gives to ideology the matter proper to 
it? 
The reference to theater gives us the answer: the materiality of ideology is the materiality 
of acting.  Since this is our frame of reference, it should be said right away that, in it, “acting” 
has a very specific meaning; this meaning is controlled by the new sense given to 
“representation.”  Hence: it is not a matter of our acting from or with representations (acting in 
accordance with ideas that we have and believe in), but acting in representations.  The former 
thesis is what Althusser calls the “ideology of ideology” (168).  He catches it, quite literally, “in 
the act” and exposes it in this celebrated passage:  
[T]he ideological representations of ideology is itself forced to recognize that 
every “subject” endowed with “consciousness” and believing in the “ideas” that 
his “consciousness” inspires in him and freely accepts, must “act according to his 
ideas,” must therefore inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the actions of his 
material practice.  If he does not do so, “that is wicked.” (167-68; emphasis in the 
original) 
 In the same way that people do not give themselves ideological ideas, they also do not 
give themselves (generate) the actions in question.  Of course, they are the ones de facto 
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performing these actions, just as they were the ones de facto thinking those ideas.  But like the 
ideas, the actions are given to them by the performance in which the people find themselves.  
Before being theirs, i.e., the actions of the actors, these are the acts of the Representation, in the 
broader sense, the acts pre-inscribed in the script of the performance.   
[The ideology of ideology] talks of actions: I shall talk of actions inserted into 
practices.  And I shall point out that these practices are governed by the rituals in 
which these practices are inscribed, within the material existence of an 
ideological apparatus, be it a small part of that apparatus: a small mass in a 
church, a funeral, a minor match at a sports’ club, a school day, a political party 
meeting, etc. (168; emphasis in the original) 
As a result, we have the chain: ideas count to the extent that they are “performed” in 
(individual) actions, which are, in each case, the instantiations of practices, which, for their part, 
take place within institutionalized rituals, the latter constituting the concrete life of various 
ideological apparatuses.  Following the logic of the chain, we are allowed to say that the 
individual’s ideas are “thought” by his actions, which are “acted” by social practices, etc.  In the 
ultimate instance, the individual’s actions are “acted” by ideology, in the new sense that the 
concept has acquired by now.131 
 This ultimate instance has, within itself, its own ultimate instance: the summative and 
climatic consequence of the fact that the individual’s actions are “acted” by ideology, namely—
the realization that he himself is produced by ideology.  As such, he is, preeminently, not 
himself: he is the subject.  Expressed differently, the subject is what ideology has made of the 
                                                 
131 “It therefore appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its 
real determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by 
material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his 
belief” (170).  
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individual.  When I say that it has “produced” him, I am placing more emphasis on the meaning 
associated with theatrical “production,” as discussed previously (as relative to theatrical 
“representation,” “performance,” etc.),132 than on the meaning associated with industry and 
manufacture.  From here, we can reformulate the definition of “subject” as follows: “subject” is 
the individual as recruited for the production that is “ideology,” as inserted within the 
performance, where he performs the actions through which the said production “acts” him. 
Before we could begin to entertain the hope that we could somehow forestall the moment 
when, as individuals, we are recruited by ideology and, henceforth, become subjects, Althusser 
tells us that we have always-already missed that moment.  Even before the first recorded moment 
of our lives, the moment of birth, a “pre-appointment” is waiting for us, which appoints us to the 
roles we will be playing (176).  Hence: “ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as 
subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by 
ideology as subjects, which leads us to the last proposition: individuals are always-already 
subjects” (175-76; emphasis in the original).  If so, “individual” stands for the never-actually-
available (as an actuality), yet necessary, presupposition of the existence of the subject.133  
If the meaning of the term “subject” is determined exclusively by its relation to 
“ideology,” this exclusive determination is reciprocated: “ideology” cannot be thought outside of 
this relation in which individuals are constituted as subjects.  In fact, ideology is nothing but this 
relation: “The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects 
are one and the same thing” (175).  Earlier we said that, in his ultimate instance, the individual is 
                                                 
132 Lest it be thought that this semantic emphasis is arbitrary, or serving better the purposes of my argument than as a 
faithful rendition of Althusser’s, here are the words in which Althusser himself speaks of interpellation: “I shall now 
turn my attention to […] the way the ‘actors’ in this mise en scène of interpellation, and their respective roles, are 
reflected in the very structure of all ideology” (177). 
 
133 Althusser expresses this with the statement, “individuals are ‘abstract’ with respect to the subjects they always 
already are” (176).  The obverse of this conception, was given earlier in the text: “concrete subjects exist insofar as 
they are supported by a concrete individual” (174). 
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what has been produced by ideology, namely, the subject; he does not exist, except as a subject.  
In reciprocation, we must now say: ideology, in its ultimate instance, is what produces subjects; 
it does not exist, except as this production. 
At this point we can stop and take a look back, in order to measure the distance we have 
traveled in the company of Althusser.  I said, at the beginning, that this distance takes us beyond 
ideology.  We can now see why it is so.  In itself, that is, in its very name, ideology is a matter of 
ideas.  To this literal evocation, we added the moments of (political) interest and the illusion-
distortion through which ideology hides reality.  None of this has survived by the point at which 
we stand now; or, rather, they have survived, but as the insubstantial, as what can no longer be 
the real matter of ideology.  Beyond all this, ideology, as we see it with Althusser, is something 
completely different: it is a matter of production.  To put it in vaguely dialectical terms: ideology 
is the superesession of what it has previously been; it is its own beyond (i.e., the beyond of its 
previous object, or “matter”).   
When I said, previously, that ideology has become “non-ideological” I meant the 
expansion whereby the notion has spilled way beyond its proper object.  I hold that, if we are 
mindful of this expansion, it no longer makes sense to speak of ideology.  If it has become a 
question of contemplating the act whereby we are produced as what we consciously are, then this 
can no longer be a question of ideology, but, much more broadly, a question of (cultural) being.  
Does Althusser understand this?  I believe not.  And because he does not understand it, he 
continues to speak of ideology, even when, through his own elaboration, the concept has spilled 
far beyond its object.  Despite this spillage, the concept has not yet quite reached the expanse of 
cultural being as a whole.  It has not quite become a question of how we are as cultural beings.   
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And this is because the sphere of ideology, despite all appearances to the contrary, does 
not cover everything.  Something remains, something that does not fall within its bounds.  
Although he has declared that ideology has, first, no history (it is “eternal” [175]), and, second, 
“no outside” (quite obviously since even before birth we are “interpellated” as subjects and since 
even a simple handshake has been seen as an ideological involvement), Althusser, in a 
remarkable argumentative twist, finds such an “outside”: “ideology has no outside (for itself), 
but at the same time […] it is nothing but outside (for science and reality)” (175; emphasis in the 
original).    
The concept of ideology still holds, despite the expansion of its content, and thus fails to 
open the question of cultural being, to the extent that it is differentiated-articulated against true 
knowledge (“science”) and reality.  In this vis-à-vis, on its lot falls—what else?—falsehood.  But 
let us pause and ask in what does the “falsehood” of ideology consist?  Althusser has given us no 
easy way to answer this question.  From within the definition of the concept, as he has it, there is 
no immanent criterion for determining either truth or falsehood.  The evaluative criterion proper 
comes from the socio-economic order over which ideology operates: ideology is “false” insofar 
as the order it assists in reproducing is “false.”  But this is an external criterion.  Because it has 
been defined functionally—i.e., as the production of “subjects”—ideology cannot specify, from 
within itself, from within this production, whether the subjects are recruited for something 
“good” or “bad.”   The fact that subjects recognize themselves as the “ones” who are addressed 
by that which addresses them—“Yes, it really is me” (178; emphasis in the original)— i.e., the 
fact of (social) identity, is, by itself, neither good nor bad.134   
                                                 
134 We must assume that even a perfect social order would consist of subjects whose social identity would consists in 
the fact that they recognize themselves in the values foundational to that social order.  If so, then they too, in a 
purely formal way, will be “ideological” subjects.  And this is another way of saying that Althusser has not given us 
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The bad comes only later and, to repeat, from the outside.  Althusser says as much in the 
last sentence of the text: “The reality in question in this mechanism, the reality which is 
necessarily ignored (méconnue) in the very forms of recognition (ideology = 
misrecognition/ignorance) is indeed, in the last resort, the reproduction of the relations of 
production and of the relations deriving from them” (182-83; emphasis in the original).  In other 
words, the recognition constitutive of ideology—the recognition whereby the subject recognizes 
himself as the addressee of the call—is a misrecognition of the objective conditions of social 
existence.  Conversely, objective knowledge is “good” because it is the proper understanding of 
these conditions and, hence, the seeing-through that gives the lie to the various ideological 
“enactments.” 
An external instance must bear witness to the “falsehood” of the ideological relation 
because ideology, not only in regard to the socio-economic, but also in itself, is not a genuine 
production, but only reproduction.  What does the production, which is ideology, produce 
(enact)?  The answer can be, only: subjection.  But, let us remember, that this was already 
inscribed in the notion of ideology, which exists as nothing but the recruitment of individuals for 
their role as subjects.  We thus end up with a conceptual tautology: ideology, that is, the (non-
coercive) mechanism of subjection, recruits subjects for the sake of subjection.  In other words, 
these subjects are not recruited for anything, except for their own function;  the spectacle in 
which they are “acted” has no content of its own, other than this “acting” of actors. 
 The tautology can be appreciated also from the other side, the side of the subject, when 
we ask the question complementary to “For what are individuals recruited?”  The question now 
is: “Why do individuals respond to the call that recruits them?”  We can ask this in regard to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
an immanent index for distinguishing between “recognition” and “misrecognition” within the general act of 
bestowing-accepting social identity. 
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famous piece of “theoretical theater” Althusser stages for us: the scene with the policeman and 
the passer-by (174-75).  The fact that the passer-by turns at the policeman’s hailing, recognizing 
that “‘it was really him (sic.) who was hailed’ (and not someone else)” (174) is intuitively 
convincing.  But still, how does he know that “it was him”?  From within Althusser’s 
perspective, we can only say: the individual knows, because, by his very nature as an always-
already subject, he is the one who recognizes himself in the hailing of ideology.  How else are 
we to understand the following statement: “all ideology hails or interpellates concrete subjects, 
by the functioning of the category of subject” (173; emphasis added)?  I have highlighted the 
later part of the statement (whereas Althusser highlights the earlier) to emphasize the tautology: 
the functioning of ideology simply realizes what is already implied in the category of “subject”: 
recruitability.  Thus, if what recruits the individual for subjecthood-subjection is recruitment as 
such, what responds in him is responsiveness as such. 
In a recent theoretical rehearsal of the scene, Judith Butler has restated the question just 
posed: “How are we to understand the psychic disposition at the moment in which the pedestrian 
responds to the law?  What conditions and informs that response?” (112).  She responds by first 
pointing out the problem I just suggested: that, in Althusser’s conceptualization, ideology implies 
subjection, the law implies (submissive) conscience, etc. (115).  The consequence is that 
Ideology and Law are hypostasized, coming to occupy the place once occupied by the Divine 
(113).  They are the uncreated entities, having come into being God knows how and facing the 
human subject in such a way that, in him, their domination is inscribed (as “conscience”) before 
it is realized in actual subjection. 
 I second this critique by also recalling the short-circuited relation discussed earlier, 
which had as a consequence the hypostasis of Power.  The new short circuit that we reach with 
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Althusser is, obviously not a viable alternative.  The metaphysics (theological, as Butler insists) 
of Ideology is no better than the metaphysics of Power.135  The problem is not only that, in one 
instance, Power dominates without being the power of anything in particular, just as, in the other 
instance, Ideology recruits without recruiting for anything in particular.  There is also the 
problem that both conceptions institute, at the center of our world, a mystical Force (once called 
political Power, once called Ideology), which, because it stands mysteriously on its own, 
uncreated, no longer returns to us our own image as beings who create our own world, that is to 
say, as cultural beings. 
I believe we escape the mystification and fatalism incumbent upon these theoretical 
constructions when we relate the matter ideology to the further beyond, where, as I suggested 
already, it becomes a matter of cultural being.  We, thereby, do not dispense with ideology as an 
object of inquiry; we simply ground it in a more fundamental dimension, that is, we show its 
function as derivative of that fundamental dimension.  Along the lines charted by Althusser, we 
can now say the following: the essential act of ideology, by which it has always-already inserted 
the individual into a “representation” and “acted” him, is a function of the cultural act.  Ideology 
is able to “recruit” individuals into subjecthood-subjection because mattering and manning are 
constitutive of our being as cultural beings.  We thus give a positive significance to what is, 
otherwise, a mysterious predicament.  The strange compelling power that makes the passer-by 
turn when the policeman calls out “Hey, you!”—namely, the power of interpellation—can now 
be related (and theoretically subordinated) to the addressivity of which I spoke earlier, the 
addressivity through which it is Being that has always-already addressed us.  On a most 
                                                 
135 And, in particular reference to a favorite cold-war interpretation of Stalinism, we may add: a hypostasis of 
relation (a relation in which the Subduing succeeds because it confronts that which is submissive by default), even if 
intellectually more sophisticated, is not all that much better than a demonology of Evil Characters (Althusser’s 
clique of Despots and Priests). 
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primordial level, we turn around because only thus we will see what we are and know that we 
are, by seeing what is (true). 
The one who turns around in response to the call does not respond to a demand to 
turn around.  The turning around is an act that is, as it were, conditioned both by 
the “voice” of the law and by the responsiveness of the one hailed by the law.  
The “turning around” is a strange sort of middle ground (taking place, perhaps, in 
a strange sort of “middle voice”), which is determined both by the law and the 
addressee, but by neither unilaterally or exhaustively.  Although there would be 
no turning around without first having been hailed, neither would there be a 
turning around without some readiness to turn. (Butler 107)  
This critical gloss on Althusser requires a gloss of its own: the mutual determination spoken of 
here is, at the most fundamental level, the mutual implication of mattering and manning.  And 
the “middle voice” evoked by Butler gives body, in this concrete situation, to what I earlier 
called “draw.”   
The above does not mean—as Butler suggests of Althusser—that, in the depths of their 
being, people are connatural with the Law and complicit with its operations.  Why it is not so 
becomes clear when we remember that the draw is not a force acting between constituted 
entities.  It is what first constitutes (figures-out) these entities.  With this reminder, it becomes 
necessary to deduce Althusser’s scene of interpellation from a more “primal” scene in which it 
would not be just the subject who is constituted, but, simultaneously, also the Law.  Expressed 
differently, where interpellation shows itself as a scene of reproduction (of relations of 
domination), it is necessary to show it as a scene of (cultural) production.  It seems to me that the 
first step in every critique of ideology is just this: to show that Order and its institutions do not 
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precede, ontologically, the constitution of the “one,” but are cultural products, in principle, 
coeval with the moment when some-body turns around and becomes “one.” 
 We can deduce the primal scene, and the primal meaning, of interpellation by considering 
the encounter between the Law and “the man from the countryside” in Kafka’s Trial (215-17).136  
For most of the parable, Kafka keeps us in what constitutes the ideological illusion par 
excellence: the imposing existence of the Law seemingly outside and prior to the subject.  Its 
erection seems completely independent of whether the man from the countryside appreciates it or 
not, or even of whether he exists or not.  The impression is confirmed by the long years during 
which the man waits fruitlessly for permission to enter through the (actually, open) Door of the 
Law, as well as by the indifferent attitude of the doorkeeper; it appears, indeed, that the Law has 
no regard for the provincial solicitor, that it has completely forgotten about his existence.  All of 
this changes in the moments just before the man’s death, when the doorkeeper tells him that the 
door in front of which he has waited all these years was meant for him alone.   
When the man had first arrived from the countryside, the doorkeeper had told him that 
behind the first door there are, inside the building of the Law, many other doors through which 
he must pass before he comes into the presence of the Law Itself.  It had seemed, then, that the 
Law possesses an internal structure—let us say it—an In-Itself, which holds whether the man 
enters through the first door or not.  At the end of his life, the man has (hopefully) learned 
otherwise: that the first door was, for him at least, also the only one; that, rather than possessing 
an immanent internal structure of its own, the Law was just a façade with many such first-only 
doors carved in it, each intended for a “one.”  In other words, the Law had no existence apart 
from this being-open or being-addressed to a potential “one.”  When the address is taken up, 
                                                 
136 The short reading offered here follows the spirit of Slavoj Žižek’s interpretation advanced in For They Know 
Not… (90-91). 
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when the call is heard, and not one but many “ones” are waiting to enter, the Law ceases to be 
just a façade and has, in fact, an in-itself.  To give this understanding a succinct formulation: the 
erection of the Law (i.e., its institution, substance, and power) holds in the regard of the 
subject.137   
If we remember the more archaic meaning of “regard,” still current in French, as “look” 
or “gaze,” we should remember also the scene in the preceding chapter of this study, where I 
wanted to show just this: how a particular kind of “regard” occasions a particular kind of 
erection.   This erection, by which I mean, in the ultimate instance, the institution, substance, and 
power of Stalinist Order, is not something standing on its own.  It springs up and holds to the 
extent to which—to use Althusser’s phrase—there is a “turning around” and, hence, a “one”—
the one who is “made to see.”  We give the lie to the ideological illusion when we reach this 
understanding: that the “one” not only sustains, but also “erects” the edifice of Order.   
Just as in the parable of the policeman Althusser does not tell us what makes the 
individual turn around, Kafka does not tell us why the man from the countryside wants so 
desperately to enter the Law.  We are told only that he is “drawn to it” (215); in his dying words, 
the man himself declares, “Everyone strives to reach the Law” (217).  On the basis of these 
comments, we may tentatively assume that the Law is some kind of ultimate Value, the True as 
such, or What-Counts.  In the best of all possible worlds, this value, for which the Law serves as 
a metaphor, should not only be recognized by each “one” (as indeed it is, according to the 
parable) but should also return the favor: in it, the value of each “one” should be recognized.  
The statement made above—that the erection of the Law holds in the regard of the subject—can 
now be rephrased as a statement of social value: What-Counts counts on “ones” for its 
                                                 
137 In Žižek: “The notion of the inaccessible, transcendent Absolute makes sense only in so far as the subject’s gaze 
is already here—in its very notion, the inaccessible Other implies a relation to its own other (the subject)” (91). 
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subsistence and subsists to the extent to which, in it, these “ones” count for something.  Having 
said this, we can now venture to answer the question passed over in silence by both Althusser 
and Kafka: the individual is drawn to the Law, so that he may count for something, i.e., 
ultimately, so that he acquires determinate being (as we call it now, identity).  He can have that 
only through What-Counts (as truth/reality), and from nowhere else.  But that is also man-made, 
it is cultural; it does not descend from some transcendental and eternal domain of values, but is 
(re-)created in the very act in which “I”-being is bestowed.  The two are coterminous.   
To thus deduce the scene of interpellation and the whole question of ideology from the 
more primal scene in which (what counts as) truth and reality are produced and from the more 
fundamental question of cultural being, is not tantamount to giving an ontological blessing to 
various forms of political subjection (“Since it all happens in pursuit of the True and the Real, 
then it’s all for the best, amen!”).  It simply means that we attain a more comprehensive frame, in 
which the (re-)production of Order, political and social, can be adjoined to and thought together 
with cultural production.  In the synthesis, these can be seen as one: the production of cultural 
being, which has, as its inseparable aspects, the production of truth-reality and identity.  Having 
said this, we must immediately turn around and signal that “truth” and “reality” are not to be 
taken as absolutes.  They are, in each cultural world, prefaced by “what counts as,” that is, they 
belong to the register of “values,” which, for their part, are never absolute.  They are, 
furthermore, values such that, in them, the value of human being is reflected-recognized and, to 
that extent, measured (for, as I argued, What-Counts counts only because through it a multitude 
of “ones” count for something).   
Obviously, this way of looking at things does not preclude the possibility for what is 
known as a “critique of ideology”; on the contrary, it makes such a critique much more 
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substantial.  This critique can now be, actually, immanent.  It does not need to take its standards 
from somewhere else—as with Althusser, from the domain of “scientific knowledge”—to 
pronounce a certain enactment as “false.”  The distortion that needs to be criticized should be 
seen as a distortion not of consciousness, but of cultural being, i.e., a distortion of the world we 
ourselves are always in the act of creating.  We shall pronounce the act “false,” or “perverse,” to 
the extent that the work “one” performs in the act (enactment) satisfies an alienated desire, desire 
with the appearance of external and independent substantiality.   
 This, obviously is the case in The Trial, where the “obscene Law” (Žižek) enjoys 
substance in the act whereby it makes the subject wait.  “To make him wait and wonder” is what 
makes up the truth-reality of the Law, the tumescence of its being.  When the man from the 
countryside decides not to go through the open door, that is, by his “Yes, I shall wait,” he in fact 
“erects” the Law; now, indeed, the Law acquires the reality the doorkeeper describes: a structure 
with many doors, each guarded by a doorkeeper much more terrible than the preceding one, etc. 
This is also the case in Stalinism, whose perverse Law enjoys substance in the act 
whereby it makes the subject see.  “To make her see” is what makes up the truth reality of 
socialism, the tumescence of its being.  Where she shows her “having been made to see,” that is, 
by her “Yes, I have seen!” or “I have seen indeed,” she “erects” socialism, institutes it as a 
reality.  
  We shall now consider how this act, by instituting the reality of socialism, makes up the 
concrete institution of socialist realism.  Appropriately, we will observe this in a concrete scene, 
with a concrete setting: the First Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE BLIND, THE SEEING, AND THE SHINY 
 
 
 
 
We need to fantasize, we need to study reality in such a 
way that, on the basis of its laws, our fantasy could create 
actually possible events [real'no vozmozhnye sobytiia], 
which we do not always see. 
K. Chornyi, speech at the  
First Congress of Soviet Writers 
 
In our country there are no events that occur by accident. 
M. Kirshon, speech at the  
First Congress of Soviet Writers 
 
In one of the preliminary and general rehearsals of the dialectic movement, in the 
Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel states: “[The] new object contains the 
nothingness of the first, it is what experience has made of it” (55).  The preceding chapter of the 
present study could serve as something of an illustration to this famous thesis, insofar as in it I 
pointed to the new object, or field, to which the term “ideology” relates in the work of Althusser.  
This new object “contains the nothingness of the first,” in the sense that it is instantiated by the 
negation of what “ideology” had been previously.  I expressed this by saying that with Althusser 
ideology has become non-ideological.  In that it is no longer about ideas, ideology is beyond its 
proper self.  Speaking from that beyond, Althusser tells us of a kind of “representation” that 
touches upon ideas only in the last, non-essential, instance.  To remember, it is a representation 
that no one can “give”; it can only be given.  We notice that, along with ideology, 
“representation” also now refers to a new object.  It no longer designates the spontaneous act of 
forming or expressing ideas, but, rather, to the act in which subjects are “produced” and “acted.” 
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 It is difficult to speculate on what the experience was that “made,” for Althusser, the 
object of ideology into what we witness it as being in “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses.”  But it is easy and, moreover, necessary to say that, in the plane of historical 
happening, Stalinism is most certainly an integral part of the experience through which both 
ideology and representation find their beyond by facing the nothingness of their previous being.   
How “ideological” is ideology when we consider under this heading all those 
“ideologically alien elements” targeted by the Stalinist regime, from kulaks and “wreckers,” 
through Trotskyists and imperialists spies, to “rootless cosmopolitans”?  In the totalitarian state, 
these, as Hannah Arendt has argued (423-25), belong to the category of the “objective enemy”—
a peculiar breed of human beings, extant only since the early twentieth century, and 
distinguished by the fact that their character and subsequent fate is determined irrespectively of 
whether they actually harbor any feelings or intentions harmful to the regime.  Their 
classification as so many “enemies of the people” proceeds not from what they think, but from 
what they are.  The alien “ideological” character imputed to them does not concern in any 
essential sense the ideas that they may or may not have.  If they show themselves as, in fact, 
having such harmful ideas, this is seen as a consequence and a further, but by no means 
necessary, demonstration of their being objective enemies, not a prerequisite for being 
considered such.138  By confessing their criminal actions and intentions, they simply inhabit, with 
their consciousness, the position to which they have been assigned in advance.  With the ideas 
they voice, they sound off to the world around the “tendency” whose carriers they are.139 
                                                 
138 We could note, in passing, the kinship resemblance between the definition of the objective enemy and the 
definition of true class consciousness as a system of thought that could be thought by individuals, but which, even if 
it remains unthought by them, is nevertheless theirs, definitive of their essential being. 
 
139 “[The objective enemy] is never an individual whose dangerous thoughts must be provoked or whose past 
justifies suspicion, but a ‘carrier of tendencies’ like the carrier of a disease” (Arendt 424). 
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The counterfeit and mortifying theatricality of the Moscow show trials has been pointed 
out in almost every reference to them; but no one, I believe, has pointed out that this sham 
spectacle rests on a more fundamental “theatricality,” characteristic of Stalinist culture as a 
whole.  Behind the show that served to give some credence to Stalin’s brutal elimination of his 
enemies, to mobilize the Party’s rank-and-file, and to convince the general population, there lies 
another show, a “representation” in the sense I suggested in the discussion of Althusser’s article.  
It is true that the accused were forced to deliver falsified confessions, and, to that extent, we may 
say that they were made to “play a part.”  But this forced acting was made possible by a 
historical world in which the accused were, from the outset, viewed as beings who, in their deeds 
and thoughts, are “acted” by the tendency they embodied, by a deep essence, which guided their 
thoughts and deeds, rather than being first defined by them.  This is the primary spectacle that 
the show trials had to present: not the “ideology” of Kamenev, Zinov'ev, Bukharin, and their 
associates, supposedly motivating the crimes committed or intended, but their being-acted or 
being-driven by a force inimical to Soviet power.140   
The accused cooperated only to a point.  Many of them recited what they were supposed 
to say.141  But they, obviously, could not recite it with passion; they could not show convincingly 
                                                 
140 Consistently throughout the trials, the prosecution sought to establish precisely the absence of any consistent 
ideological program on the part of the various anti-Soviet “blocs” and “centers.”  The goal was to demonstrate that 
any semblance of recognizable ideological position served only to mask what was, at bottom, an unprincipled, 
organically innate, essentially elemental hostility toward the Soviet Union.  Proportionally to the successes of 
socialist construction—so the official scenario went—it became increasingly difficult for the Trotskyists to hide the 
bestial face of reaction behind a consistent political program.  In the words of one of the accused: “The circle has 
closed.  It is over with the political masquerade, it is over with the shams of oppositions, discussions and platforms.  
Opposition was superseded by conspiracy against the state; discussions and platforms were superseded by bullets 
and bombs” (“Last Pleas… Mrachkovsky”).  See also Vyshinskii’s violent assault on Piatakov’s suggestion that he 
and his associates constituted a “political fraction” (446-50). 
 
141 Here is the impression the accused Piatakov left on one of the notable foreign guests in attendance, the German 
writer Lion Feuchtwanger: “I shall never forget how [he] stood in front of  the microphone, a middle-aged man of 
average build, rather bald, with a reddish, old-fashioned, sparse, pointed beard, and how he lectured.  Calmly and at 
the same time sedulously he explained how he had managed to sabotage the industries under him.  He expounded, 
pointed his finger, gave the impression of a school teacher, a historian giving a lecture on the life and deeds of a man 
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to those present that they were indeed driven.  The prosecutor-general, Andrei Vyshinskii, did 
his best to remedy the spectacle: 
Is it by accident that Trotskyism became the vanguard of capitalist restoration? 
No, not by accident, because everything was leading to this from the very 
beginning.  Not by accident, because even before the October Revolution Trotsky 
and his friends were fighting against Lenin and the Leninist party, just as they are 
now fighting against Stalin and the party of Lenin-Stalin. 
Comrade Stalin’s predictions have been fully realized.  Trotskyism indeed 
turned into the central meeting point of all powers inimical to socialism, into a 
gang of mere bandits, spies, and murderers, who put themselves fully at the 
disposal of foreign intelligence services, into lackeys of capitalism, into restorers 
of capitalism in our country. 
And here, at the trial, with extraordinary fullness and clarity was revealed just 
this vile essence of Trotskyism.  They came to their disgraceful end because for 
decades they followed this road, glorifying capitalism, refusing to believe in the 
successes of socialist construction, in the victory of socialism.  This is why they 
finally arrived at a broad program for capitalist restoration, this is why they 
decided to begin betraying and selling our motherland. (435; emphasis added) 
 The (alleged) history of Trotskyism, reaching back to the years before the Revolution, is 
given (concocted) not in order to strengthen the case against the accused, to give their present 
crimes a credible background.  The goal, rather, is to chart a vector of ineluctable necessity 
(which I have punctuated by italicizing the symptomatic phrases in the quoted passage).  Nothing 
                                                                                                                                                             
who had been dead form many years, named Piatakov, anxious to make everything clear even to the smallest details 
so that his listeners should understand fully” (125). 
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occurred by accident,142 everything happened just as it was supposed to happen, just as it was 
predicted by comrade Stalin.  It could not but happen.  The show trial is the show of this could-
not-but (“here, at the trial, with extraordinary fullness and clarity was revealed…”). 
No ideological conviction, no matter how firm, how resolutely followed and 
implemented in action, could travel a road as straightforward and precipitously consequent as the 
one Vyshinskii draws for his audience.  This can only be the trajectory of a tendency, principle, 
or function, of a devilish automaton that has nothing subjective about it.  We are referred to it 
when the prosecutor-general speaks of the “vile essence of Trotskyism.”  From this essence 
proceed the acts that the accused could-not-but commit; from there they are irresistibly driven to 
ever greater crimes against the Soviet Union.  We should be careful in appreciating the logic of 
Vyshinskii’s harangue, for it follows a course directly opposite of what we might expect: the 
indictment does not move from a consideration of the deeds, intentions, and beliefs of the 
Trotskyists to the characterization of these people as anti-Soviet elements (“they did this, 
intended that, hence they should be condemned as anti-Soviet”).  It is just the other way around: 
these people are Trotsyists (i.e., in their very essence anti-Soviet), therefore they could-not-but 
do what they did and intend what they intended. 
If we now put ourselves, for a moment, in the seats occupied by the jury, we can see from 
a different angle the shift in the object to which the word “representation” refers.  According to 
the normal legal procedure, the facts, testimonies, and pleas are presented before the jury.  
Optimally, these should coalesce into a representation of the case in the mind of the jury, that is, 
                                                 
142 The rhetoric and phraseology of Vyshinskii’s speech are echoed in some of the confessions.  The following 
passage is taken from Kamenev’s last plea: “I ask myself, is it an accident that alongside of myself, Zinoviev, 
Evdokimov, Bakayev and Mrachkovsky are sitting emissaries of foreign secret-police departments, people with false 
passports, with dubious biographies and undoubted connections with the Gestapo.  No! it is not an accident.  We are 
sitting here side by side with the agents of foreign secret-police departments because our weapons were the same, 
because our arms became intertwined before our fate became intertwined here in this dock” (“Last Pleas… 
Kamenev”; emphasis added). 
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they should be able to form a clear idea about the circumstances, the character of the accused, the 
motives for the crimes committed, etc.  In short, the evidence and testimonies presented should 
come together into a consistent “picture.”  But this traditional demand for the consistency of 
legal proof is countered, in the case of the Moscow show trials, by a much superior demand, 
issuing from the very foundation of Stalinist culture—the demand for thoroughgoing necessity 
and predictability, for a world in which everything happens just as it was meant to be.  The 
satisfaction of this second, imperious demand proceeds, as I already suggested, by way 
diametrically opposed to traditional legal procedure.  What is supposed to be the legal 
demonstration of proof passes into a demonstration of the “tendency.”   
In the latter, we begin with the “picture” and arrive only at the very end to the evidence 
and the testimonies.  At first, there is the general picture, or representation, of victorious 
socialism, implying, by necessity, the reciprocal decline of capitalism.  This picture needs to be 
filled; since it is just the scheme of historical necessity at its most schematic, it must draw 
material in order to be completed.  From the second part of the picture, an “essence” emerges, a 
concretization of the very inevitability of the tendency.  The essence is the anti-Soviet pure and 
simple—degradation as such.  Now, the essence needs a “character,” in order to show itself in 
human-psychological form.  This character is none other than the “Trotskyist,” the paramount 
exemplification of the anti-Soviet person.  It contains just what was contained in the essence: 
undying hostility toward socialism, subterfuge, escalating moral degradation, passing into 
unprincipled bestiality, etc.  For its part, the “character” needs concrete actions, beliefs, and 
words, through which it will make appearance on the stage of the world; it needs the components 
constitutive of a “role.”  Once all this is put in place, one last thing remains: the role needs to be 
manned, an actual human being has to appear in it—a body through whom the actions will be 
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acted, the beliefs believed, and the words spoken; in other words, through whom the picture will 
come complete, so that everything that is will be shown to be indeed just what was meant to be.    
The Moscow show trials accomplished the staging of this entire “production.”  In so 
doing, they posed, in a distorted and chilling way, the question of whether to “have identity” is 
not to succeed where the accused could not succeed fully: to accept and inhabit the role into 
which we are already “cast” and “acted” by the production that is, ultimately, the production of 
social-cultural being.  Because, in this particular case, the question is asked in such a distorted 
and grotesque way, from a stage that is obviously the stage of violence and monumental forgery, 
we have the option to look away and not engage with it.  But if we doggedly continue to repeat 
that the trials falsified reality, that the actions, intentions, and, ultimately, characters imputed to 
the “enemies of the people” were fictitious, we may miss the fact that this fictitiousness refers us, 
ultimately, to something real.  I would like to argue that the show put on during the Moscow 
show trials presents the flip side of a coin, whose other side is the ongoing “show” through 
which a multitude of “ones,” for the most part without any overt compulsion, took part in 
constituting the reality of Stalinist socialism.  
To see this other, shinier, side of the coin, let us attend, for the rest of this chapter, to an 
event ostensibly quite different, yet deeply akin to the one just considered.  We do not need to 
change locations: the House of Trade Unions on Bol'shaia Dmitrovka Street in Moscow, where 
in March 1938 the last of the show trials took place,143 was also the venue of the First All-Union 
Congress of Soviet Writers, which convened between 17 August and 1 September 1934.   
The organization of the congress was decreed by the Party resolution of April 1932, and 
set in motion almost immediately after it.  The preparation took longer than expected, and the 
                                                 
143 This was the trial of the so-called “Anti-Soviet Right Trotskyist Bloc.”  Among the accused were Nikolai 
Bukharin, Aleksei Rykov, and the former chief of OGPU/NKVD, Genrikh Iagoda. 
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opening date had to be moved back on a couple of occasions.  The delegates were carefully 
selected, and selected foreign guests invited.  The order of presentation was set in advance.  The 
key speeches and reports had to be approved beforehand by the Organizational Committee; their 
text was made available to all the delegates.  Excursions, concerts, and public festivities 
accompanied the main event.  On the street outside the House of Trade Unions, large crowds of 
people gathered every day to greet the writers when they entered or exited the building. 
This eager, effervescent life was not confined to the outside.  It made its way inside.  At 
measured intervals throughout the writers’ debates, organized groups of common folk from 
various walks of life proceeded down the aisle of the magnificent Hall of Columns and ascended 
the podium.  These were the “delegates without membership cards,” as Boris Pasternak referred 
to them: industrial workers, representatives of kolkhoz collectives, young pioneers, soldiers, 
scientists—“shiny, happy people.”  All of them had come to greet the unprecedented, luminous 
assembly, voice their enthusiasm for the epochal event, and testify to the eager attention with 
which all Soviet people followed the congress’ proceedings.  Their entrances were more than 
colorful intermezzos, ceremonial exclamation points in a prosaic text that was, otherwise, about 
different matters: artistic literature, the method of socialist realism, the organization of the 
Writers’ Union, etc.  They were very much part of this text—an essential part, I would argue, 
without which the text turns into a hieroglyphic.  The intrusion of the shiny, happy people is 
constitutive of the act through which “socialist realism” was produced, and not a sideshow to the 
deliberations through which, supposedly, socialist realism was “formulated.”  This was—in a 
sense that will be elaborated in the following discussion, but which was already foreshadowed in 
previous chapters—the show. 
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Each such appearance was introduced by the session chair with the words: “Comrades, 
we have been visited by…” (“Tovarishchi, k nam prishli/priekhali…”).  Usually, after saluting 
the delegates and providing a short biography of the collective he or she was chosen to represent, 
the speaker proceeded to present a zakaz (“order,” “commission”).  All of them made, 
essentially, the same demand: “Show us.”144  In different voices, the representatives of the 
people were demanding that they be represented.  In the voice of comrade Bratanovskii, speaking 
on behalf of proletarian authors of technical literature: “Our collective order to you, comrades 
writers, is: get closer to the industry worker, depicting him not only at the machine, but also 
showing his fight for acquiring high technical qualification, for absorbing all achievements of 
world culture […]” (Pervyi 554);  as expressed by comrade Nemtsova, a representative of a 
factory-university (zavod-vtuz) named after Stalin: “Give us a woman-hero, not just a shock-
worker, but a woman who raises our next generation […], who combines this exacting, 
complicated task with the struggle for socialist construction” (366); and as sung by a choir of 
pioneers from Moscow: 
To the writers—an order from the children of the capital: 
In your stories we want to be merry, 
As we are in camps, gardens, and courtyards. 
[………………………………………………………….] 
We want to dream of stars and planets, 
To invent machines in our fearless minds... (179). 
                                                 
144 In the words of a distinguished foreign guest, André Malraux: “All delegations, which brought to us, along with 
their gifts, the human warmth and extraordinary friendship amidst which your literature grows, what did these 
delegations say?—‘Express us, show us’” (Pervyi 286).  Similarly, in the speech of Aleksandr Afinogenov: “New 
people came onto this podium, and they said: ‘Describe us, write about us’” (429). 
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This was the social commission speaking, commissioning itself.  It did not need to be ordered 
from somewhere else, from “up high.”  Life itself, “our reality,” was entering the Hall of 
Columns and ordering its own representation.  
The assembly was genuinely moved.  When a kolkhoz farmer carrying a heavy piece of 
machinery on her shoulders took to the podium, Pasternak was so flustered that he lunged at her, 
seized the tool, and tried to carry it for her.  When the pioneer choir marched through the hall 
and began singing, Gor'kii could not suppress his tears; many in the audience sobbed with him.  
Throughout the proceedings, speakers kept reminding the gathering of this or that memorable 
appearance: “When, yesterday, those children entered the hall, when all those colors, gestures, 
applause, the sounds of the orchestra, of the trumpets, the flood of light […]” (206); “Take for 
example the speech of the kolkhoz worker who greeted us.  This absolutely fearless, valiant 
woman […]” (232); “Comrades, Otto Iul'evich Schmidt145 spoke here.  He said something 
seemingly simple, but quite significant […]” (616); “Comrades, one of the most remarkable 
moments of this congress was the speech, during the first session, of the Donbass shock-worker 
Nikita Izotov” (654). 
The writers understood and agreed that the business for which they had convened, the 
business of Soviet literature, of artistic representation in general, of socialist realism, had to do, 
in the first place, with showing the builders of socialism.  Nikolai Pogodin even equated socialist 
realism with the task of presenting the biographies of these people (388).  The call to depict the 
new heroes was heard from all sides.  The Party emissary, Andrei Zhdanov: “Soviet literature 
                                                 
145 Otto Schmidt was the head of the 1934 northern expedition on board of the icebreaker Cheliuskin.  After the 
steamship was crushed by the icepacks and sunk, 104 members of the crew escaped onto the ice, where they had to 
survive for two long months.  During these desperate times, Schmidt behaved as a true political and moral leader of 
the group: he organized poetry readings, lectured on philosophy and world politics, and even managed to publish a 
wall newspaper (!).  In April, 1934, the crew was rescued by Soviet airplanes that landed directly onto the ice 
surface.  The seven pilots participating in this unprecedented rescue mission were among the first to be awarded the 
newly instituted title “Hero of the Soviet Union.”  Schmidt received the same honor in 1937. 
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must be able to show our heroes […]” (4); Gor'kii: “The main hero of our books should be labor, 
that is, the human being organized by the processes of labor […]” (13); comrade Nemtsova: 
“Give us a hero who lives a full life, give us the kind of hero who is to be found in our socialist 
construction” (367); Aleksandr Fadeev: “Indubitably, our literature lacks the images of 
monumental, intelligent, integral characters, the likes of which are promoted in ever greater 
numbers from the ranks of the working class and the peasantry” (234). 
And yet, even as they were urging each other in this way and vouching to fulfill the main 
social commission, to show in their works the new people of socialism, the writers could not 
ignore the fact that the social commission itself had “made a showing.”  Had the people not 
appeared in front of the congress?  Had they not come from the factories and fields, walked 
down the aisle, and stood before the assembly?  Those that had come, had come not just to speak 
to the writers about the building of socialism.  They had also come to exemplify it.  They had 
taken to the stage in the Hall of Columns and stood there as icons of Soviet life.  This too was 
“showing”—one that did not wait to be shown through the agency of the “delegates with 
membership cards,” but was showing itself on its own, from within itself. 
Once again, after the scene from Panferov’s Bruski discussed in Chapter Two, we come 
upon the duality hidden behind the word “representation,” the duality between Darstellung and 
Vertretung, between “depicting” and “standing for,” or “embodying.”  On one hand, we have a 
showing that shows something: the depicted object.  It is transitive.  The second is a showing as a 
pure “show.”  It does not take us somewhere outside of itself, to a thing that we shall see.  It is 
itself the thing that we shall see.  The first showing is satisfied and extinguished when it gets to 
the object.  The second is satisfied when it “gets” to the viewer.  Its “object”—for it is not as 
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intransitive as it seems—is to possess its audience.  Nowhere but in this possession does it prove 
successful as a show.   
Not nearly everyone in the audience at the First Congress of Soviet Writers understood 
what was required of them.  What were they supposed to do?  What was their part in the 
production that was already under way: the cultural production of socialist realism.  And, as a 
first order of business, how were they to react to the demand of the new people: what were they 
supposed to do in order to show these people?  Because, after all, they were writers, members of 
the intelligentsia, living lives different from those of their potential heroes, many thought that it 
was a matter of getting closer to the new people, getting to know them more intimately, and 
depicting them from this intimate distance.  As in the years prior to the congress, there were 
reproaches that echoed the old Russian theme of the intelligentsia’s separation from the life of 
the masses.146  In response, voices, some of them quite authoritative, prescribed a more involved 
and diligent study of the object.  In his official report on the Statute of the Union of Soviet 
Writers, Pavel Iudin mandated:  
The artist must study reality intently, carefully, and persistently, he must know 
the new man in detail, in all the particulars, his work, everyday life, soul, personal 
qualities, how he thinks, how he converses with his comrades, what he thinks 
about himself, what he sees in his dreams, how he loves and hates, how he cries 
                                                 
146 “These days, every corner of the Soviet Union is saturated with unusual life—a kind of life that may provide 
material for a truly universal [literary] theme.  Unfortunately, we do not see life, we do not study it sufficiently, and 
know it very little” (428). 
“Our enormous country has been seized, from end to end, by the grandiose processes of building and transforming 
absolutely all aspects of life.  Great discoveries of Soviet science and technology are taking place all around us.  
There is a serious flaw in our life as writers: we stand quite far from the intellectual life of our country, we still live 
boring, limited, and insufficiently social lives” (203). 
“To study, read, people, the new people, is enormously difficult. [.…]  I am not only not familiar with the new 
[Soviet] man—I often do not know, cannot do, cannot hear[…]” (426; emphasis in the original). 
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and rejoices.  Without this, the writer cannot become an “engineer of human 
souls.” (665) 
Only for a brief initial moment this statement sounds like an invitation to a diligent empirical 
study.  The moment is gone when we realize that we are in the Soviet Union of the 1930s, the 
last place in the world where the writer could be advised to be a mere observer of life (and 
certainly not by Iudin, a Party philosopher and one of the leading interpreters of Marxism during 
Stalinist times).  We may also notice that no empirical acquaintance could possibly get to the 
depths of intimacy Iudin envisions (“what he sees in his dreams”).    
How, then, can one attain this intimacy?  How deeply into the thick of reality must one 
reach, before reality shows its real face?  What is that optimal proximity at which the knowledge 
of reality becomes authentic and lends itself to truthful artistic syntheses?  At what point in the 
asymptotic approach to the presence of “life itself” does one begin to see that presence truthfully, 
“in detail, in all the particulars”? 
One thing is certain, and bears repeating: the desired point is not, as it had been earlier, 
the point of application of method.  Since the first part of this study, since the culture of the 
1920s, we have moved beyond this point.  The first indication that the attainment of the “real” 
was no longer the provenance of (professedly) scientific hermeneutic was the controversy, at the 
beginning of the 1930s, centered on the literary theory of RAPP.   
Even as their organization was being dismantled, the leaders of RAPP had continued to 
insist that the essential characteristic of Soviet literature is its ideologically superior vantage 
point upon the world: the so-called “dialectical-materialist method.”  In preliminary meetings 
between writers and representatives of the Party’s Central Committee, this platform was rejected 
and the phrase “socialist realism” proposed (purportedly, by Stalin himself) as a more 
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appropriate description of the “method” of Soviet literature (Robin 38).  This was more than just 
a scholastic squabble over words.  It suggested a profound cultural shift.  From now on, there 
was not going to be a mediatory instance (“vehicle”), through which the truth of reality would 
emerge from latency and manifest itself.  It would do so on its own, out of itself.  
This shift was implied in the first published mention of socialist realism, a statement by 
Ivan Gronskii, the head of the newly-formed Organizational Committee, quoted in the 23 May, 
1932, issue of Literaturnaia gazeta:  “The basic demand that we make on the writer is: write the 
truth, portray truthfully our reality, which is in itself dialectic” (qtd. Robin 39; emphasis added).  
By this, we should understand that no special apparatus is needed to extract the truth of life, for 
“our reality” itself makes this truth legible.147  All that was needed was to “write” what has thus 
been rendered manifest.  The sentence following the one just quoted, comes as an inference: 
“Therefore, the basic method of Soviet literature is the method of socialist realism” (39).  In 
other words, socialist realism is the generalization of this kind of artistic practice for which no 
method is needed, insofar as it records a truth that has been made explicit already by the 
movement of life itself. 
In Stalin’s inaugural, semi-legendary, proclamation of socialist realism, reportedly made 
two weeks earlier, during a meeting with writers at Gor'kii’s apartment, the same logic is 
articulated also structurally: “If an artist truthfully depicts our life, he cannot but notice and 
depict in it that which leads it to socialism.  This exactly will be socialist art.  This exactly will 
be socialist realism” (qtd. Ermolaev 145; emphasis added).148  First comes the world, with its 
                                                 
147 The question of life’s priority over the “bookish” knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, as a foundational trait in the 
theory of socialist realism, is treated in Ermolaev 154-57, 164-67. 
 
148 Panferov has reported a pronouncement by the leader similar to the one quoted above, in which Marxism is 
substituted for socialist realism, without altering the general conceptual structure: “You must understand that if a 
writer frequently and honestly reflects the truth of life he cannot but arrive at Marxism” (qtd. Ermolaev 167; 
emphasis added). 
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immanent truth, then the writer’s contact with it, and only in the last instance, following a line of 
inevitability (“cannot but”), as a consequence or a point of arrival—the so-called “method” of 
socialist realism.  This, of course, is none other than the concatenation discussed in Chapter Two, 
on the example of a moving story told by Gor'kii, through which the object arrives at the 
reflection proper to itself in the “stead” of its researchers.  At that time, we were considering the 
general mechanism through which the truth of socialism “works.”  We are now considering the 
same mechanism, but with a view to the obligations this truth places upon the author.  To phrase 
the question in accordance with the conceptualization of the cultural act advanced earlier: what 
does it mean to man this “stead,” so that, in it, there would be the “one” who counts as a Soviet 
author?   
It indeed appears that “his burden is light.”  As we established, no special knowledge or 
intuition is required of him prior to the encounter with the world.  According to the words of the 
leader, all that is needed is sincerity.  The person mirroring Stalin’s role within the writers’ 
community, Gor'kii, voiced the same imperative in his keynote address to the congress: “Only 
one thing is required of the person [in our country]: to be honest in his attitude toward the heroic 
work of creating a classless society” (14; emphasis added).  Under ordinary circumstances, we 
would have no excuse to pause and ponder the meaning of such common phrases as “being 
honest” or “being sincere.”  But we are now in quite extraordinary circumstances, which give us 
reasons to doubt whether the sincerity intended by Stalin and Gor'kii is exactly what we have 
always understood by this word. 
Sincerity, as we know it, presupposes something contained within (feelings, intentions, 
thoughts, etc.), which is not held in concealment, but is freely released into the open.149  It is a 
                                                 
149 It is worth remembering, at this point, that “sincerity,” understood exactly in these traditional terms, was to 
become the slogan word for Thaw culture’s attempt to veer off the course set by Stalinist socialist realism. 
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motion of letting out.  But this is not at all what Stalin and Gor'kii had in mind.  The sincerity 
they preached is a letting-in or, even better, letting-through.  It is more akin to the eighteenth-
century notion of sensibility: one’s capacity to be affected by life in its various manifestations, to 
“resonate” with the meaning-emotion intrinsic to life’s events, to be moved.  In regard to Stalinist 
culture, we may say, in a preliminary way, that it is a matter of one’s capacity to be “moved” 
(driven) by the truth or, which is the same thing, the “tendency,” of “life itself.”  Rather than 
letting out a truth that may be held concealed, it is a matter of being affected by a truth that is 
coming out of concealment.  As we now see, the optimal proximity to reality that Iudin and 
many others required, the proximity of clear artistic vision, is not at all to be measured with the 
yardstick of some expert knowledge or systematic observation, but by degrees of “sincerity.” 
When, in the same speech, Gor'kii complained that “we still poorly see reality” (14), he 
was blaming the predicament precisely on the dearth of such sincerity.  The injunction he 
directed at his audience pivots on a verbal usage on which I would like to elaborate: 
For the success of our common work, we must understand, feel [prochuvstvovat'], 
the fact that organized socialist labor in our country, the labor of half-literate 
workers and the primitive peasantry, has created, in a short period of time, a 
decade, colossal values…150  The right evaluation of this fact would show us the 
cultural-revolutionary force of the teaching that unites the proletariat of the world. 
(13)  
 “Feel,” whose proper Russian equivalent is pochuvstvovat', falls a little short of 
translating prochuvstvovat'.  The latter denotes a different kind of relation to the object of 
sentiment.  Pochuvstvovat' refers us to the moment a feeling is born, when an emotion emerges 
                                                 
150 An almost identical phraseology is to be found in Bukharin’s report to the congress: “We, USSR, are the apex of 
the whole world, the backbone of future humanity.  We need to understand, think through, feel through 
[prochuvstvovat'], this [fact]” (498; emphasis in the original).   
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out of nothingness or ephemerality.  It takes as a direct object this very emotion, whatever its 
name may be (“love,” “resentment,” “sadness,” etc.).  By contrast, prochuvstvovat', used in 
Russian much less frequently, directs us to an object that has nothing ephemeral about it.  On the 
contrary, it is something that predates the exertion of feeling, a solid, pre-existent reality, an 
antecedent fact.   To feel, in the sense of prochuvstvovat', is not so much to experience a 
particular emotion, as to inhabit with emotion this pre-existent reality. 
In the passage just quoted, Gor'kii spells out clearly for those in attendance the reality 
that needs to be infused with feeling: it is the “fact” of socialist construction.  Given that the fact 
is already a fact, we may ask, what is to be gained from this additional operation?  Can it be 
made more real, more present?  Indeed, it can.  When one opens up, “sincerely,” to the fact of 
socialism, a new level is reached.  We already know what the qualitatively new moment is, and 
Gor'kii’s words confirm this knowledge: through sincerity, one begins to see “the force of the 
teaching” on which the entire edifice stands; that is to say, one sees the power of this teaching to 
become reality; one sees that what was meant to be, could not but come to be, and so it is indeed 
coming to be, now and forever, amen! 
The preceding is, of course, none other than the dialectic of seen-ness discussed in 
Chapter Two.  Its two principal instances are: first, socialism as a merely empirical reality, as a 
bare and contingent “it exists”; this pedestrian reality, reality as factuality, is transcended where 
one sees that what appeared to exist just empirically, to merely be, is actually a coming-to-be of 
what has been predestined to occur.  In the second instance we have the actual reality 
(nastoiashchaia deistvitel'nost') of Stalinist socialism, its truth.  Between the two, there is a 
mediatory space—the opening where something needs to be done, an opening in need of 
manning, in order for the truth to emerge.  This is the position “where one sees that indeed…”  
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The manning of this opening produces, along with the sought-after truth, the “ones” of Stalinism, 
its subjects.   
To these moments of the dialectic, rehearsed on earlier occasions, we have now added the 
chief prerequisite for filling the opening, for being a good “one”—a certain openness of being, 
the capacity to prochuvstvovat' the fact of socialism.  To best render what this prerequisite 
means, the verb, I believe, should be in the passive voice.  For, as we saw already, it is the world, 
not the artist, that has the active part.  The former, not the latter, does the showing.   
The Soviet dramatist possesses one small advantage, he is relieved of one 
small worry: he does not need to look for a hero.  There is no need for him to light 
his torch and search in the secret nooks of life for man, the new man—the hero of 
our epoch.  
The epoch came to his rescue.  The secret of life stands revealed, 
grandiloquently clear.  The hero is everywhere. (Pervyi 459; emphasis added) 
The Soviet author does not need to light his torch and illuminate reality because reality is now 
itself the light of revelation: it is beaming.  Shining this light more powerfully than anything else 
are the shiny, happy people, the heroes of socialism.  Some of the writers speaking from the 
congress’ rostrum testified to having been nearly blinded:  
I want to look in the eyes of Soviet poetry’s tomorrow.  I want to look into the 
eyes of truth.  This is very difficult.  This is how great our time is, this is how 
starkly bright and fierce [iarka i iarostna] this truth is.  This truth is what gave 
birth to us. (540; emphasis added) 
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 [We …] proved to be unprepared for a full-bloodied poetic perception of the 
grandiose complexity and blinding simplicity of the reality that has come to be 
[nastupivshei deistvitel'nosti]. (537; emphasis added)  
To be a Soviet writer means to be in possession of such blinding [oslepitel'nyi] 
material, the likes of which was not available to any writer, in any country or 
historical period. (278; emphasis added) 
Because the light is already here, with us, all one needs to do is throw one’s torch away 
and “let the light shine through.”  The imperative of sincerity, translated into the scopic register, 
requires that one open one’s being to a point where it becomes translucent, porous, in relation to 
the light, so that it can “transmit” it without distortion or attenuation (as I pointed out earlier, 
what beams needs a transmitter).  The verb that best describes this unusual operation is a 
synonym of prochuvstvovat', only in the passive: proniknut'sia.  It is one of those instances that 
showcase the charming subtleties of expression possible in Russian.  The root verb, proniknut', 
translates easily and quite accurately as “penetrate.”  But after it comes the reflexive particle, 
which changes everything.  The semantic result is not “penetrating oneself,” or “letting oneself 
be penetrated,” or just “being penetrated.”  It is: through one’s own activity to render oneself 
penetrable, to bring about the permeation of one’s own being by something initially external (an 
emotion, the consciousness of something; respectively, proniknut'sia chuvstvom…, proniknut'sia 
soznaniem o…). 
In this single word, I believe, we have a succinct answer to the question posed earlier: 
how is the Soviet author to achieve the intimate knowledge required for a proper representation 
of socialist reality and its exemplary inhabitants?  The key to such intimacy lies in a particular 
position that the two partners—the author and the raw, unprocessed, reality—must assume.  The 
  
 215
roles are reversed from the relation implied in the very name “author”: his role of actively 
manipulating the “material,” shaping it into a creation onto which he may place the seal of 
master and originator.  We traced the beginnings of this reversal through the artistic theories of 
the 1920s.  We can now witness its completion.  He who by virtue of a cultural anachronism still 
calls himself author must now assume a position vis-à-vis the material such that he opens himself 
to the stealthy thrust of “life-itself”—a surrender in which his being will be possessed to the 
core.  What was seen, in the previous cultural frame, as an immanent organization, principle, 
tectonic, etc., has now acquired the activity of an invasive force, which manifests itself exactly 
where it takes possession of the human subject.  In that it “acts” him, this force proves to be real, 
enjoys presence. 
If one is, indeed, possessed by this force, one sees clearly.  Conversely, the inability to 
see should be attributed to a certain obdurateness of being and, ultimately, to “foreignness.”  The 
distance between these two states of existence was covered in the emotional speech of the young 
writer Aleksandr Avdeenko.  An abandoned child, he had had a difficult early life, riddled with 
violence, crime, and imprisonment.  He was speaking of this past when he admitted: “My life 
was such that I looked at people and did not see them” (243; emphasis added).  He interrupted 
abruptly the story about his past to refer to the moment when the pioneer choir had taken to the 
podium; it was as if his former, low life continued all the way to that memorable entrance and 
was terminated only by it: “We lived by the day, by the hour.  But in that moment when the 
pioneers appeared on the congress’ podium, I felt a tremendous desire to live.  And my thoughts 
ran not by decades, but by centuries. [….]  Then, in front of me, the future flashed, revealed itself 
[blesnulo, raskrylos']” (243; emphasis added).  However, in the lobby, during the intermission, 
as Avdeenko was looking to share his enthusiasm with his colleagues, he was taken aback: “But 
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many of the writers were not shaken by the pioneers’ demonstration.  That was an offensive 
indifference.  Indifference is the most terrifying thing” (243). 
Avdeenko remembered a previous occasion on which he had been offended by the 
indifference of his colleagues.  His mentor, Gor'kii, had told him of a new kind of blade that a 
Soviet scientist had invented: a blade that cannot be blunted, only sharpened.  “He [Gor'kii] drew 
an entire picture of what awaits our economy and our life as a consequence of this invention.  He 
became impassioned.  I do not know whether he had ever been as happy or excited as in that 
moment” (243).  When, afterward, Avdeenko asked other writers about the blade, it turned out 
that no one had heard of it; not only that: they were not even interested in learning about it (243).  
Gor'kii is the antipode of this obtuse nature:  
Aleksei Maksimovich harbors a special hatred toward indifference.  He has 
the ability to feel life [umeet chuvstvovat' zhizn'].  Once he was telling me that in 
our country labor is beginning to turn into art.  He proved it with facts, examples.  
I left Gor'kii’s house shaken by his passionate attitude toward life.  It was 
uncomfortable for me to walk down the street: I thought that people would stop 
me and start asking me questions. 
I felt that I had become smarter, as if I had read a dozen good books.  I wanted 
to speak, live, dream just as wisely and profoundly, as he, Aleksei Maksimovich.  
No other writer has shaken me in such a way, from others I have not heard such 
speeches. 
We lack this voracity toward life.  We are either unwilling or unable to be 
voracious toward life’s manifestations. (243)  
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What reads as a sickeningly syrupy profession of feelings, passing into a plea for 
sensitivity, is, in essence, really about something else.  The ability to be moved by life, which 
Gor'kii exemplifies and which his protégé is happy to evidence as well as to eulogize, is a matter 
of emotion only because it is, first and foremost, a matter of belonging.  Gor'kii sees better and 
farther because he feels deeper; but he feels deeper because he is organically rooted in Soviet 
reality.  He does not even need to do what every other writer is urged to do: proniknut'sia.  As it 
is, his being is already permeated by the tendency characteristic of socialist life.  He is moved 
emotionally by life’s “manifestations” because, in a deeper sense, he is driven by the driving 
force of this very life: driven to see. 
What is it that Gor'kii sees from his privileged position?  According to Avdeenko, 
Aleksei Maksimovich is able to “dream wisely and profoundly.”  He sees, for example, what will 
happen as a result of the new invention; he sees the future in which labor will become a creative 
endeavor.   This “dreamy” futurist vision had a well-known name: revolutionary romanticism.151  
It was only fitting that Gor'kii possessed the capacity for it to the extreme, for he was also its 
foremost exponent.  In his keynote address at the First Congress of Soviet Writers, which, along 
with Zhdanov’s speech, remains a locus classicus for the doctrine of revolutionary romanticism, 
he envisioned an epic style that would be supremely realistic precisely because it is also 
mythical.   Myth, Gor'kii reasoned, is something imagined, invented.  But if the invention 
provides a genuine synthesis and expression of what is actually present, then it is realistic (10).  
Revolutionary romanticism was just this paradoxical coalescence of the mythical and the 
realistic, which begins with available experience and, “following the logic of a hypothesis,” 
arrives at the portrayal of the “desired and the possible” (10).   
                                                 
151 Zhdanov’s oft-quoted pronouncement described revolutionary romanticism as a “combination of the most 
austere, most practical work with the greatest heroics and grandest perspectives” (4).   
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Much maligned in Western and post-Soviet Russian scholarship for having sanctioned 
illusionist “varnishing of reality,” the theory of revolutionary romanticism certainly cannot be 
accused of this one “sin”: that it appealed to the power of the writer’s imagination.  It was, 
primarily, an appeal to belonging.  About it we should say what was already said about socialist 
realism: this was not a certain method or style of “approaching reality,” of manipulating the raw 
data of experience.  After all, as one speaker asserted, “the style of artistic work cannot be 
anything other than the style of life [stil' zhizni]” (382).  To be “romantic,” then, did not mean to 
fantasize about the bright future after diligently reading Lenin and Marx, but to be organically 
one with the Soviet “style” of life—a life that was in itself a sort of a dream machine, inasmuch 
as in it the (foreseen) dreams of historical humanity were being fulfilled.  Since Gor'kii was one 
with this device, he was naturally “moved” by it and, hence, just as naturally, the visions of the 
future appeared before his eyes.  
Those for whom such natural belonging could not be assumed were in danger of 
succumbing to “naturalism”—the lifeless registration of what is merely there.  Along with the 
second deadly sin of Stalinist culture, “formalism,” the naturalistic copying of reality was to be 
viewed as a sure sign of the artist’s severed connection with the fullness of Soviet life.  To the 
lifeless exactitude of the copy was opposed the full-blooded truth of the “invention”: “Our work 
is not a mere imitation, an exact registration, but an invention that emerges from the closest and 
most intense connection to reality, a reality that gives rise to the possibility of being that could 
give dramatic works the character of a prediction, a foretelling, a prospective plan” (Pervyi 460; 
emphasis added).  Decoding playwright Aleksei Faiko’s awkwardly phrased pronouncement, we 
come to realize, first, that to him “invention” does not mean some unencumbered flight of the 
imagination.  The flight is very much restrained in that it aims, optimally, at an objective 
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prognosis—an advance knowledge of what cannot but take place.  Second, we see that the act of 
prognostication does not begin with the subject, the author.  It begins with the “reality” that 
engenders a unique “possibility of being.”   The (socio-historical) being in question possesses the 
unique ability to lay bare and render manifest.  Only to the extent to which the writer is part of 
this being, it imparts to his works the “character of a prediction,” etc., etc.  In that case, in his 
writing, this being would prognosticate. 
Criticizing along similar lines the inability of some writers to provide powerful artistic 
expressions of the world in which they lived, Faiko’s colleague, Vladimir Kirshon, attributed the 
problem to a disorientation characteristic of the present day.  Life was changing swiftly and 
dramatically; what was current yesterday was found to be obsolete today; new phenomena 
sprung up incessantly from the fabric of Soviet reality.  For many writers, the impression was 
overwhelming; “they wander through [life’s] events like blind people” (405).  As a defense 
strategy against the onrush of this rich and powerful life, which strikes them as chaotic, they take 
to the path of naturalism: “photographing the present reality, they want to hide behind the 
photographic depiction their attitude toward this reality” (405).  To these people, who covered up 
their blindness with the exactitude of the copy, Kirshon gave this assurance:  
 What takes place in our country is not chaos, not an accumulation of random 
occurrences, no—this is an expression of the internal laws of historical 
development, which lie at the foundation of events, the laws of scientific 
Marxism, which are embodied in tactics and strategy—our Party’s general plan. 
 As it is being implemented, this plan itself becomes a historical factor.  On 
the basis of the Party line in the execution of this extraordinary historical plan, 
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there take place not just foreseen processes of the socialist transformation of life, 
but also ones that have been elicited and organized by our Party. 
 In our country there are no events that occur by accident.  There is diversity 
in the unity of a single line. 
The task of the writer is, first and foremost, to feel this line organically. (405; 
emphasis added) 
This is an opportune moment to recall the words of Trotsky quoted earlier in this study, 
which, similarly, sought to dispel the seeming chaos of historical happening with an assurance 
that pointed confidently to the “iron formulas” of “revolutionary algebra.”152  At first glance, the 
two statements seem to be articulating the same meaning.  In fact, the difference between what 
they say is radical, paradigmatic, marking the distinction between two different cultures.  
Trotsky’s statement says, essentially, “I am through what I know”: the method of historical 
materialism gives us knowledge of the intractable laws of historical development, turning the 
apparent chaos into an ordered picture; as a revolutionary, I am guided by this picture, etc.  
Stalinist culture speaks differently, as a matter of fact, in reverse: “I know through what I am.”  
Such is the logic underlying the quoted passage: if you were to be truly Soviet, you would feel 
organically the immanent tendency of our life, and, hence, be able to behold the picture of 
perfect order and unswerving direction through the apparent chaos of events and phenomena.   
But this means that the theatrical stage, the page, and the canvass have to somehow 
become isotopic with the podium in the Hall of Columns, which, for its part, is isotopic with the 
stage on which life does its own showing.  Expressed differently, the motion of painting or 
writing must become absolutely unassertive, ephemeral, so that it can easily be “moved” by the 
grand gesture of self-revelatory life.  Is not this the implication we should read in statements like 
                                                 
152 See p. 220. 
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this one, made by Gronskii a couple of months before the Congress: “The direction of historical 
development, the outcome of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, is now 
drawing itself out [vyrisovyvaetsia] sufficiently clearly before the artist” (212; emphasis added)?  
The “drawing” mentioned here is not an artistic activity proper.  It is, rather, the drawing of that 
absolutely straightforward and determinate line of which Kirshon speaks, the line that lets no 
event fall out of line with necessity and inevitability.  It takes place on a surface that we, usually, 
do not consider contiguous with the surface on which the artist draws.  And yet, the peculiarity 
of socialist realism, as a cultural practice, consists precisely in the attempt to splice these two 
surfaces together, as if they were one.  The first kind of drawing, the drawing that depicts, is 
made a function of the second—the drawing that gives direct embodiment, manifests, and 
fulfills.  Any line of depiction must issue forth from that other line, which the author is advised 
to feel organically.   
This is the extent to which, with socialist realism, we find ourselves beyond the 
traditional understanding of representation.  This is also the extent to which we find ourselves 
outside the notion of authorship.  We now see that to be a Soviet author—changing only slightly 
Stalin’s previously quoted definition—means to have depicted truthfully; but this means to have 
seen, which—and here the contradiction is already apparent—means to have been penetrated and 
possessed by the force of socialism, and thus, to have been made to see. 
This force counts as real or, as I previously phrased it, enjoys erection, to the extent to 
which “one,” in our case, the Soviet writer, proves amenable to it.  Both words, “prove” and 
“amenable,” require additional elaboration.  The former is meant to resonate with the peculiar 
logic of proof operative at the Moscow show trials.  As noted, the court sought not so much to 
prove the guilt of the accused, as to demonstrate the workings of a “tendency” (in fact, the 
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former proof was subsumed by the latter).  Ideally, the accused would have been able to show 
themselves, in their words and behavior, as being irresistibly driven by this inexorable tendency.  
Similarly, at the Writer’s Congress, the writers had to show that they were, indeed, those who 
they were supposed to be—beings irresistibly driven to clarity by a force that possessed them to 
the core, but which was, nevertheless, distinct from them.   
In the concrete setting of the Hall of Columns, this force was acting concretely as the 
force of exhibition.  On the podium, right before the writers, it was demonstrating in concrete 
human forms that socialism had, indeed, become reality, since it was, indeed, producing a new 
breed of man, a new attitude toward labor, new forms of ethics, etc.  And so, in this performance, 
everything happened just as Gronskii’s words had described it: “drawing itself out sufficiently 
clearly before the artist” was the “direction of historical development.”  In saying that writers 
had to prove “amenable” to this force of exhibition, I mean, quite literally: to be able to adopt a 
disposition of elated resignation analogous to an “Amen!”  Since it was the force, and not the 
artist, who did the essential showing, for the latter there was little left to do than show that his 
being is not opaque to the show that showed.  Verbalized, his attitude had to be something like 
this: “Yes, now I see!  Indeed, it has come to pass before me!  And so, I let it be just as it was 
meant to be; I let it draw itself out and present itself just as it has been drawn in heaven.  
Amen!”153 
This disposition was captured effectively in Pasternak’s words that serve as an epigraph 
to this study: “Proletarian dictatorship is not enough to influence culture.  For this, a true figural 
hegemony [plasticheskoe gospodstvo] is needed: a hegemony that would speak through me 
without my knowing it and even against my will.  I do not feel this” (qtd. Pervyi 175).  There is 
                                                 
153 Our heaven refers, of course, to the celestial heights in which the objectivity of the Marxist-Leninist “scientific” 
analysis is re-inscribed as the effective force of destiny that rules Soviet society.  
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no doubt that the hegemony to which Pasternak wished to be subjected is homologous with the 
force of socialism as a force of concrete and true showing.  And his desire for a “ventriloquized” 
expression, unconscious and unwilled, gives us a variation on the desire to be unconditionally 
driven to see.  We are also reminded of the psalmic refrain, “Into your hands […] I commend my 
spirit,” in which redemption also blends seamlessly with surrender.  The “Amen!” implied in 
both utterances could be imagined as a certain letting-go whereby one’s ontological density 
decreases, a self-induced ephemeralization of one’s being, so it can be “moved” more easily by 
the force of truth (“For You shall redeem me, Lord of truth”). 
Pasternak made the pronouncement in 1925, during the NEP period, but he was reminded 
of it during the congress by one of the speakers, A. Lezhnev.  The main theme of Lezhnev’s 
speech was the theme discussed in Chapter Two: the radical conversion of the old intelligentsia 
in the years of Stalin’s cultural revolution.  The transformation, he argued, consisted not in the 
writers’ mere acceptance of the new social order, but, much more substantially, in their changed 
worldview (177).  The latter he attributed precisely to the realization of Pasternak’s “real figural 
hegemony” (176).  When it came time for him to speak, Pasternak, in his own words, supported 
Lezhnev’s conviction.  The power for which he had been waiting in vain in 1925, the one that 
bypasses the consciousness and will of the author on its way to an artistic articulation, was 
finally making itself felt; its effects were palpable even within the official enclosures of the Hall 
of Columns.  One of these effects was the birth of a new poetic language:  
For twelve days we were have been united by the dizzying bliss of the fact that 
this high poetic language was being born on its own in our conversation with our 
present day, with the present day of people who had cut off the anchor of private 
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property and were freely soaring, floating, whirling, in the space of the 
biographically conceivable. [….] 
The poetic language of which I reminded you sounded the loudest in the 
speeches of the people with the most decisive vote: the delegates without 
membership cards, the members of the delegations that had come to visit us.  In 
all these cases, the poetic language reached such power, that it forced apart the 
bounds of reality and transported us to that realm of the possible, which in the 
socialist world is also the realm of the necessary. (549) 
This realm is, of course, the provenance of the aforementioned revolutionary romanticism.  We 
need to emphasize here again the way in which it is reached: by a “transport” that, unlike in 
Romanticism proper, does not begin with an interior ecstasy, before extending into a poetic 
presentation of an external world.  This one begins with the self-presentation of an objectively 
existing world, which through the pure power of this suddenly manifest presence takes 
possession of the poet and transports him into an eye-opening vision of the “possible, […] which 
is also […] the necessary.” 
Pasternak went on to sketch briefly but passionately a new understanding of poetry and 
poetic practice: 
What is poetry, comrades, if such is its birth before our eyes?  Poetry is prose: 
prose not in the sense of someone’s collected prose works, but prose itself, the 
voice of prose, prose in action, not in paraphrase.  Poetry is the language of the 
organic fact, i.e., the fact that has living consequences. [….]  Poetry is nothing but 
this: pure prose in its transferable intensity [v perevodnoi napriazhennosti]. (549) 
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Modifying Pasternak’s vision with the analytical insights gained so far, we reach the following 
ideal picture of how socialist-realist writing should proceed: socialist reality shows or expresses 
itself in “organic facts”; as long as the writer is “ours,” i.e., as long as he is made from the same 
substance as the rest of Soviet reality, he is subjected to/penetrated by the “transferable intensity” 
of that reality; through him, bypassing his consciousness and his will, the organic fact reaches 
the page and speaks; only what is spoken in this wise counts as an authentic artistic expression 
and, thus, as genuinely “true.” 
Inspired by the organic facts that were being demonstrated before the congress, Viktor 
Gusev wrote verses that could serve as poetic illustration to the mechanism just described154:  
Interrupting our speeches, 
Blinding us with the shine of unimaginable deeds, 
They were offering to us their victories, 
Bread, airplanes, metal— 
   themselves. 
They were presenting themselves as a theme, 
Their work, love, life… 
And each of them 
   sounded like a poem, 
Because in each of them  
   Bolshevism thundered. (675; emphasis added) 
We can now say explicitly what has been obvious throughout: that the “shine” of the 
shiny, happy people belongs to the kind of radiation I designated earlier as “beaming”—the one 
through which there is “vision” (in the impersonal).  And the mechanism by which (ideally) 
                                                 
154 Gusev’s improvised poem was read by Gor'kii during his closing speech. 
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socialist-realist texts will be produced follows the dialectic of seen-ness, which was rehearsed by 
analogy with the exhibitionistic scene.  The analogy can now be extended, so that it comes full 
circle: the moment in which the penis is reflected in the “eyes wide open,” the moment enabling 
its erection, is analogous to the moment in which the “prose” of reality turns into poetry.  It 
seems that this is a “natural,” immanent process, which does not need the presence of the writer.  
It seems that the words that “sound like a poem” do so out of themselves and by themselves, and 
that the writers sitting in the audience are nothing but audience.  What good could they possibly 
do when faced with a life that spontaneously turns into poetry?155  
However, even a life that spontaneously turns into poetry still needs an external “turning 
point.”  In the exhibitionistic act, this external point of reflection is the passer-by.  In the cultural 
act of socialist realism, this external point of reflection is the artist.  Expressed more accurately, 
in the proper order of realization: he shall be a Soviet artist who comes to the point in front of 
which the organic fact of life shall bare itself.  In other words, first comes the open “stead,” 
where the laying-bare awaits its satisfaction, and only then—the “one” who comes and actually 
stands there.  The “one” is what comes out (figures out) of manning that opening. 
At the congress, this topological arrangement was realized as follows: there was, on one 
side, the procession of triumphant and radiant life; across from it, corresponding generally to the 
place from which the audience was watching this show, was the place where the Soviet writer 
was supposed to appear and stand as just such a “one.”  This moment would come—speaking 
here conceptually and figuratively, rather than referentially and literally—when someone stood 
up and, from that spot, said something along the lines of “Yes, now I see, indeed.”  As we saw, 
Avdeenko made this proclamation almost literally.  This was also the essence of Pasternak’s 
                                                 
155 This impression was captured in Vladimir Ermilov’s frequently quoted equation, “The beautiful is our life” 
(“Prekrasone—eto nasha zhizn'”). 
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speech and the overarching thesis of Lezhnev’s, as the latter chronicled the short biography of 
the Soviet writer.  This is also what we should read in the following words of Babel: “The first 
scaffolding is being removed from the edifice of socialism.  Even the most shortsighted can now 
see the outlines of this edifice, its beauty.  And we are all witnesses of the fact that our entire 
country has been enraptured by a powerful feeling of sheer physical happiness” (279; emphasis 
added).  But nowhere was this onset of vision expressed more engagingly than in Iurii Olesha’s 
highly crafted oratory, which, in the general agreement of those present, provided the dramatic 
and rhetorical climax of the Congress’ proceedings. 
Olesha narrated the story of his personal transformation, which sounded more like a story 
of religious conversion, cast in terms of blindness and sight.  It began with the publication, in 
1927, of his novella Envy [Zavist'], which the proletarian wing had met with harsh criticism, 
mostly on account of the main hero, Nikolai Kavalerov.  An unmistakable descendant of 
Dostoevsky’s underground man, Kavalerov exemplified the bystander of the revolution, resentful 
of the ethical vigor, psychological integrity, and bristling vivacity of the new social world.  In 
him, the proletarian critics saw a reactionary creation, a reflection of Olesha’s own personality; 
Kavalerov looked at the world with the eyes of his creator (or rather, as we shall see shortly, his 
creator looked at the world with the eyes of his hero).  Fully conscious of the autobiographical 
connection, Olesha was that much more hurt to hear his hero being called “a lowlife and a 
nonentity” (235).   To his mind, Envy was where his artistic vision had been at its clearest and 
richest; but lo, what he considered to be clarity and richness had turned out to be blindness and 
misery.  At this point, the story acquires the distinct tone of a parable.  In the parable, Olesha 
imagines himself as a beggar: “There I am, superfluous, vulgar, and insignificant. [….]  I am 
standing on the steps in a pharmacy, I beg for handouts, and my name is ‘writer’” (235).  The 
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beggar-writer roams the countryside for years, until one day he finds himself in an open field on 
a bright, crisp morning.  At the edge of the field, near a forest, stands an old, crumbling wall.  In 
it, there is an opening, an arched doorway:  “I look through it and see unusual greenery…  
Maybe goats walk here.  I step over the threshold and enter; then I look at myself and see that 
this is youth: youth has returned” (235).   
What is the meaning of this miracle?  Whence youth, all of a sudden?  And what is this 
magic threshold that the beggar crosses?  The speaker himself provided keys to understanding 
the allegory.  Hearkening to the words of his critics, Olesha had “taken it personally”; he had 
thought that the distorted vision is his, that it was somehow innate in his being.  Hence, the self-
image of a worthless lowlife, which tormented him for years.  The miraculous transformation 
corresponds to the moment the writer finally understood that the problem is not in him: “I 
understood that it is not about me, but about the world around me” (235).  Everything changes 
when he realizes that he is not the one who generates the image of the world; he is just the site of 
seeing.  Representations, images, come from the “world around” and enter him.  Kavalerov had 
been one such image, a visitor from a former, “distorted” world, who had taken possession of his 
author’s self.  But a new world is already in the making: “All this time the country was getting 
younger.  There are already youths of seventeen in whose minds there is nothing of the old 
world” (236).  All the writer has to do is proniknut'sia—he must open himself up to these beings 
and the being that has given birth to them:   
I was peeking through the magic arc, but could not understand the most important 
thing: I could not understand that I believe in the youth of the country, that it is 
not my youth I want to bring back, but to see the youth of the country, i.e., of the 
new people.  Now I see them. [….]  This is how the miracle happened of which I 
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had dreamt while looking through the magic arc.  This is how youth came back to 
me.  (236; emphasis added) 
The magic arc of Olesha’s allegory, then, is not unlike the line that separates the audience from 
the podium in the Hall of Columns.  It is the imaginary membrane of the world through which 
one passes in order to cease “representing” and begin the movement of showing wherein it is he 
who is being shown the way.  On this side of the arc, the writer sees from within himself, 
“subjectively.”  On the other side, he sees, so to speak, “from without,” he sees because he 
partakes of seen-ness—the general stuff from which the cultural world of Stalinistm is made, 
through which it beams.   The symbolic moment of going through the doorway is none other than 
the moment of this partaking: the writer takes the part allotted to him in the production of clarity, 
which, in a broader sense, is the cultural production called “socialist realism.”    
  
Because this is how the act of socialist realism unfolds, we cannot fail to notice that manning is 
prior to “man” (in our case, the Soviet man).  Stalinist culture makes this explicit, lays it bare for 
us, when it stipulates, in a paradoxical fashion: “If you were one of us, truly Soviet, then you 
would see that indeed…”  In this stipulation, voiced not by this or that particular person or 
institution, but, implicitly, by Stalinism as a whole, we find a particular instantiation of the call 
that calls to truth, while also calling to identity: what I designated as mattering.  And yet, it is a 
highly peculiar instantiation, which puts the proverbial cart in front of the horse.  At least since 
Descartes’ “Cogito ergo sum,” we are used to the concatenation in which doing precedes being.  
It is customary for us to think that it is through doing that we determine our being.  And when 
Marx proclaimed that being determines consciousness, he did not in the least seek to invert this 
concatenation, but, rather, to transpose it onto a different plane from the one instituted by 
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Descartes and broadened by German idealism.  Marx gave priority to one kind of doing (material 
activity) over another (thinking), but foundational to his endeavor was still the idea that man 
makes and remakes his image, even if this creative power has existed, for most of man’s history, 
in the unrecognizable, alienated form of external objectivity. 
In the cultural world that saw itself as the living fulfillment of Marx’s anticipations, it 
became possible to invert the order and place being before doing.  Here doings are 
manifestations of axiomatic “tendencies.”  Deeds are where being eventually registers, rather 
than where it is first shaped.  Real-life actions are credited with no more than the ability to “act 
out” what is contained, originally and exhaustively, in the definition of being.  Because it is not 
first defined by actual doing, being appears as an empty slot, a role that awaits an actor who will 
man it, so that it can play itself out.  Consider the following passage from an article in the journal 
Bolshevik: “Shock workers unmask attempts by pseudo-shock workers [lzheudarniki] to over-
fulfill the norm at the expense of quality” (Rubinshtein 62).  For a moment, we might think that 
the sentence refers to the witnessed actions of real people.  The illusion is dispelled by 
subsequent passages like this one: “The kolkhoz farmer, having become a shock-worker, cannot 
be indifferent toward the problems in his brigade, in the kolkhoz as a whole.  Shock work, by its 
very essence, eliminates this indifference inherited from the [period of] fragmented private 
farming” (63; emphasis added).  Here we have the (ideal) character of the shock worker, as 
presupposed by the essence of socialist labor, and not a description of some actually existing 
state of affairs.  The present tense in which “shock workers unmask attempts” is a uniquely 
Soviet temporality wherein the empty slot of being acts and enjoys presence independently of 
any living bodies that may serve to fill it.  It is the temporality proper to the existence mandated 
by the implacable cannot-but.  
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An identical kind of existence is mandated to the Soviet writer. Like the shock worker 
who cannot but care for socialist property, the writer, because he is Soviet, cannot but see.156  For 
those who come to stand in this open stead, the task of writing takes on a characteristic, 
tantalizing duality.  As it portrays, writing must demonstrate.  The legibility of the word and the 
created world must be, at the same time, the legibility of proof.  For in the completed text it will 
be read whether the person writing is truly one of us.  And so, with its proper motion of showing 
a world, of giving a picture, representation must strive to fill out the picture into which it has 
been inserted beforehand, by which it has been axiomatically presupposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
156 In the same journal, several issues later, we find the following passage, whose resonance with the just-quoted 
characterization of shock workers is difficult to miss: “Our Soviet writer, describing conscientiously, artistically 
truthfully, the real relations between classes and people in the USSR, cannot possibly come into contradiction with 
his own sympathies, provided he is not a conscious or unconscious agent of the remnants of liquidated capitalist 
elements” (Kantor 90-91; emphasis added).  The idea that one can be an unconscious agent of capitalism should not 
sound too paradoxical; such possibility was accounted for in the definition of the objective enemy discussed earlier.  
From here, by conceptual symmetry, there arises the intriguing possibility that one could also be an unconscious 
devotee of socialism. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: LIFE HAPPENS 
 
 
 
 
“The steps of a good man are ordered by God, and 
he delighteth in his way.” 
Psalms 37: 23 
 
In the previous chapter, I presented the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers as a 
complex performance in which it is shown that the agents of representation, that is, these very 
Soviet writers, are not really agents, but rather pieces in a larger show, wherein they are “moved” 
by the force of self-revelatory immanence.  And yet, I take it as understood that the case of the 
author is an instance in the broader problematic of subjecthood; and that the motion of being 
moved to vision is an instance of a more general movement that reaches beyond the sphere of 
artistic work.  On the following pages, I would like to extend the argument, no matter how 
tentatively, into this broader thematic.   
I will advance my thesis by analyzing one of the most remarkable epic narratives of 
Stalinism: the film The Vow [Kliatva] of 1946, directed by Mikhail Chiaureli (1894-1974), who 
collaborated on the script with writer Petr Pavlenko (1899-1951). I contend that the film shows, 
from the movie screen, the same thing the Congress showed: that agency does not issue forth 
originally from the action of subjects, but only “registers” in them.  Yet the stage on which The 
Vow makes this apparent is the grand stage of Soviet history.  And the cultural act, which 
appeared so far in the limited perspective of writing, is given in Chiaureli and Pavlenko’s story 
in the generalized form of any human “doing.”  If the Writers’ Congress stages the “making of 
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the Soviet writer,” The Vow stages the making of the Soviet subject in a cinematic fantasy whose 
generic territory encompasses both the modern historical epic and the fairy tale.  Stalin’s central 
and functionally unique role in the plot will provide me with an opportunity to address in a 
sketchy, but I hope suggestive, theorization the phenomenon known under the misnomer “cult of 
personality.”  
The Vow is one of four films by Chiaureli chronicling the life and heroic deeds of the 
Leader.  The other three in the series are: The Great Dawn [Velikoe Zarevo; 1938], The Fall of 
Berlin [Padenie Berlina; 1949], and The Unforgettable 1919 [Nezabyvaemyi 1919; 1951].  They 
all can be classified under the peculiarly Soviet genre category of the “historico-revolutionary 
film” (istoriko-revoliutsionnyi fil'm), in its typically Stalinist variation characterized by the all-
decisive participation of the political and military leadership of the country in the epic events 
unfolding on the screen.  The four films also share a main narrative device: the biographic 
journey of an ordinary hero adjoins and then follows Stalin’s path for a certain stretch of 
climactic historical time.157  But it is in The Vow and, to some extent, in The Fall of Berlin—the 
two scripts written by the team of Chiaureli and Pavlenko158—that this device is radicalized, 
attaining a new structural quality and introducing a new level of meaning.   This new structural 
quality and level of meaning will be the focus of my analysis. 
The Vow opens on a stormy winter day in early January, 1924.  It is just days before 
Lenin’s death (21 January, 1924).  At the beginning of the story, however, we are far from 
Moscow and from the grand stage of political history.  We are on the banks of the Volga, in the 
                                                 
157 The Great Dawn is set on the eve of the October Revolution, during the last days of Russia’s participation in 
World War I.  Next in the chronological sequence is The Unforgettable 1919, which follows Stalin trough the years 
of the Civil War, focusing particularly on his leadership during the defense of Petrograd.  Broadest in its historical 
scope, The Vow covers the years from 1924 to 1945.  The Fall of Berlin mythologizes the Leader’s role in the Great 
Patriotic War of 1941-1945. 
 
158 Chiaureli’s screenwriting partner for The Great Dawn was Georgii Tsagareli, while on The Unforgettable 1919 
he collaborated with Vsevolod Vyshinskii (on whose original play the script was based) and Aleksandr Filimonov. 
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little provincial town of Tsaritsyn, and in the company of “little,” common people.  Stepan, an 
old Bolshevik, is returning home from a trip to the countryside, where he has been investigating 
the crimes committed by kulaks sabotaging the organization of kolkhoz collectives.  As he is 
walking through the snowy fields outside Tsaritsyn with his daughter, Ol'ga, Stepan tells her that 
it was on this very field that in 1919 he and Comrade Stalin fought against the Whites.  His 
reminiscences are interrupted by an ambush: the kulak “elements” Stepan has been prosecuting 
have come to take their revenge.  He falls on the very field where in 1919 he and Comrade 
Stalin…  It is a desolate spot, covered with snow and swept by stormy winds.  It is a blank spot, 
seemingly. 
Back in town, Stepan’s family home is the scene of a heated debate on the current 
political situation in the country.  His younger son, Sergei, a student and devout follower of 
Lenin and Stalin, is arguing with his friend, Anatolii, whose stereotypically Jewish features 
betray his alien nature even before he begins praising Trotsky and Bukharin; moderating the 
shouting match that soon ensues is the older son, Aleksandr, an unemployed and politically 
uncommitted engineer, who devotes his ample free time to drawing blueprints of buildings that 
will never be built.  At this point, having just witnessed Stepan’s tragic end, we could be tempted 
to anticipate a typical unfolding of the subsequent story, with the younger, more “conscious” 
son, taking over the main role in the film by also taking over the symbolic place vacated by his 
father.  If such is the case, our anticipations would prove wrong.  One of the biggest surprises the 
film has in store for us concerns precisely the category of “hero” and the qualifications it 
presupposes.  As we will learn in the further unfolding of the story, being conscious is not among 
these qualifications. 
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While Sergei’s role in the film will be hardly more than episodic, the spotlight of a main 
character will fall on his mother, Varvara.  At the moment we meet her, she is a no-one: a simple 
housewife, completely absorbed in the prose of her quotidian life, completely oblivious to any 
concern that goes beyond this parochial realm.  While the young men are arguing about politics, 
their mother is—where else?—in the kitchen, fretting about the return of her husband and paying 
not the least attention to the discussion.  From the next scene, however, her status will change 
suddenly.  Ol'ga rushes in and delivers the tragic news.  The family rushes out to find Stepan 
expiring on the sledge that has brought him home for the last time.  In a last dying effort, he 
hands Varvara a letter and instructs her to deliver it personally to Lenin.  Chiaureli does not tell 
us what is in the letter, not yet.  At the moment, this is a white sheet of paper, a blank spot. 
We will find out what is in the letter only when, having reached Gorki—Lenin’s 
residence during the last stage of his illness—Varvara finds herself amidst a group of modern-
day pilgrims, representatives of various Soviet nationalities, who, like herself, have come to visit 
Lenin and report to him their grievances.159  As she reads to them Stepan’s letter, we discover 
that it is a description of the various kulak crimes of which Stepan has been informed during his 
last trip.  At the same time, we begin to discover something different, something unexpected and 
quite miraculous: as Varvara reads, the people who have gathered around her start to recognize, 
in her words, the stories each of them has come to tell.  The events described in the letter she 
carries are identical with the events the pilgrims carry indelibly in their minds.  This is the first of 
several instances in the film when miracles spring from (seemingly) blank spots. 
The pilgrims soon learn the sad news: Lenin is dead.  As they make their way to 
Moscow, we are offered a glimpse behind the scenes of the Soviet political theater.  While 
                                                 
159 Apart from the association with pilgrimage, the episode is modeled, quite consciously, I believe, on the 
traditional image of the Russian peasant appearing before the Tsar Himself as a last resort in the pursuit of social 
justice.  
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Kamenev and Bukharin are scheming, Stalin is taking a pensive stroll through the park in Gorki.  
In a moment of unbearable sublimity and inimitable statuesque sentimentality, he comes to a 
lonely park bench, the mere sight of which brings back to his mind the haloed image of Lenin.  
This—as every Soviet viewer is supposed to know—is the same bench on which Lenin and 
Stalin are shown seated in a famous photograph of 1922.160  We now see it covered with a thick 
cover of white snow.  It is another desolate place, a blank spot. 
Several scenes later, this private sublimity has its public, and no less sublime, outpouring: 
on Red Square Stalin pronounces the Vow.  He swears to fulfill Lenin’s symbolic will.  The 
multitude gathered in the square instantly recognizes the man speaking in the distance (without a 
megaphone), just as they instinctively sense the sacred charge of the moment.  Thousands of 
hands holding Party membership cards go up and thousands of voices second Stalin’s each time 
he pronounces solemnly “We swear!”  As if the sacramental public spectacle were not enough to 
convince us that Stalin has the mandate of the people as Lenin’s true heir, the scene is capped off 
by a final, blatantly tautological gesture: the enormous crowd parts, giving way to Varvara, who 
approaches Stalin and hands him the letter from her husband.  Intended for Lenin, it reaches, 
quite “naturally,” his rightful successor.  By the time it does, it has ceased being the letter of a 
single person, from a single place: miraculously collected on this white piece of paper are now 
the voices of all Soviet people and places. 
Participants in the public ritual, along with all the rest, have been our pilgrims: Varvara 
(who has made it an explicit point to swear on behalf of her entire family, as if knowing in 
advance the beneficial effects this will produce in the future), the Ukrainian Baklan, the 
                                                 
160 This massively reproduced photograph remains the only visual evidence hinting at any kind of close personal 
relationship between Lenin and Stalin.  Needless to say, it was heavily exploited for purposes of propaganda 
throughout the Stalinist period. 
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Georgian Georgii, and the Uzbek Turgunbaev.  This miniature model of Soviet society161 is 
bound together—as the authoritative voice of Pravda remarked soon after the film’s release 
(“Kliatva” 3)—by the binding power of the vow.  By the same power they are elevated in status: 
in the short course of a few years, which the film traverses almost instantaneously, we see them 
promoted to the ranks of znatnye liudi, the aristocracy of Stalinist socialism—those very beings I 
called earlier “shiny, happy people.”  Of course, by these credentials, they also figure as the main 
characters in the film narrative. 
There is no motivating transition between these two states of existence.  Varvara and her 
children, Baklan, Georgii, and Turgunbaev, each move from zero to hero without really 
accomplishing anything special.  The transformation is really not their doing.  As a matter of 
fact, the doing comes after.  First comes being, in this case, being there.  Our heroes’ “elevation” 
happens not through their knowledge, abilities, even less accomplishments: it happens through 
the mere fact that they all have been there, on Red Square, at the time of Stalin’s vow.   
That this is indeed the case is shown to us in a small episode inserted within the larger 
scene of the vow.  The camera enters into the crowd to find Turgunbaev, who is visibly 
disconcerted.  While all the hands around him go up, his stays down.  To the puzzled Baklan he 
explains: “I don’t know what it is.  I feel strength, and then it’s gone…”  He, an illiterate peasant 
without a Party card, feels unworthy of the great scene at which he is present.  To this his 
companion responds by drawing a striking verbal image: “Take the vow!  Let us all take it: you, 
and I, and everybody else.  You have nowhere to fall” (“Tebe i upast' nekuda”).   
Turgunbaev knows what makes him weak, but he does not know what makes him strong.  
The latter “something” is some mysterious, invigorating force that supports and uplifts him, so 
                                                 
161 Chiaureli and Pavlenko will redeploy the formula in The Fall of Berlin, where we meet a multinational family of 
Red-Army soldiers fronted by the Russian, Ivan.     
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that there is nowhere for him to fall; it is strangely reminiscent of those angelic hands that would 
not allow the Son to fall and dash His foot against a stone (Luke 4.11).  Just as miraculously, the 
illiterate Turgunbaev will be uplifted to a place of distinction in Soviet society.  But for this to 
happen, he must first raise his hand.  This he must do not out of his convictions and knowledge, 
i.e., not out of his consciousness.  All his consciousness can tell him at this moment is that he is 
an insignificant, illiterate peasant, with little or no awareness of even the basic tenets of 
Marxism-Leninism.  But, as we ascertained already, first with the example of the Institute 
employees, then with the example of writers, this fact matters very little in Stalinist culture.  
Consciousness is subsequent.  It belongs to the dimension of the effect.  First comes the gesture 
of partaking, or belonging.  And so, Turgunbaev raises his hand, and pronounces, together with 
the rest, “We swear.”  The gesture can be called “somnambulic” because it is not guided by prior 
knowledge and will.  Quite in reverse: knowledge and will first spring from it.  Only after—and 
as a direct result of—his taking the vow, will Turgunbaev become a conscious builder of 
socialism.  All takes place in the paradoxical sequence specified in Pascal’s prescription: “Kneel 
down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe.”162 
We see how belief is born out of somnambulic motions in the extended episode showing 
the construction of the Stalingrad tractor plant—itself part of the epic saga of Stalin’s Five-Year 
Plans.  Initially, the central figure here is Varvara’s older son, Aleksandr.  And, let it be said in 
advance, his centrality is in proportion to his un-consciousness.  The grandiose project furnishes 
him with a long-awaited opportunity to transfer his engineering visions from the walls of his 
room, where they have been hanging as mere drawings on paper, to the world outside.  But at 
first, like Turgunbaev, Aleksandr is of little faith.   When he hears of the plans to build the 
                                                 
162 See p. 182.  In The Sublime Object of Ideology (36-40) Slavoj Žižek has revisited this paradoxical topos of faith 
and used it as a support for a persuasive rethinking of ideology in the direction first indicated by Althusser.  
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enormous plant on the bank of the Volga, he explodes: “Where?!  On these marshes?!”  The film 
cuts promptly to a shot of Stalin standing on the very same bank, pointing to these very same 
marshes, and confidently instructing the architects and engineers surrounding him that 
construction should indeed commence on this spot.  One of the group, Aleksandr listens carefully 
to the Leader’s words but continues not to understand: “Still, why on this spot?!”   
The enigma so impenetrable for the cerebral engineer is solved quickly in the simple 
words of a simple man.  Varvara’s brother, Ermilov, the figure of comic relief in the film, spells 
out what every more or less attentive viewer has realized already: that this empty spot, seemingly 
unfit for any constructive erection, is the same spot where Stalin defeated the Whites in 1919; 
moreover, it is a place marked with the historical presence of Ivan IV, Stepan Razin, and 
Emelian Pugachev; in short, it is a sacred place.    
We see Aleksandr next when construction is already under way.  He does not appear to 
have been fully possessed by faith, not yet.  But, by now, this has ceased to matter.  What is 
important is that he is there, he is standing in that spot.  His motto now is: “We must work, not 
wonder!” (“Rabotat' nado, a ne udivliat'sia!”).  The meaning can be translated, or extended, as 
“We must work, instead of analyzing.”  The only one who still analyzes is Anatolii.  Rational 
analysis is the meta-position, which here means: the position of those who do not belong.  
Because they do not belong, they can never believe. And so, even as he half-heartedly 
participates in the construction work, Anatolii continues to mumble that the project is nothing 
but a crazy fantasy, and that the Party leadership has lost touch with reality (when the plant is 
nearly completed, we will see him setting fire to one of the facilities; driven by his alien nature, 
he has found himself, quite naturally, in the ranks of the “wreckers”). 
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If we agree that human labor consists of more than the menial operations performed, that 
it is not, in other words, only physical, but always also symbolic, permeated with meaning 
(whether or not consciously accessible to those who labor), let us ask about the labor through 
which the Stalingrad tractor plant is erected in the film.  What does this kind of work involve?  
Beyond the film plot, the question aims, of course, at the general plot through which the cultural 
act of Stalinism unfolds, giving rise to the erection called “socialism.”  Taking Aleksandr as our 
model (but remembering also the episode with Turgunbaev), we should describe this work as 
follows: to happen to be in the right spot and, when there, to let go; to labor in such a way that 
the effort produces material results just as it induces a self-forgetfulness of sorts, an abandon.  In 
this effort, one abandons, first of all, the possibility of grasping things in advance, as well as the 
possibility that one’s actions should be guided by such a preliminary grasp.  Having let go, one 
can now be “moved,” driven by the power that dormantly subtends the empty spot, which is also 
the right spot.  Through its agency, the seemingly fantastic project is fulfilled and the erection 
happens. 
Through the same power, human life also “happens.”  If the film shows one thing clearly, 
and absolutely consciously, it is this: that one cannot author one’s own deeds and, consequently, 
one’s being.  They happen to him, and may even surprise him at times (and there is nothing 
surprising about this: after all, socialism is supposed to bring out what is best in being human, 
meaning—previously untapped, slumbering potentials; thus, there appears the possibility that 
each Soviet person could be caught unawares by the deeds socialism elicits from the depths of 
this person’s own humanity).  Like Varvara, like Turgunbaev, really, like all other “heroes” in 
the film, Aleksandr begins as no-one and becomes “someone” through achievements that are not 
really his.  Since this is the same mechanism we observed in previous chapters, we can reiterate 
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the earlier formula: in his stead the heroic work of socialist construction is being done.  The stark 
appeal of Pavlenko and Chiaureli’s cinematic narrative comes from the fact that in it we see “in 
plain view” what I previously elaborated only as an abstract, theoretical, proposition: we see the 
“stead,” the place where one is supposed to be standing, being demonstratively empty, separate 
from, and antecedent to anyone who may actually come to stand there.  In this particular episode, 
it is a construction site.  More broadly, it is the entire area of Stalingrad, the former Tsaritsyn.  
Most broadly, it is the place where socialism is being built: the land of the Soviets. 
After the tractor plant is completed (and survives the demonic schemes of the saboteurs), 
we leave Stalingrad for a while, with the complete confidence, instilled in us by now, that we 
shall be given the opportunity to revisit.  For the film has already established the pattern of 
“eternal return” to this spot.  And surely enough—World War II begins, both in order to fulfill 
Stalin’s prediction of a day when the Soviet Union would have to be defended against enemy 
attack and in order for us to witness for one last, and climactic, time the power of the sacred 
place.  We return to Stalingrad, and see it once more as a desolate spot: this time because the 
months of incessant fighting have turned it into a ghost town.  We find here, once again, Varvara 
(she is now in charge of an orphanage), Aleksandr, and his wife, Kseniia.  Aleksandr is captured 
and executed by the Germans, but, as everyone knows, the empty spot is once again victorious in 
the battle that effectively decides the fate of Hitler’s eastern campaign.  Varvara takes one final 
walk before the ranks of victorious Red-Army soldiers shouting “Hurrah!”  Through a cut, the 
walk takes her to the very heart of the Kremlin, where the Father of all Soviet people greets her 
as his symbolic partner. 
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  The agency that brings Varvara to this symbolic apex is—with a nod in the direction of 
Lacan—the agency of the letter.163  She comes onto the stage of the narrative because she carries 
a letter.  But if we consider the situation more carefully, it is really the letter that carries her.  It is 
a sheet of paper, of whose contents she is initially unaware.  More importantly, even when she 
becomes aware of them, the significance of what is written in the letter remains outside her 
conscious grasp.  How could she know that the letter will mysteriously absorb and express in a 
single voice the grievances of the whole Soviet Union of the NEP years?  Varvara knows that 
she and the letter come from Tsaritsyn, but how could she possibly know that Tsaritsyn will turn 
out to be the right place, and that the word hailing from there will turn out to be the fullest, most 
meaningful Word?  How could she anticipate that this Word, capitally swollen by the unanimous 
recognition of all Soviet people, will exceed its intended function of informing and take on the 
function of a popular mandate legitimizing the political succession in the Kremlin?  Of all this, 
Varvara remains unaware.  These happenings outrun her consciousness.  They come to pass 
before her, that is, ahead of her cognizance and will, and, as they do, they direct her (subsequent) 
steps—they carry her.   
Varvara’s personal, biographical story is advanced by another, bigger, story that passes 
covertly underneath.  The former is “hitched” to the latter and, hence, as the latter unfolds, it 
“moves” the former along.  This mechanism accounts for the fact that Varvara’s life “happens,” 
that is—it comes to her from somewhere else.  At first, she happens to be the wife of Stepan, 
who happens to have fought alongside Stalin during the Civil War; as Stepan happens to die on 
                                                 
163 I am alluding both to the classic essay “The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud” 
(delivered first as a lecture in the Sorbonne on 9 May, 1957) and to Lacan’s famous reading of Edgar Alan Poe’s 
“Purloined Letter” in his seminar of 1954-1955, hosted by Société Française de Psychanalyse (see Seminar 191-
205).  In both texts Lacan emphasizes the independent and determinative workings of signification, the 
preponderance of its “material” aspect (the “letter,” the signifier) over its “ideal” counterpart (the intended meaning, 
the signified). 
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the very site of Stalin’s past exploits, Varvara happens to be chosen as a messenger (although her 
younger son would have been a more understandable choice); Lenin dies just when Varvara 
happens to be in Moscow; etc.  This logic is carried out with impeccable consistency in the 
film—not just in relation to Varvara, but in relation to all shiny, happy people.  With reference to 
all of them and to Stalinist culture as a whole we can advance the following semantic 
equivalence: “to be” means “to happen to be.” 
As far as narrative is concerned, this logic reminds us of times long past.  Similarly 
structured plots are to be found in the tragedies and mythic tales of classical antiquity.  There as 
well, the hero’s life is hitched to a larger, more essential story, which he either knows not at all 
or, as with Oedipus, fatefully misconstrues.  Archaic but indelible familial memory has marked 
the landscape of the hero’s journey and specifies its precipitous course, visibly for us, but 
unbeknownst to him.  It is his “fate.”  Although significantly modified, this type of narrative 
persisted in the hagiographic literature of the Middle Ages, where fate is to be found in the 
predetermined path that leads the righteous to their true Father.  But the modern period begins 
exactly where this circuitous route—from the pre-inscription of a mythic proto-story to its re-
inscription and reaffirmation through the fate of a particular “one”—is no longer capable of 
delineating the meaning of human experience.  The first great narrative of the new era, the 
biography of a lunatic knight errant, presents us with a desperate desire for the signs of 
predestination and a pathetic effort to tease these signs out of the barren landscape of a decidedly 
post-mythic land.  Precisely because of its failure, Don Quixote’s quest shows the only road that 
the hero can now take: because destiny is not predestined (in either scriptures of faith or books of 
chivalry), it must be constructed out of the hero’s own inwardness.    
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The possibility of providing a destiny for oneself is, from the beginning of this new 
beginning, coextensive with the power of giving oneself representations.  Although in Cervantez 
this power is equated with madness—since all it gives are misleading apparitions—eventually it 
will become normative.  In Hamlet already, madness springs not from the wanton self-giving of 
(illusory) representations, but precisely from the impossibility of doing so: the ghost that appears 
at the beginning is an apparition that Hamlet has not given to himself from within himself; and as 
much as he would like to believe that this is all an illusion, he cannot: like the sacred Father of 
medieval Christianity, the royal Danish father has bestowed absolutely binding destiny upon his 
child.   But this is now an unnatural, unexpected, and unwanted gift.  Since it cannot be refused, 
its acceptance brings derangement. 
The Vow returns us to that earlier moment when the hero’s steps were still “ordered by 
God,” who “delighteth in his way.”  What makes God so happy?  Certainly, the fact that the hero 
is a good man, i.e., a good subject, who walks the way pointed out by his master.  We can easily 
relate to a divinity that rejoices for subjects who have freely chosen to follow the steps to the 
True.  However, in our context, which is Stalinist culture, there is pleasure to be had precisely 
insofar as subjects do not choose their steps, but, rather, execute them in a somnambulic fashion.  
Much more than the conscious recognition by its subjects, this divinity enjoys the unconditional 
hegemony whereby they are driven to do what they do and be what they are.  It delights in their 
“creaturely” nature.  For the more unconsciously their being unfolds, the more emphatically it 
manifests and affirms the creation whose creatures they are, the order by which their steps have 
been ordered.  Precisely in the spot where it catches the subject unawares, this order shows itself 
as most actual. 
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We have an accessible reference point for understanding such a libido: Oedipus Rex.  The 
deities presiding over Oedipus’s fate are satisfied to see the prophesy fulfilled, but the real 
enjoyment comes from the hero’s wriggling: the hopeless effort to evade destiny, an effort whose 
every motion only con-firms the firmness of the grip.  With every conscious step toward escape, 
Oedipus unconsciously realizes what was meant to be.  The same extended act through which he 
shows himself as a pathetic plaything of predestination, arouses, at each stage and ultimately, the 
ancient story of familial sin.  By the same token, the act arouses the power through which this sin 
is being punished, instantiating it as the Power that be. 
Keeping this famous archetype in mind, let us ask what is being aroused in the act that we 
watch unfold in the narrative space of The Vow?  Enough has been said so far to make the terms 
of the question less flippant than they may seem.  The sexual rhetoric is there to suggest that, 
even on the scale of socio-cultural formations, we are still dealing with desire (which appears in 
the twin shape of an impersonal “needing” and the personal desire for being “part”).  But, as I am 
seeking to co-articulate this problematic with the theme of creation, of building, giving shape, 
institutionalizing, terms like “arousal” and “erection” acquire a two-dimensional significance 
(and, so I shall hope, evade the charge of frivolity).  As before, we are asking about the figure of 
order (truth) that figures out, or is constituted, in the same motion in which “one” comes to count 
for something.  And so: what is aroused in The Vow? 
The easy answer is: “Stalin.”  And as long as we understand what “Stalin” stands for, this 
would be also the right answer.   
In The Vow, unlike in the other Chiaureli films in the cinematic tetralogy devoted to the 
Leader, Stalin appears in two distinct hypostases.  On the one hand, he is there “in the flesh,” as 
an actual living person; although, of course, not by any means an ordinary person.  He is just as 
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Nikita Khrushchev will describe him later, in his secret speech to the Twentieth Congress of the 
Communist Party: “a superman possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god.  
Such a man […] knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is 
infallible in his behavior.”  This image is familiar.  We find it, essentially, in every film or text of 
the period in which the Leader makes an appearance.   
On the other hand, however—and this is where Pavlenko and Chiaureli’s mythography 
becomes truly radical—the Leader exists as a trace: a proto-story that has been inscribed in the 
diegetic landscape, creating in it a patch of sacred space—Stalingrad.  The whole point of there 
being a trace is that it should be retraced: ordinary heroes are made to retread the ground once 
trodden by Stalin.  As they do, they arouse the sacred charge suffusing the seemingly empty spot 
and experience its miraculous effects.164  Having become “conductors” of this charge, our heroes 
begin to “shine.”  Another way of describing the same occurrence is: through the agency of the 
sacred trace, their lives “happen.” 
Given that “Stalin” is the name for two quite different things—a living person (even if a 
superman) and a trace circumscribing an empty spot—it would be prudent to inquire which thing 
deserves the priority of consideration?  Which of the two is the essential, authentic referent of 
“Stalin,” the one we need to foreground in order to authentically understand the phenomenon 
called “Stalinism”?   
If we go by a straightforward logic, we must conclude: first comes the person who leaves 
the trace, then comes the trace left by him (Stalin comes along, defeats the Whites; from that 
point on, the place of his exploits is marked as a “sacred” one).  Following the same logic, only 
                                                 
164 An identical logic is found at work in the ritualistic traditions of many indigenous cultures. Particular places 
within the tribal territory are associated with the archetypal journey of the ancestor (cultural hero).  This trajectory is 
retraced and the places revisited during holiday celebrations, when specific rituals serve to evoke the memory of 
mythic times, as they also evoke, for quite “practical” purposes, the energy of the ancestral loci.  See, for example, 
Durkheim 330-40. 
  
 247
this time in the direction of opprobrium rather than adulation, subsequent Soviet historiography 
was to script the historical and cultural trauma of Stalinism: as the trace (scar!) left by a 
particular human being, named “Stalin.”  The phrase “cult of personality,” first used in 
Khrushchev’s secret speech, sloganizes this type of understanding, in which much of cold-war 
Western historiography is also complicit. 
Without disputing the fact that the Leader’s personality left a significant imprint on 
policies in virtually every sphere of Soviet life, including the artistic (one thinks first of the film 
industry, which produced Stalin’s favorite art and was, to that extent, most consistently 
influenced by his tastes), I see this fact as belonging to a secondary, derivative dimension.  The 
excessively inflated importance of one person’s word should be treated as a consequence of the 
place this person has come to occupy.  The place, for its part, should be treated within a 
fundamental understanding of the power that constitutes Stalinist Soviet culture. 
 We are familiar with the power in question.  It is the power of cannot-but, of the meant-
to-be, of pure fulfillment.  And there is probably no text from the Stalinist period that showcases 
it more vividly than The Vow.  After all, it is the story of a vow.  And a vow, as we know, is 
something that must be fulfilled.  This, really, is the main movement of the narrative: from the 
word given to making it happen, from the course charted to its execution, from the delineation of 
an empty space to the erection that comes to stand there.  For all these ful-fill-ments, “Stalin” is 
just as much the name of the heroic leader whom we watch in action on the grand stage of 
history, the personage through whose wisdom and will everything is accomplished, as it is the 
name of a mysterious agency guaranteeing in advance that everything will be so indeed. 
The distinct character of Stalinist culture resides in the fact that this power of making 
things happen is abstracted from the doings of people and the making of things.  Whether it is 
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verbalized and made sense of as the “energy of the proletariat,” the “power of socialism,” the 
“leading tendency of our life,” or the “general line of our development,” it is thought and lived as 
a separate entity.165  Not only that: people’s deeds count as such only to the extent to which they 
exhibit the workings of this power.  But this really means: only to the extent to which they show 
themselves as the creatures whose actions come to them from somewhere else, whose life, 
datively, happens to them.  The work of “representing” (Darstellung) should be considered as a 
particular instance of this general situation.  In this particular “deed,” as in others, the possibility 
of counting as “one” is antinomic to the meaning of autonomous accomplishment and, hence, to 
the possibility of genuine authorship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 For a further elaboration of this thesis, see Conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION: THE MANA OF STALINISM 
 
 
A fair number of the speakers at the First Congress of Soviet Writers tried to capture in words 
the unique characteristic distinguishing the world in which they happened to live, its peculiar 
“truth” or “reality.”  Some, as we have seen, spoke of it in terms of a line—the unbending 
“general line” (general'naia liniia) that led Soviet society forward.  Others—in terms of a 
“tendency.”  Still others defined it as partiinost', a party spirit or principle, which could be felt 
even in mere breathing.166  Or could it be that its name was simply “heroism”?  There were 
those, like Aleksandr Fadeev, who preferred a more dynamic idiom and called it (as Gor'kii had 
done in the article referenced earlier)167 as the “force of socialism” (233).  Erenburg said that the 
truth of the present day is easy to feel but difficult to define: “like the blueness of the colorless 
sky, like the sound of a quiet August midday” (182).  Finally, there was one Iu. Iuzovskii, who 
found it necessary to invent a new chemical substance in order to describe this quality.  Like 
many of his colleagues had done, he pointed to the space, both imaginary and real, which began 
where the audience of writers ended, the space before them:  
But comrades, you need to take a step higher […].  You see: before you stands the 
resplendent society of real people [nastoiashchie liudi], people like Stalin, 
                                                 
166 From the speech of B. S. Romashov: “In our country the very air is saturated with partiinost', and he who does 
not breathe this air does not breathe fully.  We have in mind not just the formal membership in the Party.  We have 
in mind the special feeling of vital interests, the nearness of the wished-for goal, the happiness of labor, the 
simplicity and profundity of human communication, the reality of tomorrow’s day in the present one” (427). 
 
167 See pp. 152-53. 
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Molokov, Schmidt, Frankfurt, Vinter, the kolkhoz worker Smirnova; I am not 
talking about [their] degree of genius; I am talking about the molecules of the 
socialist principle, the molecules of “stalinite,” which are to be found in them 
(467). 
From the protean indefinability noted by Erenburg to the metallic consistency formulated 
by Iuzovskii something palpably hardens, takes shape, figures out of the indeterminate and into a 
separate existence.  Eventually, we come to witness a modern instance of what anthropology has 
known after Robert H. Codrington’s 1891 description of native Melanesian customs under the 
name mana: a mystical element that mediates the collective’s total being.  Whether, in the 
present case, we call it “stalinite” or any of the other names proposed, it is more or less the same 
thing: a common thing, something shared, an imaginary substance that allows a culture’s 
ontological content to be apportioned and distributed (“imaginary”—to reaffirm an earlier 
insistence—does not mean vaporously fictional and, thus, inconsequential).  The advantage 
afforded by Iuzovskii’s neologism is that it allows us to visualize more easily this Stalinist mana 
as what it is actually: a currency, a carrier of value.  “Stalinite” is the material from which this 
currency is “minted.”  It has been established already that it is a shiny substance.  It has also been 
established that, like any currency, it is distributed unevenly: some have more of it—some 
“people like Stalin, Molokov, Schmidt, Frankfurt, Vinter, the kolkhoz worker Smirnova,” which 
is exactly what makes them the shiny, happy people that they are.  Others, like the writers 
Iuzovskii is addressing, are enjoined to step forward and partake of what they are lacking.  When 
they do, they will “count for something.”  For what?  We have finally given it a name: stalinite is 
that very “something” for which the many count as “ones.”  It is the substance in which their 
value is fixed.  But still, what is it? 
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Is it not simply an imaginary extract of Stalin’s haloed being, given that it is, quite 
obviously, christened with a verbal extract of his name?  The argument at the end of the last 
chapter allows me to assert without much ado: it is just the other way around.  Despite the fact 
that it takes its name from the person, stalinite takes precedence over Stalin.  The latter simply is 
perceived to have (inordinately) “more of it” than other people but, principally, he, like them, is 
determined by, rather than determinative of, the ultimate social value that is being distributed.   
Žižek makes a similar point by considering two opposite mechanisms of nicknaming: 
Let us take two individuals […]: Charles ‘Lucky’ Luciano and Iosif 
Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili “Stalin.”  In the first case the nickname tends to 
replace the first name (we usually speak simply of “Lucky Luciano”), while in the 
second it regularly replaces the family name (“Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin”).  In 
the first case the nickname alludes to some extraordinary event which has marked 
the individual (Chales Luciano was “lucky” to have survived the savage torture of 
his gangster enemies)—it alludes, that is, to a positive descriptive feature which 
fascinates us; it marks something that sticks out on the individual, something that 
offers itself to our gaze, something seen, not the point from which we observe the 
individual. 
However, in the case of Iosif Vissarionovich, it would be entirely erroneous to 
conclude […] that “Stalin” (Russian for “[made] of steel”] alludes to some steely, 
inexorable characteristic of Stalin himself: what is really steely are the laws of the 
historical progress, the iron necessity of the disintegration of capitalism and of the 
passage to socialism in the name of which Stalin, this empirical individual, is 
acting […]. (Sublime 108) 
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Looking at it from this perspective we should say that the person Stalin is a function of his 
nickname, insofar as, before being given to the individual, the nickname already alludes to the 
“sublime” substance that mediates the social whole.     
It could well be that every culture, if we just looked closer, could be found to possess 
something of this sort, in a more or less explicit form, its own particular mana.  This is where 
people’s total effort of making a world for themselves receives the properties of a solid.  
Subsequently, it may be vested in the more definite shape of an idol, god, monuments, 
institutions, or a short, swarthy Georgian with a moustache.  In these figures, the substance may 
find its privileged embodiment, but not its source.  And the primary goal of cultural analysis—if 
it is to be deserving of its name—is to analyze the way back to the authentic source.  It must 
“liquefy” the figure’s appearance of solidity and trace it to its original state.   
Asking, in principle, what this original state might look like, I proposed that we think of 
it as a certain “state of affairs.”   Then I proceeded to develop the proposition into a basic 
theoretical understanding of the cultural act, suggesting that the primary state of affairs is the 
intercourse of mattering and manning out of which truth-reality and identity-belonging take 
place.  This is where and how mana is made.  This is also where and how people are made as 
concrete members of [X], as “ones.”   And yet, for the most part, the picture we see in the realm 
of culture is completely different.  Rather than the primary relationship of mattering and 
manning, in which human desire (or, better, “desirousness”) is inextricably united to the 
possibility of (or, from the other side of the same coin, the void in) truth, we see “men” in an 
external relationship to some sublime “matter.”  The latter appears not as something made, but as 
something given.  And, as given, it is something of which subsequently men may partake.  
  
 253
Within this general understanding, the case of the Stalinist mana is quite special.  The 
grand historical mission of Soviet society was to create, at the hither end of history, a world in 
which man will finally be reunited to his own creation; where this creation, existing for so long 
in the unrecognizable forms of alien objecthood, will finally reflect back to man his authentic 
image, so that he may recognize himself in what he does and know himself in the dignity of a 
first and last Creator.  We now know that something completely different took place.  This 
sublime truth of man’s historical existence formulated by Marxism became internally alienated 
from itself.  Its content was eclipsed by its form; its ground proved weightier than the living 
thing it grounded.  The vacuous, “stupid” movement of predictive necessity was abstracted from 
and triumphed over the concrete existence that this necessity was to bring about.  Rather than a 
matter of dignified human labor, emancipation, and spiritual enrichment, Stalinist socialism—at 
its deepest foundation—showed itself to be a matter of certainty.  In this sense, the briefest 
definition of stalinite would be just this: certainty in the form of matter, a reification of the empty 
cannot-but.  
This is how Arendt understands the process of formalization taking place within 
totalitarian cultures:  
What distinguished these new totalitarian ideologists [Stalin and Hitler] from 
their predecessors was that it was no longer primarily the “idea” of the ideology—
the struggle of classes and the exploitation of the workers or the struggle of races 
and the care for the Germanic peoples—which appealed to them, but the logical 
process which could be developed from it.  According to Stalin, neither the idea 
nor the oratory but “the irresistible force of logic thoroughly overpowered 
[Lenin’s] audience.”  The power, which Marx thought was born when the idea 
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seized the masses, was discovered to reside, not in the idea itself, but in its logical 
process which “like a mighty tentacle seizes you on all sides as in a vise and from 
whose grip you are powerless to tear yourself away; you must either surrender or 
make up your mind to utter defeat.”168  Only when the realization of the 
ideological aims, the classless society or the master race, was at stake, could this 
force show itself.  In the process of realization, the original substance upon which 
the ideologies based themselves as long as they had to appeal to the masses—the 
exploitation of the workers or the national aspirations of Germany—is gradually 
lost, devoured as it were by the process itself […].  It is in the nature of 
ideological politics—and is not simply a betrayal committed for the sake of self-
interest or lust for power—that the real content of the ideology (the working class 
or the Germanic peoples), which originally had brought about the “idea” (the 
struggle of classes as the law of history or the struggle of races as the law of 
nature), is devoured by the logic with which the idea is carried out. (472) 
This lengthy passage illustrates perfectly how inadequate it is to discuss totalitarianism in 
terms of an ideological movement.  Everything takes place in the realm of ideas.  Ideas first have 
content, through which they “appeal to the masses” and keep them under an illusory spell.  When 
the masses are recruited for the ideological project, ideas begin mysteriously to lose their 
content, retaining only the bare contours of logic.  At this point, we must assume, the masses are 
already caught in the vicious mechanism, which makes it irrelevant whether they believe in the 
“beautiful lies” or not.  We are told that logical formalism is somehow inherent in totalitarian 
dictatorships, but we are never told how such a feature comes into existence.  In one moment, we 
                                                 
168 The quotation comes from Stalin’s speech of January 28, 1924, delivered on the occasion of Lenin’s death at a 
memorial meeting of the Kremlin Military School.  The statement belongs not to Stalin, but to a delegate at the 
Bolshevik conference in Tammerfors, Finland (1905), whom Stalin is quoting. 
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are made to think that this formalism is hardly more than the private obsession of individuals like 
Stalin and Hitler, an idiosyncrasy that then spreads through the “movement” on the wings of the 
leader’s charisma.  In the next moment, however, the evacuation of content is spoken of as an 
immanent development of the curious entity called “ideological politics.”  Having triumphed and 
installed itself in power, the politics in question resorts to war and terror in order to implement 
not so much the idea, as its iron “logicality.”  Since the gigantic and bloody undertaking is not 
driven by self-interest or lust for power—one of Arendt’s most astute observations—nor by the 
willing support of the people, we are left to ponder a strange metaphysical region in which 
schematic rationality exists as a self-generated and self-sustained Power, before descending upon 
human history and turning it into a landscape of carnage, fear, and moral debasement .169 
The alternative to this metaphysics of logicality is to recognize that the abstraction of the 
form of necessity from any concrete content accomplished in totalitarian cultures is more than an 
ideal, ratiocinative moment.  This abstraction is real: it is an actual movement, whose field is not 
just the minds of “isolated men,” but the cultural-historical being of the Western world.  It is 
something concretely “made” in the cultural process.  This is none other than the “making” we 
have been following all along, the cultural production that has as one of its final products the 
hardened stuff of stalinite. 
A possibly traumatic thought waits for us behind this recognition, making it that much 
more tempting to turn away from it and seek to repress it.  For where we take seriously what 
                                                 
169 On the following page, Arendt goes so far as to suggest that logicality is the intellectual equivalent of totalitarian 
terror (!): “The tyranny of logicality begins with the mind’s submission to logic as a never-ending process, on which 
man relies in order to engender his thoughts.  By this submission, he surrenders his inner freedom as he surrenders 
his freedom of movement when he bows down to an outward tyranny. [....]  The compulsion of total terror on one 
side, which, with its iron band, presses masses of isolated men together and supports them in a world which has 
become a wilderness for them, and the self-coercive force of logical deduction on the other, which prepares each 
individual in his lonely isolation against all others, correspond to each other and need each other in order to set the 
terror-ruled movement into motion and keep it moving.  Just as terror, even in its pre-total, merely tyrannical form 
ruins all relationships between men, so the self-compulsion of ideological thinking ruins all relationships with 
reality” (473-74; emphasis in the original). 
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Stalinism shows us—the image of historical truth as the empty enclosure of certainty—we are in 
danger of finding something out about human being.  If we admit that this was not the work of 
despots obsessed with logical consistency, but of many people—not maniacs, not degenerates, 
not creatures trembling for their lives, but just people—we might ask whether human being is not 
the very emptiness that fills out and sustains the enclosure.  If we take seriously what we 
discover in the various rituals of Stalinist culture—that “reality” is subordinate to the enacted 
certainty of a meant-to-be “realization” or “fulfillment”—we might also question the correlative 
term of this reality: human identity, selfhood.   What if these, likewise, do not presuppose any 
determinate content available in advance, but are, rather, the precarious after-effects of an 
initially blind motion of surrender?  What if the self’s existential “fulfillment” or “realization” 
has nothing to do with the controlled cultivation and manifestation of some primary potential and 
is more in the nature of a spontaneous “spilling” by which a pre-existent blank spot gets filled?170 
The real trauma of Stalinism is not, as Arendt impresses upon us in several dramatic 
passages, that people could be made to say and do anything in the face of never-before-seen 
forms of terror.  This is a tragedy to which we can still relate.  Much more disturbing is to think 
that people could say and do anything without any terror whatsoever.  When one reads 
Feuchtwagner’s description of Piatakov’s confession,171 the chilling sensation comes not from 
the fact that here we have a human being whose body and spirit has been broken in the torture 
chambers of KGB.  This was most probably the case, but something quite different strikes us: the 
                                                 
170 The last questions could be asked with equal relevance, if in a less dramatic tone, from the territory of 
contemporary Western capitalism, where “self-realization” has become hardly more than a vacuous marketing 
slogan of a world in which the human endeavor is cut up and pre-formatted into discreet “fields,” “careers,” and 
“positions.”  On this territory, to “realize oneself” means to fill one of these compartmentalized vacancies and 
execute with unique personal diligence and “creativity” the actions through which the “work” works you.  Could it 
be that rationalization in the service of economic efficiency is the Western counterpart to the totalitarian 
formalization in the service of symbolic efficiency?    
 
171 See note 141.  
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conviction, even ambition, with which Piatakov presents his case, his almost pedantic attitude.  
There is some quiet madness here for which words have not been found yet, whose tone is 
nothing like the shudder of physical perdition or the desperate cry in the face of the absurd.   For 
a second we begin to suspect that no physical manipulation, no matter how terrible, can produce 
such a state.  And even if the second is brief, we may wonder: what if Piatakov was less 
concerned with saving his life and much more invested in stitching as tightly as possible the 
fabric of criminal causality (regardless of the fact that the criminal was no one but himself), so 
that everything would have its proper explanation and fit neatly with the rest?  It is impossible to 
answer this question.  But I also find it impossible to pretend it was never suggested.   
Whatever may be the reasons behind the impression Piatakov created, Stalinism forces us 
to ask: is human being, in its primordial definition, not just this function of stitching—the 
holding-together that vanishes in the folds of an implemented order of things (no matter how 
precarious this order may be)?  And, if so, could it be that the self-images convincing us of our 
substantiality are just the evanescent (and posterior) appearances of this fundamental 
disappearance?  What if the so-called “human subject” refers not at all to the author, the artist 
who “creates” the picture, but rather to that which, from out of the picture’s own surface (i.e., 
from within the dimension of the object), gives consistency to the picture? 
On a couple of occasions already I referred to Descartes’s famous formula.  Since the 
signal word “certainty” has reappeared, it is only fitting that the formula be re-invoked for one 
last time here, at the end of this study.  Let us say, in very simple terms, that, sitting by the 
fireplace one day and haunted by the demons of doubt, Descartes wanted to convince himself 
that he genuinely exists, that he is.  Let us also say, that he managed to convince himself by 
concluding: “If I doubt, I cannot but be.”  This much we know.  The debate is ongoing, however, 
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on what was more important to Descartes: that he be, or that he be convinced?  What is the 
relationship between being and certainty, between “I am” and the “cannot-but”?  Is certainty 
only a moment provisional to being, which, once attained, lets a now self-assured being take care 
of more important things (studying nature, for example).  Or is it just the other way around: that 
sum is nothing but certainty rolled up into (a seeming) presence, the substantive sum-mation of 
the ratio’s very motion?  What is primary here: substance or substantiation?  Even if it is 
conceded that on that particular evening Descartes was more concerned with the latter, we can 
still hold that, in principle, the security he sought is just the beginning, the foundation for what 
comes later.  And what comes later, of course, is concrete content: the determinate thoughts 
through which this being, now that he has thought himself into certainty of himself, will know 
the world.  If we believe that this is indeed the case, we may pass lightly over the startling fact 
that the self designated by sum is rather abstract; it is not a concrete, existing individual; it is 
simply a figure of certainty.172  We could maintain that this twilight hour when Descartes had 
abstracted himself from his body, armchair, and fireplace, from everything existent, so that 
thinking may apprehend itself thinking, is just that: a brief “abstract” moment, which serves only 
to return him more confident to the fullness of concrete existence.  But could it be, in reverse, 
that the human being, so concretely seated in the armchair in front of the fireplace, is actually 
abstract in relation to the movement in which certainty is generated?   
From the opposite end of the modern period, and in a realm quite different from that of 
philosophical reflection, Stalinism asks us to consider the latter possibility.  In this realm, as I 
have argued, the concrete human being encounters his/her own sum—in the specific socio-
historical variation of sum Sovieticus—as an empty stead within the production of “socialism,” 
                                                 
172 In Hegel’s commentary on the Meditations: “‘I’ has […] significance here as thought and not as individuality of 
self-consciousness” (227).  And a bit further: “‘I’ is just certainty itself […].” (232)                                                                                  
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which is, first and foremost, the reification of necessity and the production of certainty.  The 
concrete thoughts and deeds of this human being can “count” only to the extent to which they 
show themselves to be the out-comes of a necessary becoming and, thus—the concrete 
reaffirmations of certainty.  But this means: human being gets its content from the in-itself-
empty movement of cannot-but.  Continuing this line of thought, we can give a more 
comprehensive formulation of the Stalinist mana: stalinite is the object in which socio-historical 
being shows itself as produced by its own form of necessity; it is where substantiation wraps 
itself in its motion and comes to count as the ultimate substance.  
Although not philosophical, a certain type of reflection is at work here as well.  It does 
not occur, strictly speaking, in the mind, but outside, in social space.  Its mechanism can be 
grasped on the example of the shaman’s behavior.173  When he enters his ecstatic state, the 
shaman implements practically a kind of “reflection.”  The possession he exhibits demonstrates 
not only that he is a real shaman, but also—and this is the more important part—that the spirits 
are still with the tribe.  This fact, which is constitutive of the social union, is “reflected” in the 
performance.  It is there, in the open.  It shows.  Its “factuality” or, simply, reality, is established 
in the same “happening” in which the identity of the shaman as shaman is also established.  
These are the collateral products of a single act.  The same type of reflection is implemented in 
the act that defines Stalinist culture.  As I have argued, it too centers on a peculiar form of 
possession.  The subject must show himself as being-driven (in fact, this is what would make 
him a subject, what would make him count).  The act “reflects” the fact that the laws of history 
are still “behind us” (za nami), and—an important qualification—not so much their content, as 
their pure form as laws: their “lawfulness,” that is, predictability, device-like automatism, 
efficiency as such. 
                                                 
173 For what remains the best study of shamanism to date, see Eliade.  
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Where is this reflection directed?  Wherein does it reflect?  Whose eyes does the show 
satisfy?  Memories or old reels of the lavish public spectacles of official Soviet culture remind us 
that there are always luminary guests in attendance.  From a tribune, sometimes especially 
erected for the occasion, they observe the festivities and wave to the participants.  Such events 
were appropriately called “demonstrations” (demonstratsii) or “manifestations” (manifestatsii), 
for they demonstrated the plentitude resulting from history’s ongoing self-fulfillment (of which 
the over-fulfillments of production norms and Five-Year Plans were only an “epiphenomenal” 
extension).   From this well-familiar arrangement, we might conclude that the show is produced 
for the eyes of power.  But this would be a hasty conclusion, overlooking the fact that the show 
is the production of power.  As with the shaman’s ecstasy, the act is what “materializes” the 
presence of the sublime (even if it appears that it only provides evidence of the sublime’s eternal 
existence).  The elevated structure on which the representatives of power are standing, seemingly 
erected before the demonstration began, is in fact erected in it.  
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